After the victory of Gangut the Russian fleet, which now enjoyed free rein in the western skerries of Finland, reached Abo and occupied the Aland Islands. This greatly lifted
morale and considerably stiffened the fighting spirit of the Russian troops. Gangut was given the name “Poltava at Sea” and its anniversary (July 27) became a
celebrated tradition in the Russian Navy.
The year 1715 was marked by new Russian victories in the Northern War. The squadron of Captain Pyotr Bredal, three frigates and a snow captured three Swedish ships during a
desperate fight in the open sea. In response, the Swedes attempted to engage the Russian ships at Revel, but failed. New victories nearly always meant new allies. Thus, England and
Holland, interested in seaborne trade with Russia, sent a large convoy of merchant vessels and an escort squadron to the Baltic. Exploiting his success and the favorable position
it gave him, Peter next decided to organize an allied Russian-Danish landing at Sconia, a southern province of Sweden.
In the summer of 1716 the Russian fleet, now concentrated off the Danish coast, was joined by Danish, British and Dutch ships. The allied armada was under the command of Peter
I, who hoisted his ensign on the stellar ship of the Russian fleet, the 64-gun Ingermanland. The Russian force included frigates, small cruisers and eighteen ships of the line.
The allied armada set sail for Bronholm. Fearing that engagement with such a strong fleet would prove unsuccessful, the Swedes blockaded themselves in Karlskrona. Although final
victory was at hand, considerable discord prevented the allies from bringing their mission to a successful conclusion. The summer of 1716 was not blessed by victory: the landing
operation in Sweden did not take place, and the Northern War continued.
Moreover, Charles XII died in December 1718, putting an end to the peace negotiations which had already begun. England, now anxious over the obvious strengthening of
Russia’s position in the Baltic, took up the side of the Swedes and volunteered to defend their interests with the backing of the English fleet.
It was difficult to stop the Russian forces which, by this time, were firmly established in the Baltic. The Russian fleet had become so powerful that it could now challenge the
Swedish fleet on the open sea. In May 1719 Captain Naum Sinyavin left Revel with a group of six ships of the line and a snow to intercept a Swedish unit. On 24 May, the adversaries
met not far from Osel Island. Sinyavin, aboard the 52-gun Portsmouth, supported by Captain Konon Zotov on the Devonshire, resolutely attacked the flagship of Swedish Commodore
Wrangel. In the fierce fight that ensued, the Portsmouth, despite the loss of sails, managed to hit the 34-gun Swedish frigate Karlskrona Vapen with a fore-and-aft salvo, forcing
her to surrender. When the Swedish flagship, the 52-gun ship of the line Wachtmeister, attempted to escape from the Russians, Captain Iakov Shapizo commanding the Raphail and
Lieutenant-Commander John Delyap of the Hyagudiil were sent in pursuit. The bloody ensuing fight continued until the Russians overcame the Swedish flagship and forced her to strike
her colours. Aboard the captured ships were approximately 110 killed and wounded. Sinyavin’s feat went down in history, and the battle of Osel Island became the first victory
of the Russian fleet on the open sea.
Sinyavin was himself promoted to the rank of Captain-Commodore.
Ships involved
Russia
Devonshire 52
Portsmouth 52
Raphail 52
Uriil 52
Varachail 52
Hyagudiil 52
Natalia 18
Sweden
Wachtmeister 52 – Captured
Karlskrona Vapen 30 – Captured
Bernhardus 10 – Captured
The following year the Swedes attempted to strengthen their position in the waters of the Aland Archipelago. However, the attempt resulted in defeat for Sweden. At the end of
July 1720 near Grengam Island the galley fleet of General Mikhail Golitsyn engaged the detachment of Vice-Admiral Eric Sjoblad. Sixty-one Russian galleys and twenty-nine island
boats set out against a Swedish ship of the line, four frigates and several smaller craft. Yielding to the enemy’s superior artillery power, Golitsin’s fleet retreated
to the skerries. The Swedes started in pursuit of the Russian vessels, but Golitsyn, a shrewd and experienced officer, enticed the enemy into a disadvantageous position and seized
his opportunity. The granite coastal boulders, in effect, came to Golitsyn’s aid; two Swedish frigates were run against them, seized and boarded. The Swedes realized their
mistake and began to retreat, but it was already too late. The Russian galleys chased the Swedish vessels and in a savage fight succeeded in defeating two more frigates. An attempt
was made to overtake the flagship of the Swedish force, and Admiral Sjoblad himself was fortunate to escape on the damaged 52-gun Pommern.
The Battle of Grengam, 1720 by Ferdinand Victor Perrot. The Battle of Grengam of 1720 was the last major naval battle in the Great Northern War that took place in
the Åland Islands, in the Ledsund strait between the island communities of Föglö and Lemland. The battle marked the end of Russian and Swedish offensive naval operations in Baltic
waters. The Russian fleet conducted one more raid on the Swedish coast in spring 1721, whereupon the Treaty of Nystad was signed, ending the war.
The Battle of Grengam in the skerries became an important page in the history of the Russian fleet. The Swedish 34-gun frigate Stor Phoenix, the 30-gun Vainqueur, the 22-gun
Kiskin and the 18-gun Danska Orn were all taken captive. The Russian forces suffered losses of 285, while the Swedes recorded 510 casualties.
In 1721, the final year of the Great Northern War, Russian galleys ravaged towns along the coast of Sweden in a series of raids. It was now clear that the Kingdom of Sweden was
no longer the dominant power in the Baltic Sea, a position the Swedes had enjoyed since the days of the Vikings.
Ingermanland 64 (“Ингерманланд”, 1715) – memorial ship 1724, BU after 1739. Ingermanland is a Russian tsar sailing battleship. It marks the beginning of
Russia’s great plan for ship construction. It was constructed in 1712, launched in 1715 and became the flagship of Peter the Great in the campaigns of 1716 and 1721 during
the Great Northern War. It has a 46.02 meter and 12.8 meter wide deck and 5.56 meter hull height.
A Russian Galley of 1719 Campaign: these big beasts were 40m (130ft) in length, 7m (23ft) abreast and 1.5m (5ft) deep, and included 25 pairs of oars, 2-4 guns, 90
crew and 200 soldiers. They could make five knots by oar.
Peter I was also devoted to the modernization of most aspects of Russian national life. He began with the military, building the Navy essentially from scratch to a force that at
his death boasted fully 36 ships-of-the-line, 86 additional significant warships (frigates and galleys), and 280 support vessels. So dedicated was Peter to the Russian Navy that he
made chopping down an oak tree a capital offense, and he also punished the collection of forest windfalls, reserving all hardwood for ship-building. He imported hundreds of foreign
artisans, engineers, and mercenaries and sent Russian nobles abroad to study.
With its brackish waters, indented shoreline and lack of tides, the Baltic is more of a vast inland lake than a real ocean, making for difficult sailing and navigation
conditions. A semi-Arctic climate imposes yet further restrictions upon sailing fleets and their use. It took all the iron will and determination of Tsar Peter the Great to found
the Russian Navy in 1705 with the naval base at Kronstadt, on the Gulf of Finland. To outflank Swedish defences in Finland, Peter built a powerful galley fleet to combine with his
new Europeanized army in amphibious operations.
Galleys were cheap and easy to mass produce, could easily be manned by sailors and did not require experienced naval officers to command them. Furthermore in the Baltic, like
the Mediterranean Sea, the winds were often fickle and the oar was often superior to the sail. The Petrine galley measured 40m (130ft) in length, 7m (23ft) in width, had a shallow
draft of only 1.5m (5ft) and was equipped with 2-4 heavy guns and 18 lighter mounted guns. With a crew of 90 sailors and 200 troops manning 24 pairs of oars, the galley could make
a speed of five knots, weather and sea permitting. The hold had enough room for 30 horses, although the crew had to sleep on shore during the night. The effort expended on the
galley fleet was vindicated when the Russians defeated a Swedish fleet at Gangut (Hangö Head) in August 1714, paving the way for an outright Russian occupation of Finland.
Battle of Gangut, (July 27/August 7, 1714) (in Swedish, the Battle of Hangö), a naval battle near the Hangö Peninsula between the Russian and Swedish fleets during the Northern
War of 1700-21.
In 1714 a Russian galley fleet under the command of Admiral-General F. M. Apraksin (99 galleys and scampavias [small galleys], with an amphibious landing force of 15,000) was
sent to the Åbo-Åland reefs (skerries) to effect a landing. However, the Russian flotilla that left Kronstadt on May 9 was forced to stop at Tvärminne because the further route was
barred by the Swedish battle fleet (15 battleships and 14 smaller ships) of Vice-admiral Wattrang. In order to bypass the Swedish ships in the southern extremity of the Hangö
Peninsula, it was decided to create a portage on the narrow part of the isthmus and to drag the galleys across and into the rear of the main forces of the Swedish fleet. The Swedes
sent a detachment under Rear Admiral Ehrensköld (one frigate, six galleys, and three skerry boats) toward one end of the portage and another detachment under Rear Admiral Lillje
(eight battleships and three other ships) to Tvärminne in order to attack the Russian flotilla.
Taking advantage of the division of the Swedish forces and of the calm, Peter I decided to break through along the shore. On July 26 the Russian vanguard (35 scampavias)
bypassed Hangö Peninsula on oars and blockaded Ehrensköld’s detachment in Rilaks Fiord; on July 27 it was joined by the main forces. On July 27 the vanguard attacked Ehrensköld’s
detachment, which surrendered after a stubborn battle. The Swedes lost ten ships with 116 guns; 361 men were killed, 350 wounded, and 237 captured, including Ehrensköld. On July 28
the Swedish fleet withdrew to the Åland Islands. The Gangut battle, which was the first major naval victory of the Russian fleet over a strong enemy, ensured domination over all
Finland to the Russian troops. In memory of the victory, a medal was instituted and a monument erected on the shore at Rilaks Fiord.
The following year the Danish fleet blockading Stralsund defeated the Swedish fleet, enabling an allied amphibious force to capture a key offshore position, sealing the fate of
the fortress. These operations were supported by a British fleet which had entered the Baltic with the Dutch to protect their commerce against Swedish privateers. The new king of
Britain, George I, was also Elector of Hanover, and his continental ambitions gave a new importance to the Baltic. Charles had hoped the privateers would deny Russia any economic
benefit from the recently conquered Baltic provinces, but Britain and Holland would not allow the supply of naval stores to be interrupted. In 1716 Danish warships destroyed the
Swedish galley fleet in the Sound, crippling Charles XII’s attempt to invade Norway.
Less than five years later, Peter gathered a massive galley fleet in the Åland archipelago. His aim was to capture the Swedish capital of Stockholm. The Swedish sailing fleet
would be unable to pursue the shallow-drafted galleys and would be immobilized by the lack of wind power. Numbering almost 270 vessels, including 40 ships of the line and 123
galleys, the Russian fleet set sail in late July 1719 with 26,000 troops on board.The aim was to land near Stockholm with one corps while the rest of the fleet laid waste to the
long easterly Swedish coastline. The coastal raids ravaged the towns and settlements, leaving thousands of Swedes without homes. However, the great fear for the Swedes was that the
capital could be reached via the narrow and shallow Stäket Sound.To prevent this, the Swedes placed a floating artillery pråm (battery deck) at the northern exit of the Staket
Sound and three heavily armed galleys in the middle passage.At the eastern entry to Staket, where the Russians were expected, the Swedes built defensive works mounted by stakes and
a gun battery, and manned by 500 troops. On 13 August 1719, 7000 Russian troops landed as expected at Staket but were halted and driven back by a stout Swedish defence. This may
have saved Stockholm, but the Russians captured the Baltic provinces with their ports at Riga, Reval, Pernau and Viborg, in addition to Kronstadt.
In 1719 Russian galleys landed troops to ravage the Stockholm region and, after Charles XII’s death, a Danish amphibious force bombarded and captured the Swedish fleet and
base at Marstrand, wiping out Swedish communications for operations in Norway. The same year Britain made peace with Sweden, and tried to remove Russian influence from north
Germany in order to re-establish a Baltic balance. The former policy was successful, but the latter proved impossible. Sweden was now too weak and isolated to return to the front
rank of European states. However, a British battle fleet and the Swedish galleys were able to restrict Russian naval activity between 1719 and 1721, when the Peace of Nystad ended
the war.
The collapse of the Swedish Empire was the result of naval attrition. Sweden simply did not have the naval power to deal with the fleets of Denmark and Russia operating at
opposite ends of the Baltic, and so her naval forces, adequate against either, were whittled down in small-scale, largely indecisive actions. These minor defeats culminated in the
loss of Stralsund and the ravaging of the Swedish coast. The process was hastened by the loss of vital commercial revenues. Unable to use the sea, Sweden could not move her army to
meet the allied attacks.
The Soviet Naval Infantry fought during the Second World War, but was then transferred from the navy to the coastal-defence forces before being disbanded in the mid-1950s. On 14
July 1958, however, the president of Lebanon requested urgent aid from France, the UK and the USA to counter a threat by the USSR to deploy Soviet ‘volunteers’ to support
pro-Nasser rebels. The US Sixth Fleet was able to land three Marine battalions the very next day, and the threat from the Soviet ‘volunteers’ immediately disappeared. The Marine
battalions withdrew on 21 August after what had been a classic exhibition of the value of sea power and amphibious capability.
The Soviet leadership, never slow to learn from such experiences, responded by re-establishing the Naval Infantry, which rapidly became a corps d’élite. in 1961 the Naval
Infantry was resurrected; the Soviet Army came to recognize the utility of specialized marine forces for conducting amphibious landings, and each of the fleets was allotted such a
unit. Essential to this new policy was the development of amphibious warfare ships, notably the new tank-landing ships (LSTs) of the Alligator class.
The Naval Infantry was divided among the four fleets. From 1961 the Black Sea, Northern and Baltic fleets were allotted a naval infantry regiment, while the Pacific Fleet
deployed a brigade. US intelligence assessments from the 1980s indicate that these formations were larger by that time, with brigades deployed by three fleets, and a division with
the Pacific fleet.
Each naval infantry regiment comprised three naval motor rifle battalions and a naval tank battalion. The motor rifle battalions each had about 33 BTR-60 amphibious armoured
troop carriers, while the tank battalion had a mixed complement of 34 PT-76 amphibious tanks and ten T-55 or T-72 tanks. In battalions with the T-55 tank, three of the ten were
often the TO-55 flamethrower type. A naval infantry brigade had two tank battalions and five battalions of naval motor rifle troops, making it nearly double the size of the
2,500-man regiments.
The naval infantry troops, like most Marine forces, were of a higher calibre than normal motor rifle troops of the Soviet Ground Forces. They were better trained than their
Ground Forces counterparts, and an increasing percentage were parachute qualified and trained in helicopter-landing operations. There were apparently specialized teams in these
regiments trained to employ atomic demolition munitions (ADMs). Soviet ADMs are believed to have been available in several types, weighing 32-36kg each, with an explosive force of
0.1-0.5 kilotons. They would have been used to attack major port or seaside facilities.
The Soviet Naval Infantry force was quite small. It was intended for use on a tactical level as a raiding force, and on an operational level as the spearhead of an
amphibious-landing force. Once a beachhead had been seized, further troop landings would be provided by Ground Forces units. For this reason, the Soviet Naval Infantry numbered
only about 18,000 troops – compared to the US Marine Corps, which was more than ten times its size. Likewise, the Soviet Fleet’s amphibious warfare ships were inferior
in number and sophistication to those of the US Navy. The Soviet Naval Infantry also differed considerably from the US Marines in its approach to amphibious warfare. While the US
Marines relied on specially designed armoured, amphibious tracked vehicles (amtracs) for landing operations, the Naval Infantry used the normal Ground Forces BTR-60, which had only
marginal performance in the open water. This policy was due in no small measure to the difference in the experiences of the two forces. The US Marines had a tradition of preparing
for hotly contested beach assaults, such as those of World War II in the Pacific. In contrast, Soviet wartime experience was mainly against targets without formidable beach
defences. Current areas where the Naval Infantry might be used, such as the Danish or Norwegian coasts, were not heavily fortified.
Yet the Soviet Naval Infantry was ahead of the US Marines in the adaption of hovercraft for beach-landing operations. The Soviet fleet deployed over 60 hovercraft in classes,
most notably 35 of the AIST class, which was capable of carrying four PT-76 tanks, two T-72 tanks or 220 troops; a fourth class of hovercraft, the Uterok, began entering service in
the 1980s. Hovercraft have obvious attractions over armoured amphibious vehicles: against lightly defended beaches, they can quickly land an assault force, and return rapidly
alongside the ships of the assault fleet to load up for renewed missions to the beachhead.
Judging by the Soviet Navy’s shipbuilding programmes of the 1980s, the Naval Infantry remained central to Soviet strategic thinking. The construction of further Ivan
Rogov-class landing ships, for example, made the Naval Infantry more suitable for employment outside traditional Soviet waters. The Naval Infantry was no longer confined to LSTs
alone: the Ivan Rogov class had habitable berths on board, thus permitting long voyages to more distant destinations.
The force expanded, peaking in size and effectiveness around 1988, when it was some 18,000 strong. It fielded:
• one division (7,000 men) of three infantry regiments, one tank regiment and one artillery regiment;
• three independent brigades (3,000 men), each of three infantry battalions, one tank battalion, one artillery battalion and one rocket-launcher battalion;
• four spetsnaz (special forces) brigades, each of three underwater battalions and one parachute battalion.
The Naval Infantry was transported by a growing number of amphibious-warfare ships. Largest were two Ivan Rogov-class dock landing ships, displacing 13,100 tonnes, which carried
one Naval Infantry battalion and forty tracked or larger numbers of wheeled vehicles, plus helicopters and surface-effect ships. Fourteen Alligator LSTs were similar in many
respects to the British Sir Galahad-class logistics landing ships (LSLs); with a large cargo capacity and bow and stern doors, these were intended for follow-up operations rather
than the assault wave. Principal assault vessels were the thirty-seven Ropucha LSTs, which were built in Poland. Smallest were forty-five Polnocny-class small tank landing ships
(LCTs), also built in Poland, which displaced some 1,000 tonnes and had a payload of six battle tanks.
The Naval Infantry seized on the surface-effect ship (SES) as an effective way of transporting marines ashore, and developed a number of types including the Pomornik, which
could carry three battle tanks, and the Aist, which carried two. Under development at the end of the Cold War was the Orlan-class wing-in-ground-effect (WIG) vessel, designed to
transport up to 150 troops at speeds of up to 300 knots. Both the SES and the WIG vessels were very fast compared with normal amphibious shipping, and were designed for short
‘hooks’ in support of a ground advance, or for lightning attacks on crucial targets in the Baltic and Black seas, both types of operation having precedents in the Soviet experience
in the Second World War. These craft were another example of the flexibility of thought in the Soviet forces, which produced some novel solutions to the problems facing them.
The Soviet Naval Infantry (marines) numbered some 12,000 during this period, organized into regiments (one each stationed with the Northern, Baltic, Black Sea, and Pacific
Fleets.) These forces were tailored for amphibious assault, but were largely directed to support the activities of the fleets to which they were assigned. However, as the
Soviet-Syrian exercise in 1981 showed, they did have the capability to operate in a power projection role, as did the presence of Soviet amphibious forces in the Indian Ocean
during this time. A total of 83 amphibious ships supported these forces. Supply could have been provided by the Soviet merchant marine, numbering some 1,723 ships by mid-1982.
In displaying American geopolitical will vis a` vis the USSR, the US Navy increasingly revealed the weaknesses of its Soviet counterpart. The Soviet Navy was never able to match
the wide-ranging exercises of the Americans during the 1980s, as its Okean maneuvers in 1970 and 1975 had done. This is not to say that the Soviet Navy was idle. A major amphibious
exercise was undertaken in July 1981 by Soviet and Syrian forces in the Eastern Mediterranean involving over 1,000 Soviet Naval Infantry. In September of that year, the Soviet Navy
deployed 60 ships and landed more than 6,000 Naval Infantry and Army troops as part of Zapad ’81, a major combined-arms exercise conducted in the Baltic near the Polish
border. The size of the exercise (the Soviets officially declared that some 100,000 personnel took part) and its political significance (it occurred three months before martial law
was imposed in Poland as a result of the challenge of the Solidarity movement) meant that the Navy could still be seen as important to Soviet foreign policy. Nonetheless, when it
is considered that the US Navy was able to participate in a plethora of combined-arms exercises that achieved such impressive results, Soviet activities are put into proper
perspective.
Russian Federation
The Marine Infantry (MI) is an Arm of the Coastal Troops of the Navy, designed and specially trained for combat operations in amphibious landings, as well as for defending naval
bases, important parts of the coast and coastal facilities.
The marines in amphibious operations can operate on its own for capturing stationing sites of the enemy’s navy, ports, islands, non-integrated parts of the enemy’s coast. In the
cases, when the landing basis is represented with the Land Force’s units, the marines land within advanced units to seize seashore points and parts and to support landing on them
of the main landing forces.
The MI’s armaments: waterborne combat equipment, portable anti-tank and anti-aircraft systems and automatic small arms.
The Marine Infantry’s formations and subunits are landed on the beach from amphibious ships and boats, as well as from shipborne and shore-based helicopters with fire support of
ships and aircraft. In some cases, the marines can surmount water spaces under their own power aboard amphibian vehicles (in most cases, armoured personnel carriers).
The Russian Naval Infantry have been gradually phasing out PT-76 amphibious tanks, and started to receive a number of T-80s. A full-strength Naval Infantry Brigade may have up
to 70-80 Tanks. The APCs used by the Naval Infantry are either wheeled BTR-80s (in Assault Landing Battalions) or tracked MT-LBs (in Marine Battalions). While Naval Infantry units
were supposed to receive BMP-3 IFVs, BMMP (bojevaya mashina morskoj pekhoti) fitted with the turret of the BMP-2, few have been delivered, and it is far from certain such re-arming
will take place. BMP-3s may equip one company per Marine battalion.
According to Defense Ministry statement published by RIA Novosti (November 27, 2009), “All units of Russia’s naval infantry will be fully equipped with advanced
weaponry by 2015.” Included in this upgrade would be T-90 tanks, BMP-3 IFVs, 2S31 120mm mortar/artillery tracks, wheeled BTR-82A armored personnel carriers, air defense
equipment and small arms. All Naval Infantry units were equipped with Ratnik infantry combat gear and all Northern Fleet naval infantry units were equipped with BTR-82A APCs as of
November 2016. Naval Infantry and Navy units also receive new-technology binoculars. The Naval Infantry have started to receive a modernized version of Strelets reconnaissance,
control and communications system and completed receiving D-10 parachutes. All Pacific Fleet and Caspian Flotilla naval infantry units were equipped with BTR-82A APCs as of May
2018.
In late February 2014, at least one Black Sea Fleet assigned unit (at company level) was apparently using Tigr armoured cars near Sevastopol during the 2014 Crimean crisis.
During the crisis in March 2014 imagery emerged of some Naval Infantry personnel carrying what appeared to be the OTs-14-1A-04 7.62×39mm assault rifle with an under-barrel GP-30
40mm grenade launcher; a bullpup design normally associated with the Russian Airborne Troops, as well as Combat Engineering and Spetsnaz units.
Kinetic Physical Evidence suggests that Russia has invested in a sweeping range of kinetic physical counterspace capabilities over the past decade, including ground- and
air-launched direct-ascent ASAT missiles capable of targeting satellites in LEO and co-orbital ASAT weapons that could operate in any orbital regime. Russia’s kinetic
physical counterspace activities often closely resemble previously operational Soviet-era ASAT programs, suggesting that the country has benefited from decades of ASAT weapons
research conducted by the Soviet Ministry of Defense.
On October 20, 1968, the Soviet Union became the second country in the world to successfully demonstrate a counterspace weapon when it destroyed a domestic satellite in LEO
using a co-orbital ASAT. Called Istrebitel Sputnikov (IS), meaning “satellite destroyer” in Russian, the first Soviet co-orbital ASAT was tested 20 times between 1963
to 1982, destroying several targets launched as part of the program. A follow-on version of the IS system, known as IS-MU, was operational from 1991 to 1993.
Prior to the fall of the Soviet Union, the country began developing a much more capable co-orbital ASAT known as the Naryad. Reportedly designed to reach altitudes as high as
40,000 km and contain multiple warheads in a single launch, the Naryad would likely have posed a serious threat to satellites in GEO. The system saw limited testing-with just one
launch in 1994-and no confirmed intercepts.
Unlike the Soviet Union, Russia’s kinetic physical counterspace arsenal includes ground-launched direct-ascent ASAT missiles. In December 2018, Russia conducted its
seventh test of the PL-19/Nudol direct-ascent ASAT system. The PL-19/ Nudol completed its first successful flight test in November 2015, after two unsuccessful attempts.
Unclassified U. S. reports suggest that both this launch, and a previous test in March 2018, used a mobile transporter erector-launcher (TEL) within the Plesetsk Cosmodrome complex
instead of a static launch pad. Although at least six of the seven launches are verified to have originated from Plesetsk, a mobile launch system would theoretically allow the ASAT
to be launched outside of the Cosmodrome facility, ensuring greater flexibility to target LEO satellites in inclinations above 40 degrees as they transit over Russian territory.
Although not specifically designed as direct-ascent ASAT weapons, Russian mobile-launched S-400 surface-to-air missiles-capable of reaching a maximum altitude of 200 km-could
potentially reach a satellite in LEO. The follow-on surface-to-air missile system, the S-500, is expected to reach altitudes up to 300 km if launched directly upward. Oleg
Ostapenko, Russia’s former deputy minister of defense, once stated that the S-500 will be able to intercept “low-orbital satellites and space weapons.” First
tested in 2018, the new missile’s production timeline has since slipped, and “there has been no indication of when an actual S-500 will be made available.” Like
the PL-19/Nudol system, using the S-400 or eventually the S-500 as a direct-ascent ASAT would require a high-precision targeting capability that has yet to be demonstrated via a
destructive test.
MiG-31BM “Foxhound” Aircraft on September 14, 2018. Photographed at the Zhukovsky airfield outside of Moscow, the aircraft is carrying what has since
been identified as a potential anti-satellite weapon.
A modified Russian MiG-31 fighter jet was photographed in September 2018 carrying an unidentified missile that some reports suggest could be a “mock-up” of an
air-launched ASAT weapon. Although this development follows a 2013 statement from the Russian Duma expressing the Russian government’s intent to build an air-to-space system
designed to “intercept absolutely everything that flies from space,” the system depicted in the September 2018 photo would almost certainly be limited to targeting
objects in LEO, due to its size. In 2017, a Russian Aerospace Forces squadron commander confirmed that an ASAT missile had been designed for use with the MiG- 31BM aircraft-the
same variant spotted with the mysterious missile. Citing several sources familiar with a U. S. report on the new weapons system, CNBC reported that the missile may become
operational as soon as 2022.
Orbital Trajectories for Cosmos 2542 and USA 245 on January 23, 2020. Since orbital parameters for classified satellites do not appear in the U. S. Space
Command’s public catalog of space objects, analysts use observations from amateur astronomers to calculate USA 245’s orbital trajectory.
Russia has not publicly announced the development of a new co-orbital ASAT program since the fall of the Soviet Union. In the past few years, however, the Russian Aerospace
Forces has launched a series of small “inspector” satellites in LEO that have demonstrated some of the technologies required to operate such a system. In 2017 and 2018,
three small Russian satellites-Cosmos 2519, 2521, and 2523-engaged in RPO in LEO, prompting a statement of concern from the U. S. State Department. Although a June 2017 Russian
Soyuz launch appeared to place just one satellite in LEO-Cosmos 2519-a second satellite was detected two months later, likely deployed from the first as a subsatellite. The Russian
Ministry of Defense made a statement saying that the second satellite was designed to “inspect the state of a Russian satellite.” In October 2017, a third satellite was
deployed from either Cosmos 2519 or its subsatellite, resulting in three independent satellites in orbit. Over the course of several months, the satellites engaged in a series of
maneuvers and RPO exercises, including slow flybys, close approaches, and rendezvous. In February 2020, Chief of Space Operations of the U. S. Space Force General John Raymond
appeared to refer to one of these three satellites when he said that Russian inspector satellites have “exhibited characteristics of a weapon.”
Analysis published in Jane’s Intelligence Review used Russian procurement documentation and contractor reports to connect Cosmos 2519, 2521, and 2523 with the program name
Nivelir. Contracts signed in 2016 between the Nivelir program and a Russian company known for developing radiation-absorbing materials suggest that future Nivelir satellites-such
as Cosmos 2535, 2536, 2537, or 2538, all launched in July 2019-may be coated with a protective film to avoid being tracked by optical or infrared sensors from the ground or in
space.
Russia’s newest co-orbital system may be designed to target satellites in GEO. Designated Burevestnik, this program will likely employ low-thrust but highly-efficient
electric propulsion to maneuver lightweight satellites-possibly similar to those from the Nivelir program-around the GEO belt. A report published in 2019 indicated that a new
ground control center was being built for Nivelir and Burevestnik at the same site the Soviets used to control the Istrebitel Sputnikov missions in the 1960s.
Luch Continues to Explore the GEO Belt. The Russian satellite has stopped at 19 different positions in the geostationary belt since its launch in 2014, including
those depicted here in 2019.
Although there is no evidence yet of lightweight Russian satellites maneuvering in the GEO belt, a larger satellite has been observed engaging in suspicious RPO activity in the
regime. The satellite-known as Olymp-K or Luch-has attracted attention for shifting its position within the geosynchronous belt on a relatively frequent basis, occupying at least
19 different positions since its launch in September 2014. Luch first attracted attention when it repositioned itself between two satellites operated by Intelsat, a U. S. satellite
communications company. Approaching satellites in GEO in this manner could allow for close inspection or potentially interception of their communication links. In September 2015,
Luch approached a third Intelsat satellite. The international response escalated in September 2018, when French Minister of the Armed Forces Florence Parly accused Russia of
committing “an act of espionage” after it approached a French-Italian military satellite “a bit too closely” in October 2017.
Analysis of Luch’s on-orbit behavior since its launch in 2014 suggests that the satellite has approached 11 unique Intelsat satellites, four Eutelsat satellites, two SES
satellites, and at least nine other satellites operated by Russia, Turkey, Pakistan, the United Kingdom, and the European Space Agency. Although Luch appears to be maneuvering
around the GEO belt in a systematic, deliberate manner, no public reports suggest it has damaged any of the neighboring satellites along the way.
Spying on a Spy Satellite ON NOVEMBER 25, 2019, Russia launched a small satellite, Cosmos 2543, into what the Russian Ministry of Defense described as a “target orbit from
which the state of domestic satellites can be monitored.” Two weeks later, the ministry announced that a subsatellite, Cosmos 2542, had been deployed from Cosmos 2543.
Three days after its deployment, Cosmos 2542 performed an orbital maneuver to synchronize its orbit with USA 245, what is believed to be a U. S. National Reconnaissance Office
(NRO) satellite. Amateur satellite observers who record and share satellite observations online noticed that USA 245 performed its own maneuver soon thereafter, possibly to steer
clear of Cosmos 2542. In January 2020, Cosmos 2542 maneuvered toward the American spy satellite again, this time coming as close as 50 km. A day later, USA 245 made another
maneuver, further distancing itself from the Russian inspector satellite.
In an interview with SpaceNews, General John Raymond, the Commander of U. S. Space Command and Chief of Space Operations of the U. S. Space Force, confirmed the close approach,
adding that he believed it was intentional.
In 1240 a military campaign was launched from Livonia against Pskov, resulting in the overthrow of the faction that supported the rule of Aleksandr Iaroslavich. Early in the
spring of 1242 Aleksandr recaptured the city and on 5 April defeated the Livonian army in what has become known as the Battle of the Ice. The independent sources for these events
include the Livonian Rhymed Chronicle, the First Novgorod Chronicle, the vita of Aleksandr Iaroslavich, the Laurentian Chronicle, and the Chronicle of Suzdal. It is doubtful to
what extent the information found in the chronicles of Pskov can be regarded as original.
The Rhymed Chronicle records after the transfer of northern Estonia to the Danish king that Bishop Hermann of Dorpat had come into dispute with the Russians “at this
time”. The Russians had turned against the bishop and done him much harm. The bishop asked the Teutonic Knights for help, and their master had also come to his aid. The
“men of the king” (kuniges man)-a contingent from Danish territory-had also arrived to give help. The chronicler also writes that this army took Izborsk, where all
Russians who defended themselves were killed. Russians from Pskov clashed in fighting with the Order, the men of the Danish king, and the army of Bishop Hermann, and were defeated
at Izborsk. The Russians fled to the River Velikaya. A siege of Pskov then began, whereby “many knights and squires / deserved their right to a fief”. The city
surrendered, weakened from the lost battle, its prince Gerpolt freely handed over the castle and good land to the knights so that the master of the Order would take care of them.
The Order’s army then left Pskov, leaving behind two knights and a small contingent of Germans to guard the territory. When the prince of Novgorod heard of this, he came with
his army to Pskov and drove away the two knights, who were acting as bailiffs: “if Pskov were held / it would be a great thing for Christendom / until the End of the World. /
It is a misfortune / if somebody has conquered good lands / but failed to man it well: he may well complain at the damage”, writes the chronicler in conclusion. The prince of
Novgorod returned to his city but then the prince of Suzdal Alexander arrived with a large army and advanced further on to Livonia. When the bishop of Dorpat learned of this, he
prepared for an attack. The armies of the Order and Dorpat, even united, were too small and they were overwhelmed by the superior number of Russians. Twenty Teutonic Knights were
killed and six were taken prisoner. Aleksandr returned to his land. After describing the battle, the chronicler adds that the Order’s master Herman Balke had been at war with
both the Russians and the pagans for five and a half years and had then died. The capture of Izborsk in 1240 and the two knights with their small entourage are also mentioned in
the chronicle of Hermann von Wartberge.
The Novgorod Chronicle has the following account. In 1240, after the Battle of the Neva, Izborsk castle was captured by the Germans, namely by the men from Odenpäh, Dorpat, and
Fellin, acting together with Prince Iaroslav Vladimirovich. When news of this reached Pskov, an army left to fight the enemy and was defeated. The Germans proceeded to burn the
outskirts of Pskov together with their churches and icons, books, and gospels. They destroyed a number of villages near Pskov, besieged the city for a week, and took the children
of the venerable men hostage. Then the “treacherous” Pskovians, Tverdilo Ivankovich and others, let the Germans into the city and set themselves up together with them
as rulers of Pskov, plundering the villages of the Novgorod Land as well. Some Pskovians fled with their women and children to Novgorod. When the Germans invaded Votia, the
Novgorodians asked Iaroslav Vsevolodovich to send them a prince, but were not satisfied with whom they received, namely Andrei Iaroslavich, and asked for Aleksandr. He did indeed
come in the spring of 1241, capturing Koporye together with the Novgorodians, the warriors from Ladoga, the Karelians, and the Ingrians. In March 1242 Aleksandr, with the
Novgorodians and his brother, attacked the land of the Chuds and besieged Pskov, where he took the Germans and the Chuds prisoner and sent them “in chains” to Novgorod.
He himself fought the Chuds and had his army destroy their lands. Following the crushing defeat of a Russian reconnaissance unit, the prince and his troops moved to the lake, where
they were followed by the Germans and Estonians. In the battle “by the Raven’s Rock on the narrow [of Lake Peipus]” on 5 April the Germans were defeated and the
Chuds took to flight. That same year a German embassy was sent to Novgorod or to the prince promising to return everything that had been conquered from the prince in his absence:
“Votia, Luga, Pskov, Lettgallia”. The prisoners on both sides were released as were the hostages of Pskov.
Aleksandr’s vita narrates that in the third year after the Battle of the Neva Aleksandr had set out in the winter for the land of the Germans with a great army. The
Germans had at that time already taken Pskov and installed their bailiffs there. Aleksandr killed some of the Germans, took others prisoner, and freed the city from its conquerors.
He then went to the land of the Germans to destroy it. Aleksandr achieved a great victory in the battle, taking many prisoners, including those called the “knights of
God”. In Pskov he was glorified by the priests for defeating the aliens. The prince nonetheless warned Pskov not to betray him during his lifetime nor that of his
grandchildren. The chronicles of Pskov are the only source to add the date of the Battle of Izborsk as 16 September, but their other accounts may have been influenced by both the
Novgorod chronicles and the vita of Aleksandr. The Laurentian Chronicle records that Andrei was sent by his father Iaroslav to the Novgorodians to help them and also refers to the
battle on the lake and that many prisoners were taken.
The mention in the Novgorod Chronicle of Iaroslav Vladimirovich and the men from Odenpäh, Dorpat (i. e. the soldiers of the bishop of Dorpat), and Fellin (i. e. the Teutonic
Knights) indicates a direct analogy with the events of the 1230s, when Izborsk was temporarily occupied by a Russian army allied with Dorpat. It is highly plausible that none other
than Iaroslav Vladimirovich is called Gerpolt in the Rhymed Chronicle. The taking of hostages to guarantee the treaty indicates an analogy to 1228, when a Livonian contingent
settled in Pskov and the agreement was likewise guaranteed through the handing over of hostages.
Although the accounts found in these independent sources are highly consistent with one another, it is hard to discern the significance of these events in the overall context of
contemporary relations between Livonia and Rus’. A central role is clearly played by the bishop of Dorpat and Prince Iaroslav Vladimirovich, whereas the Rhymed Chronicle and
the chronicle of Hermann von Wartberge, both chronicles of the Teutonic Order, concentrate on the actions of its members. Yet even the Rhymed Chronicle mentions that the bishop
asked the Teutonic Knights for help, in other words that this was a catalyst for the campaign. The Rhymed Chronicle also mentions the Danish king’s vassals, but under the
year 1240 rather than 1242. The bishop of Dorpat is acting throughout as territorial lord, not as missionary. Although these events are sometimes regarded as an attempt, instigated
and countenanced by the papacy, to subjugate the territory and church of Rus’, this cannot be demonstrated by any of the sources in relation to the campaign against Pskov.
The description in the Novgorod Chronicle of the burning of churches and holy scriptures in the vicinity of Pskov is not a sign of the heresy of the occupiers but simply of their
criminal behaviour overall. The Novgorod Chronicle deals with the destructive campaigns that took place in Novgorod’s territory in 1240-41 separately: in relation to Pskov,
the chronicler refers to the destruction of the villages in the Novgorod Land, but in relation to Koporye reference is made to localities on the Luga river. There is no basis in
the sources for treating the campaigns as a combined attack on Novgorod from two sides.
The Rhymed Chronicle, and the tradition derived from it, appears to associate the campaign against Pskov and the Battle of the Ice with the first master of the Teutonic Order in
Livonia, Hermann Balk. Balk had already left the country in 1238 and died in 1240. He was succeeded by Dietrich von Grüningen (1238/39-1246) and Andreas von Felben (1241, 1248-53).
The Rhymed Chronicle mentions the master’s participation in the 1240 campaign against Pskov, but not, however, in 1242. The mention of the “men from Fellin” in
the chronicle appears to point to the Order’s territory in Estonia. However, the expression in the context of the Order’s great castle that was nearest to Novgorod may
have referred to the Order as such. On the other hand, Evgeniia Nazarova argues that the commander of Fellin played a key role in the occupation of Pskov. The fact that the Rhymed
Chronicle refers principally to the Teutonic Knights does not necessarily mean, however, that the Teutonic Order played the most important role or that its master or his deputy,
Andreas von Felben, personally led the campaign. It has long since been pointed out that the attack on Rus’ was not in the general interest of the Teutonic Order in Livonia.
Its main opponents were in the south: in Curonia, Samogitia, and Lithuania, not to mention in Prussia. In 1241-1242 the Teutonic Order in Livonia, led by the Livonian provincial
master, Dietrich von Grüningen, seized Curonia with mil itary support from the Danish vassals and the bishoprics of Riga and Ösel. According to Friedrich Benninghoven, the
campaigns against Rus’ were informed by the attitudes and separate policy of the former Sword Brothers who had survived the Battle of Saule but could not come to terms with
the transfer of northern Estonia to Denmark and thus tried to assert their authority by means these attacks. There is no evidence, however, that there was a confrontation between
two different tendencies in the Order. After the merger of the two orders, the Teutonic Order pursued a determined policy of forcing the former Sword Brothers into the background.
In support of the view that there were two opposing visions of conquest, or at least different political tendencies, recourse is made to the unproven assertion that the Order had
indeed wanted to launch a campaign from Livonia to conquer Pskov or even Novgorod in 1240. Taking part in the campaign against Pskov and the attempt to capture Votia are not
incompatible with the Order’s plans south of the Daugava.
At the centre of the campaign against Pskov was therefore the bishopric of Dorpat and its relationship with Prince Iaroslav Vladimirovich dating back to the 1230s and, by
extension, to the Pskovian opposition to Aleksandr Iaroslavich, who sought Iaroslav Vladimirovich’s ascension to power in Pskov. Prince Iaroslav’s closest supporters
were constantly in touch with Odenpäh, which explains why the “men of Odenpäh” come first in the list of the “Germans” in the chronicle. The fact that the
“men from Fellin” come last in this list indicates the smaller role of the Teutonic Order in comparison. The start of the offensive may have been determined by a
propitious moment in Pskov’s internal political situation. The “harm” (leit) mentioned in the Rhymed Chronicle inflicted by Rus’ on Bishop Hermann, who had
to suffer it during a long time, and the danger for Christians are not a direct reference to the earlier military activity in the borderlands between Dorpat and Pskov c. 1239-40.
There was a constant internal political opposition in Novgorod and Pskov which sought support from various external powers-the princes of Suzdal, Smolensk, and Chernigov among
others. Trade relations with Livonia were crucial for all groups. We cannot say that one group had a particular interest in trade with Livonia. Rather, we are dealing with
pretenders from the different political tendencies to the princely throne, with one of these being Iaroslav Vladimirovich.
Pskov’s surrender in the face of the oncoming Livonian army constituted a change of prince from the city’s point of view. The limits of the authority of the
Order’s two bailiffs remain unknown. Iaroslav Vladimirovich’s relationship with the support army from Livonia was extremely complex, and his power in Pskov was secured
by means of the hostages. The Novgorod Chronicle names Tverdilo Ivankovich “together with others” as the real ruler of Pskov. He had “made himself ruler in Pskov
with the Germans”. Iaroslav’s position also depended on Tverdilo. There is no indication of who in Livonia was promised the hostages, whether the bishop of Dorpat or
the Order. When describing Livonia’s peace embassy, however, the chronicle deals with the release of the hostages and other terms of peace affecting the Order more than the
bishop of Dorpat. The Rhymed Chronicle also mentions the fiefs that the bravest knights had earned in the battle of Izborsk, although this may simply be part of the conventions
typical of battle descriptions. If anyone did indeed receive a fief, this would have first meant confiscating estates from the supporters of Aleksandr Iaroslavich, for example.
Such a course of action would have inevitably exacerbated the division among the burghers of Pskov.
A charter of 1248 provided for the division of the principality of Pskov between the bishopric of Dorpat and the Teutonic Order. It mentions that the principality “was
donated by Prince Ghereslawus, its heir, to the mentioned church of Dorpat”. Albert Ammann has attempted to show that this donation originally dates to 1239 and would thus
account for the planned attack on Pskov. This dating has been widely accepted. In the register of charters brought from Mitau to Stockholm in the mid-17th century, there is,
moreover, the following entry: “1239 Dorpat. How the kingdom of Pskov was divided between the Order and the diocese of Dorpat.” However, this may simply be a misreading
from a transumpt of 1299 regarding the charter of 1248. Despite the lack of a documentary basis, the promises of Prince Iaroslav Vladimirovich-or something that the bishopric could
subsequently construe as promises-c. 1240 appear plausible. Any military aid had to be paid for, and the “donation” of a principality might have been the form the
remuneration took. This donation can presumably be understood in terms of feudal law, as in the case of Vsevolod of Gerzike: perhaps Iaroslav had donated Pskov to the bishop of
Dorpat and then received it back as a fief. The relevant passage in the Rhymed Chronicle states “that Gerpolt who was their prince / gave with his good will / the castle and
the good lands / into the hands of the Teutonic Knights”. This might have referred to this donation, which had already been granted to the Order in 1240 as partial
remuneration for taking part in the campaign against Pskov. Iaroslav’s right of inheritance was in itself obviously fictitious. Pskov was not a heritable principality; its
princes were appointed and expelled, as was the case in Novgorod. Iaroslav’s hereditary lands would have been Toropets and Rzhev, but his-continual-presence in Livonia during
the 1230s suggests that he was not able to establish himself there or that these possession did not satisfy his ambitions. Iaroslav Vladimirovich appears in the sources again in
1243, when his wife, who had been killed by her stepson in Odenpäh and buried in Pskov, is mentioned, and also in 1245, when he fought as leader of the warriors of Torzhok along
with Aleksandr Iaroslavich against the Lithuanians’ campaign of destruction. He had probably died by 1248.
According to the Novgorod Chronicle, Aleksandr left Novgorod after the capture of Pskov and was not called back until after the invasion of Votia. This means Novgorod did not
regard the change of power in Pskov as a threat despite the destruction of Novgorod villages by Tverdilo. For the 1242 campaign against Pskov, Andrei also came from Suzdal, again
suggesting that Aleksandr, in reconquering Pskov, was acting more in his own sovereign interests rather than those of Novgorod. At the same time, the opposition to Aleksandr in
Novgorod shows that there too there were people who sympathized with the change of power in Pskov.
The Rhymed Chronicle says that after the conquest of Pskov the army of Aleksandr and Andrei advanced further “into the lands of the [Teutonic] brothers” (in der
bruder lant)169 in March and April of 1242, once the bishop of Dorpat had sent his men to help the Order. “The lands of the brothers” could indeed have served to
describe the whole of Livonia, but the chronicler distinguishes quite clearly between the different dominions and by “the lands of the brothers” principally refers to
the Order’s territory. The Russian army consequently must have advanced as far as Tolowa or Sackala; the campaign of destruction lasted long enough for the Livonians to be
able to raise an army. Bearing in mind that the Order had an interest in having Pskov under its control, however, the issue of the Tolowa tribute is certainly another factor in
this context. The destructive advance of Rus’ could have made its way there precisely because payment of the tribute had been refused. As the army of Rus’ made its way
home, the troops of the Order and the bishop of Dorpat caught up with it. In the ensuing battle Aleksandr and Andrei were victorious. The dimensions of this battle have
occasionally reached absurd proportions in the historiography Anatolii Kirpichnikov has calculated that the Livonian army really could amount to a maximum of 30-35 knights and over
300 sergeants and natives and the Russians would have had been slightly more, amounting to a total of about 1000 men for both sides together.
According to the account in the Russian chronicles, a peace was agreed in Novgorod in 1242, in which “Germans”-does this mean the Teutonic Order – ceded Votia,
Pskov, the Luga, and Lettgallia to the prince and/or Novgorod. Thus the status quo was preserved in the peace. The Pskov and Votia campaigns were therefore not connected with one
another until the peace with the Order. But a separate question is what was meant by Lettgallia in this context. Novgorod had no interest in Lettgallia, therefore the chronicle
means here restoration to Pskov and Aleksandr. Since there are no reports of a temporary handover of Lettgallia during Aleksandr’s rule, it would appear plausible to assume
that Pskov had relinquished the tribute from Tolowa during the war and that its right to collect tribute there was now being reinstated. If the Order shared in the seizure of power
in Pskov, it may indeed have been recompensed with the tribute of Tolowa or the entire right of possession, but was forced to accept the restitution after the loss of Pskov. It is
altogether feasible that Aleksandr also had interests in the Daugava, since he had just married a princess of Polotsk. Aleksandr and his father Iaroslav Vsevolodovich exercised
considerable influence in the Smolensk-Polotsk region throughout the 1240s.
The place given to the Battle of the Ice as a significant event even in world history is based on purely ideological concerns and has little to do with the historical evidence.
A distinction must be made between the great importance that the Battle of the Ice has undoubtedly had in the 20th century and its importance for contemporaries in the 13th
century. In the debate about how much significance should be given to the battle, we must first define the frame of reference, i. e. whether viewed in terms of the family of the
grand prince of Vladimir, Pskov, Novgorod, the bishopric of Dorpat, Rus’ or Europe. As far as the sources from Rus’ are concerned, this was a story about how Aleksandr
lost control of Pskov only to win it back. The traitors in Votia and Pskov mentioned in the Novgorod Chronicle had betrayed the prince, not Rus’ or the Orthodox religion. The
warfare of 1240-42 “most likely did not change at all the attitude of Novgorod and Pskov towards Livonia and Sweden. The West was not seen as much of a threat or less so
following the defeat”. This judgement by Bernhard Dircks can be endorsed with the qualification that the very notions of East and West are themselves anachronistic. These
events belong exclusively in the context of local struggles for power, and in the case of Pskov we are dealing with `internal political’ conflicts as much as with `external
relations’. To the extent that the church and questions of religious confession played a role at all-which was in any case in the form of justification rather than cause-this
was of such a marginal nature that it left no mark in the sources.
In a wider sense, however, Livonia’s attempts to gain control in Votia and Pskov during 1240-42 appear as significant. The political forces in Livonia were able to
maintain a position east of Lake Peipus for some time. The event is lent an aura of exceptionality by the fact that we know in retrospective that Lake Peipus became a dividing line
during the Middle Ages between the Orthodox and the Catholic worlds. In the contemporary context, this signified on the one hand the continuation of the mission among the Votian
pagans and on the other a political intervention in Pskov, quite separate ideologically and geographically from the former. We are not dealing with a unique decision in history but
with episodes from a policy practiced both before and after the Battle of the Ice. The fact that first a victory was achieved, which itself proved fleeting when Livonians came to
face a stronger opponent in the shape of Aleksandr, depended on circumstances beyond Livonia as well as on arbitrary factors, principally internal political conditions in Novgorod
and Pskov.
A policy change introduced at this time was of major importance in the evolution of the relationship between the Tsar, the landowning class and the armed forces. For most of the
fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries the main fighting force had been composed of cavalry, largely based on the princely appanages with little centralized organization. By the
mid-sixteenth century these princely private armies were to be found only, if at all, in the appanages of Lithuanian origin, such as those of the Bel’skys and Mstislavskys,
and in the retinues of the Russian ‘service’ princes of the Upper Oka, such as the Odoevskys and the Vorotynskys.
The development of a Russian army dependent on the grand prince alone began in the reign of Ivan III, who had already extended the grand prince’s control over the armed
forces where he had been successful in absorbing a principality and destroying its separate identity. Princes and boyars, when not acting as governors and local commandants, were
usually absorbed as commanders and senior officers in grand princely regiments, in accordance with the ranking laid down by the code of precedence, or mestnichestvo. The general
run of service gentry, originally of mixed social origins, was gradually sorted out into those who served the grand prince directly, as members of his dvor, received estates in
service tenure (pomest’ia), and were merged into the dvoriane or future service gentry, and those who had served local princes and boyars and who continued to carry out their
service as pomeshchiki on a provincial basis. Lower-ranking cavalry officers were thus attached to provincial towns, resided on their estates and were summoned when required by the
grand prince, bringing their servants with them. Both these groups received lands on a service tenure which in the early days of the system could not be sold or pledged, but could
be passed on the death of the holder to a son or son-in-law fit to perform service. The service to be given was strictly calculated in terms of the amount and quality of land.
The system of pomest’ia was devised to enable cavalrymen to serve when called upon, and was to remain the basic way of paying for the cavalry army until the reign of Peter
the Great. The Pomestnyi Prikaz, or Estates Office which administered the recruitment and the provision of land to the mounted cavalry, was founded in 1475. Further distribution of
lands as pomest’ia took place under Vasily III and Ivan IV from a variety of sources. The estate was not regarded as the private property of the pomeshchik; it provided a
fixed income for his maintenance and his equipment, and he was not expected to concern himself with its exploitation. He was not therefore a landowner in the Western sense of the
word, but a land user entitled to a certain income from the land. It was thus quite distinct from the votchina or the patrimonial estate which formed the basis of the wealth of the
aristocracy and the service gentry, which many pomeshchiki owned in addition to the land granted by the government.
The first major initiative in the remodelling of the armed forces taken in Ivan IV’s reign occurred in 1550. The Tsar’s dvor numbered some three thousand all told,
and a specific group of one thousand cavalrymen, divided into three categories, was now provided with pomest’ia in the central provinces to enable them to lodge in Moscow and
provide all their supplies from lands relatively near to the capital. They were to be available for immediate service as required, serving on a rota. The estates they were allotted
were provided mainly from the Tsar’s own lands or from lands of free peasants around Moscow.46 Aleksei Adashev was one of these cavalrymen.
A corps of infantry equipped with firearms was also formed by Ivan, pishchal’niki, or ‘harquebuzzers’, as Jerome Horsey, a later English visitor, called them, who had
already been used in 1480 in the nonexistent battle of the Ugra and who were replaced in 1550 by musketeers or strel’tsy, also on foot. These, together with Ivan’s
chosen one thousand cavalry corps, formed his personal guard, ‘the forerunners of Peter I’ s guards regiments’, presumably to protect him against the sort of rioting which
had so frightened him in 1547. The strel’tsy were to be part of the military scene until the reign of Peter the Great. Their function was not to fight with cold steel or
pikes in hand-to-hand combat, but to use firepower. Their numbers fluctuated and probably reached some twenty thousand by the end of the sixteenth century. They were, unlike the
cavalry levy, a permanent uniformed corps. Unlike the Ottoman janissaries they were free men; they received salaries in money and goods according to rank, but also maintained
themselves and their families partly by artisan production and small-scale trading activities. Their officers belonged to the gentry and were allotted pomest’ia as well as
salaries. The whole corps came under the authority of a new Streletskii Prikaz.
Artillery was also extensively and effectively used in Russia, and Ivan may have taken a personal interest in the manufacture of guns – from Russian-produced iron ore – and
their utilization by his army. Each regiment was allocated a certain number of guns in the 1550s. Ivan took 150 heavy and medium pieces of artillery to Kazan’ with him in
1552, and in this respect Russia was not inferior to her Western enemies, though supplies of gunpowder and lead had to be imported and could therefore be subject to enemy blockade
on land.
The origin of the idea of this corps of strel’tsy has been much debated in Russia. Clearly Russia needed more modern weaponry, namely firearms and heavy artillery, for her
wars against Poland, Sweden and in Livonia, rather than cavalry armed with bows and arrows. Contemporaries and many military specialists have speculated on whether the new
formations were borrowed from the Ottomans through the writings of a certain Ivan Semonovich Peresvetov, which may perhaps have been known to Ivan IV. For a long time
Peresvetov’s very existence was in doubt and he was thought to be an assumed name or a collective personality. Not until the beginning of the twentieth century was his
existence actually established. In the 1950s he was unfortunately treated as one of the powerful humanist thinkers of sixteenth-century Europe, comparable to Machiavelli or Bodin.
A revision of his human and intellectual qualities has not yet been undertaken, nor is it certain that all his alleged writings can be attributed to him; thus his influence still
needs to be questioned.
Born and bred in Lithuania, conditioned by life in this borderland, divided between Polish Catholicism and Russian Orthodoxy, offering his sword as a Polish cavalryman now to
the Hungarian Jan Zapolya, a vassal of the Ottomans, now to the Habsburg King of Bohemia, now to the voevoda Peter IV Raresh of Moldavia, Peresvetov was a fairly senior officer
serving with six or seven horses and the corresponding number of grooms and servants. Evidently resentful at his failure to make good in service, and distrusting boyars and their
ilk, he attempted to enter Russian service in 1538, during the regency of Elena. He may have been attracted to Russian service by his connexion with Peter of Moldavia, whose wife
was Elena’s cousin by marriage. He tried to interest the Russian court in a model shield ‘in the Macedonian manner’ which he had invented, and was taken up by the boyar M.
Iu’rev Zakhar’in, the uncle of the future Tsaritsa Anastasia, and provided with a workshop and a pomest’ie. Unfortunately for Peresvetov, Zakhar’in died, he
lost his patron, and all interest in his patent shield evaporated.
Peresvetov continued in increasingly impoverished circumstances for some ten years, after which all traces of him vanish. This was not surprising since he had no connexions in
Russia with any of the boyar clans, or even with the gentry, who tended also to be united by fairly close local associations. Reduced in his own eyes to poverty, in 1549, at the
time of the gathering of the so-called ‘assembly of reconciliation’, he personally submitted a petition, together with a number of other written works, to Tsar Ivan, accusing the
‘great’ of having despoiled him of his land, leaving him naked and destitute, without even a horse. Peresvetov’s not unjustified hope of achieving more in Russia, where a
simple horseman could now count on some support as a pomeshchik, was not to be fulfilled, and as a man he disappears from sight. But the various writings attributed to him survived
in a number of manuscript copies of the early seventeenth century and have led to a belated acceptance of his existence as a man and his importance as a ‘spokesman’ of the gentry
or the holders of pomest’ia, as against the rich and powerful, in the sixteenth century.
It is this interpretation of the ‘class’ role of Peresvetov, considered to have been insufficiently appreciated by pre-revolutionary historians, which has contributed to his
great importance in Soviet historiography. The relevant texts attributed to Peresvetov are ‘On the conquest of Tsar’grad by the godless Tsar Magmet Amuratov, son of the
Turkish Tsar’, ‘The Tale of Magmet Saltan’, and ‘The Great Petition’, which contains Peresvetov’s account of the five months he spent in the service of Peter IV Raresh, his
only Orthodox patron. Mehmet II’s victory over the last Paleologus emperor, Constantine, was in great part attributed by Peresvetov to the selfishness, cowardice and
incapacity of the ‘great’ men surrounding the Emperor and his failure to support the more lowly men-at-arms. (‘The rich never think of fighting, they think of peacefulness and
gentleness and rest.’) He argued in favour of a centrally recruited, controlled and paid army, like the Turkish janissaries, but he also argued that free men fight better than
slaves, and the Russian cavalry was free, while the janissaries were slaves as were all the civil employees of the Ottoman court. In Russia the kholopy or bondsmen of various kinds
in the armed forces were at this time mainly employed either in the transport of food, fodder and munitions, or in labouring on engineering projects.
Another great virtue of the Ottoman system in Peresvetov’s eyes was its concentration on pravda rather than vera – truth or justice, rather than faith. This makes one
wonder whether the long years in foreign parts, before he came to Russia, had somewhat dented the purity of Peresvetov’s Orthodox faith. The sense of the Russian word
‘pravda’ is impossible to convey in English, where in dictionaries the emphasis is almost always on the notion of truth, whereas in Russian the notion of justice or righteousness
is fundamental. The most articulate expression of Peresvetov’s ideas (if they were his ideas) comes in his version of the tale of Prince Peter IV of Moldavia, where the
Prince praises Mehmet the Conqueror for having restored justice to Constantinople, and explains that ‘God does not love faith, but pravda or justice’. Through his Son he left us
the gospel of truth (pravda), loving the Christian faith above all other faiths, and showed us the path to heaven. But the Greeks, though they honoured the gospel, listened to
others and did not carry out the will of the Lord and fell into heresy (i.e. the decision to unite with Rome, taken at the Council of Ferrara/Florence).
But Peresvetov was primarily concerned with the practical problems of governing a warlike society. He favoured the institution of a professional army (like the Ottoman
janissaries), but free, government by state employees, and the bridling of the high nobility. It is difficult to see in him the spokesman of the gentry, he seems rather to place
his faith in a state ruling by ‘groza’, terror or awe. Mehmed was again quoted as an example, for when he discovered that his judges were being dishonest he had them flayed alive,
saying:
if their flesh grows back again their crime will be forgiven. And he ordered their skins to be stretched out and ordered them to be stuffed with cotton and ordered them to be
affixed with an iron nail in places of judgment and ordered it to be written on the skins: without such terrors, justice and sovereignty cannot be introduced.
Mehmed was also praised for being dread, or terrible, in fact ‘grozen’: ‘If a tsar is mild and peace-loving in his realm, his realm will become impoverished and his glory will
diminish. If a tsar is dread and wise, his realm will expand and his name will be famous in all lands.’ ‘A kingdom without terror [groza] is like a horse without a bridle.’
Peresvetov’s admiration for the efficiency of Ottoman rule is by no means unique at that time, when it was very much a lieu commun in that part of Europe which had had
dealings with the Porte.
To be ‘dread’ Ivan did not need any advice from Peresvetov, and there is not in fact any evidence that Ivan IV ever read anything written by Peresvetov; and if the idea of
creating the corps of musketeers came from outside Russia, a more convincing source is in fact Moldavia, where voevoda Peter Raresh had introduced a corps of musketeers who were
not slaves like the janissaries, but free like the strel’tsy, and with which of course Peresvetov would have been familiar. It seems, therefore, unlikely that Peresvetov
exercised any influence on Ivan’s policy in the 1550s as a spokesman for the gentry.
The BMP-3 is a Russian tracked IFV which is a continued evolution of the earlier BMP-1 and
BMP-2 tracked IFVs. The BMP-3 is fully amphibious and integrates into the turret both a 30 mm auto-cannon and a 100 mm low-velocity gun which is able to fire both conventional
rounds and ATGMs. The vehicle saw development through the 1980s and entered service with the Soviet Army in 1987. Over 2000 of the vehicles were built and are fielded with a number
of armies around the world including Russia, Azerbaijan, Cyprus, Indonesia, Kuwait, South Korea, Libya, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Turkmenistan and Venezuela.
The BMP-3 weighs 41,000 pounds (18.7 metric tonnes), and is approximately 23.5 feet (7.1 meters) long, 10.5 feet (3.2 meters) wide and 7.8 feet (2.4 meters) in height. The
chassis is of an aluminum / steel hybrid construction. The vehicle is operated by a crew of three, including a driver, gunner and commander. The gunner and commander are located in
the turret, while the driver is positioned to the forward center. The vehicle can also accommodate a compliment of 7 troops, with two of the troops seated on other side of the
driver at the front of the vehicle and the remaining five at the rear of the vehicle.
The vehicle is powered by a 500 hp diesel four-stroke liquid-cooled engine, providing a power to weight ratio of 24.3 hp/ton. The powerpack is located at the rear of the
vehicle, more typical of a MBT layout than that of an IFV. This approach permits a highly sloped glacis plate, optimizing protection along the front of the vehicle, while
protecting the engine front forward on-coming threats. The engine is actually located below the vehicle floor, and therefore persons entering and exiting the vehicle do so over the
powerpack. There are a unique set of folding doors at the rear of the vehicle to accommodate the dismounts.
Equipped with a four-speed hydromechanical transmission system and an independent torsion bar assisted suspension, the single-stage auger-type water jets are operated through a
power takeoff. The vehicle is able to attain roads speeds of 45 mph (70 km/hr), cross-country speeds of 28 mph (45 km/hr), and 6 mph (10 km/hr) in amphibious operations. With
on-board fuel the vehicle possesses an operational range of 370 miles (600 km).
The BMP-3 can be produced in a number of variants, each with its own associated weapon systems, with the baseline vehicle as the IFV. This is a comparably heavily armed vehicle
for its class. The turret contains both a low-velocity 2A70 100 mm rifled gun and a 30 mm 2A72 autocannon. The 100 mm gun is able to fire K116-3 “Basnya” and 9M117 AT-10 Stabber
ATGMs, as well as a full range of conventional ammunition for this weapon, including the 3OF32 High Explosive – Fragmenting (HE-Frag) shell. The ATGMs have a range out to 6000
meters and the 100 mm gun has a range out to 4000 meters.
The 30 mm autocannon is provided with dual feed ammunition (i.e., two types of belt fed ammunition are available to the gunner to select between) and can fire at 400 RPM, though
the weapon is typically used in short bursts. For loading of the 100 mm gun the turret is equipped with the 2K23 auto-loading system. This system loads both the ATGMs and standard
100 mm ammunition rounds through the carousel into the main gun, with 22 rounds stored in the auto-loader and the remainder in the vehicle chassis. Standard ammunition carrying
capacity for the vehicle is 40 rounds of 100 mm ammunition, 8 ATGMs, 300 rounds of High-Explosive/Incendiary (HEI) 30 mm and 200 rounds of Armor Piercing-Tracer 30 mm ammunition.
Targeting of both the 100 mm gun and the 30 mm auto-cannon is performed by the on-board ballistic computer. This computer integrates data provided by a cross-wind sensor, from
the main weapon stabilising system, the vehicles laser range finder, a sight/guidance device provided for the gunner, the gunner’s sight and an infrared searchlight. This
system enables both weapons to be aimed and fired while the vehicle is stationary, driving or swimming.
Secondary weapons consist of a 7.62mm PKT machine gun mounted coaxially with the main weapons in the turret and two additional 7.62mm PKT machine guns mounted at the front of
the vehicle on either side of the driver. These weapons are operated by the two troops who are positioned to the left and right of the driver. Each PKT is provided with 2000 rounds
of ammunition. There are also firing ports and associated vision blocks located along the side of the vehicle that enable the troops positioned in the rear compartment to fire
their personal firearms through.
The BMP-3 hull and turret are both constructed from welded aluminum. This is a ballistic alloy with a thickness of approximately 35 mm. The frontal arc of the vehicle is further
protected by an additional armor steel plate over the blow deck, and spaced armor at the trim vane. The trim vane is a plate attached on the underside of the front of the vehicle
that extends upward when the vehicle swims to keep the bow from plunging under the water line. The protection level of the frontal arc of the turret is further enhanced by the
addition of spaced steel armor plating. The vehicle offers protection against 30 mm rounds over the frontal arc and small arms fire all around. The baseline armor along the sides
of the vehicle can be further supplemented through the addition of add-on armor (AOA) modules, principally consisting of layers of ballistic steel. This armor is able to defeat 50
calibre armor piercing rounds. The frontal arc protection can be further enhanced through the addition of Kaktus ERA modules, able to defeat RPGs. These kits take the vehicle net
weight from the baseline 18.7 tonnes to 22.2 tonnes.
Additional protection is provided by an armored and self-sealing fuel tank. This is located in front of the driver location, behind the strongest armor on the vehicle. The fuel
tank, as well as being self-sealing, is further armored to resist any Behind-Armor-Debris (BAD) that may penetrate the hull from a kinetic energy or shaped-charge threat. The
vehicle is also configured to be equipped with the Shtora electro-optical jammer, and comes standard with 81 mm smoke grenade launchers, an automatic fire extinguishing system,
radiation and chemical agent detectors and filtration units, and the ability to generate an additional smoke screen by injecting diesel fuel directly into the exhaust manifold.
The BMP-3 saw combat during the First Chechen War and the Yemeni Civil War (2015). Though performance is not widely reported, the vehicle seems to have performed well in both
conflicts.
Variants
Russian Federation
BMP-3 – Basic version, as described.
BMP-3M – KBP and Kurganmashzavod have upgraded the vehicle with a new engines and turret with a new ATGM system 9K116-3 Basnya. The upgraded vehicle is called
the BMP-3M and the new Bakhcha-U turret which includes a new automatic fire control system with ballistic computer, new SOZH gunner’s sight with laser rangefinder and an ATGM
guidance channel, thermal imager, TKN-AI commander’s vision device with laser illuminator and new ammunition loading system for ATGM. The BMP-3M is also able to fire various
ammunition types, including new 100 mm laser-guided projectiles, new 100 mm HE-FRAG (high explosive fragmentation) rounds and new 30 mm APDS (armour piercing discarding sabot)
rounds. Its additional auxiliary armour shields are effective against 12.7 mm armour-piercing rounds from a range of 50 m. Explosive reactive armour is available as an option. The
new uprated engine is the UTD-32, which is rated at 660 hp. There are actually several different M models, some fitted with additional armour, “Arena-E” or
“Shtora-1” active protection systems, air conditioner etc.
BMP-3M Ataka – BMP-3M version with a two men turret armed with 30 mm 2A72 autocannon, and 9M120-1 Ataka ATGM.
BMMP (bojevaya mashina morskoj pekhoti) – Version for naval infantry, fitted with the turret of the BMP-2.
BMP-3K (komandnyi) – Tactical command variant, includes additional radio R-173, an intercom for seven users, an AB-R28 independent portable power unit, a
navigation device TNA-4-6 and the “Ainet” air burst round detonation system. The BMP-3K lacks the bow machine guns and has its whip antennas mounted on the rear hull.
Crew: 3+3.
BMP-3F – Armed with the standard 2K23 turret. Specially designed for operations at sea, with improved seaworthiness and buoyancy, capability to move afloat at
sea state 3 and fire with the required accuracy at sea state 2. Compared to the basic model, the vehicle design features changes increasing floatability and vehicle stability: the
self-entrenching equipment is omitted, a lightweight anti-surge vane and an air intake tube are introduced; the BMP-3F turret is also protected by anti-surge vanes. Water jet
propellers develop a speed of 10 km/h when afloat. The BMP-3F design allows the vehicle to come ashore under rough sea conditions and to tow the same-type vehicle. A new main
sight, the SOZH, which has an integrated laser range finder and an ATGM guidance channel, is installed. This version can endure continuous amphibious operation for seven hours with
the running engine.
BT-3F – Amphibious version based on BMP-3F with the original turret replaced by a smaller remote weapon station with either 7.62, 12.7 or 14.5mm machine gun.
It can accommodate a crew commander, driver, gunner, and 14 troops, and can use optional ERA armor.
BRM-3K “Rys” (Ob.501) (boyevaya razvedivatel’naya mashina) – Surveillance and reconnaissance variant with 1PN71 thermal sight (3.7x/11x, 3
km range), 1PN61 active-pulse night vision device ( 3 km range), 1RL-133-1 (“TALL MIKE”) I-band surveillance radar (3 km man, 12 km vehicle), 1V520 computer and a
TNA-4-6 navigation system. The armament consists of the stabilized 30 mm autocannon 2A72 (600 rounds) and a coaxial 7.62 mm machine gun (2,000 rounds) or AU-220M Baikal remote
weapon station with 57 mm BM-57 autocannon and 7.62mm PKMT machine gun. Combat weight: 19 t, crew: 6. In 1993, Russia started quantity production of BRM-3K vehicles.
BMP-3 Dragoon – New IFV version with an unmanned turret which can be armed with a variety of combat modules, including standard BMP-3’s Bakhcha-U turret
with a 2A70 100 mm cannon, a 2A72 30 mm autocannon and a PKTM 7.62 mm machinegun, the AU-220M Baikal remote weapon station module with a 57 mm BM-57 gun and a module with a 125 mm
2A82-1M tank gun, the new 816 h.p. turbocharged UTD-32T engine and powerplant moved to the front, and a hydraulic ramp fitted to the rear. It is reported that its trials were
finished in October 2017.
BREM-L “Beglianka” (Ob.691) (bronirovannaya remontno-evakuatsionnaya mashina) – Armoured recovery vehicle with five-tonne crane and 20/40 metric
tonne capacity winch.
BMP-3 “Khrizantema-S” (9P157-2) – Self-propelled anti-tank version with 9M123 Khrizantema (AT-15) ATGM system with radar and laser guidance. The
9P157-2 carries two 9M123 missiles on launch rails, which are extended from a stowed position; the radar is also stowed during transit. The missiles are re-loaded automatically
from an internal magazine with 15 rounds (missiles are stored and transported in sealed canisters) and can also accept munitions manually loaded from outside the vehicle. The
manufacturer claims that three 9P157-2 tank destroyers are able to engage 14 attacking tanks and destroy at least sixty percent of the attacking force. The dual guidance system
ensures protection against electronic countermeasures and operation in all climatic conditions, day or night. NBC protection is provided for the crew (gunner and driver) of each
9P157-2 in addition to full armour protection equivalent to the standard BMP-3 chassis and entrenching equipment. The 9M123 missile itself is supersonic, flying at an average speed
of 400 m/s (Mach 1.2) and a range of between 400 and 6,000 meters.[55] Entered service in 2005. More than 10 sets of new anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) complexes
“Khrizantema-S” on the crawler, which replaced the complexes “Shturm”, entered the artillery units of the Southern Military District, based in Ingushetia,
in November 2012.[57] Khrizantema vehicles are fielded with artillery units.
9P163M-1 “Kornet-T” – Anti-tank version with Kornet (AT-14) missile system. Some sources call it the 9P162. The Kornet is similar in function to
the Khrizantema missile system. The 9P163M-1 carries two 9M133 missiles on launch rails, which are extended from a stowed position during transit. Missiles are re-loaded
automatically by the tank destroyer from an internal magazine with 16 rounds (missiles are stored and transported in sealed canisters). Nuclear, biological and chemical protection
is provided for the two crew members (gunner and driver) in addition to full armour protection equivalent to the standard BMP-3 chassis. The guidance system of the 9P163M-1 allows
two missiles to be fired at once, the missiles operating on different guidance (laser) channels. The first Kornet-T missile carriers were delivered in 2003 to replace the Shturm-S,
and the first batch of 20 vehicles entered service in 2012. The Kornet-T is used by motorized units.
2S18 “Pat-S” (Ob.697) – Self-propelled version of the 152 mm howitzer 2A61 “Pat-B”. This was only a prototype, further development led
to the 2S31 Vena.
DZM “Vostorg-2” (dorozhno-zemlerojnaya mashina) – Combat engineer vehicle with a dozerblade and excavating bucket. Prototype.
UR-07 (ustanovka razminirovaniya) – Mine clearing system. The UR-07 might replace the UR-77 “Meteorit”. It has the same chassis as the BMP-3 but a
bigger steel hull with two launch ramps in the rear. The ramps are used to fire rockets towing hose-type mine-clearing line charges to clear mine fields.
UNSh (Ob.699) (unifitsirovannyj shassi) – Basic chassis for specialised variants.
KhTM (khodovoj trenazhor) – Driver trainer.
Hermes or TKB-841 – Air-defence vehicle with high-velocity missiles and radar system. Prototype.
2S31 Vena – Self-propelled mortar carrier equipped with a 120 mm mortar based on BMP-3 chassis. It entered production in 1996 and service in 2010.
2S38 ZAK-57 Derivatsiya-PVO – Self-propelled air defense vehicle based on BMP-3 chassis fitted with a 57 mm autocannon and passive reconnaissance and target
tracking equipment. It is designed to shoot down unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), cruise missiles, air-to-surface missiles, aircraft, helicopters, and MLRS rockets. 2S38 is
equipped with a TV/thermal-imaging system with automatic target lock-on and tracking capabilities, a laser rangefinder and a laser guidance system. The optical and electronic
target acquisition system can spot an aircraft at 6.4 km (4.0 mi) and using sectoral observation can detect aircraft over 12 km (7.5 mi) out. The cannon is fast enough to destroy
targets traveling 500 m/s (1,100 mph; 1,800 km/h; Mach 1.5). Laser-guided, air burst and specialized anti-drone munitions for ZAK-57 are in development. Its guided projectiles have
four wings folded in the casing and controlled by the actuator in the projectile’s nose section, using the energy of the airflow to steer themselves to the target.
UDAR UGV – Unmanned ground vehicle based on the tracked chassis of the BMP-3 with the center hull raised to fit the DUBM-30 Epoch armed with 2A42 autocannon,
7.62mm PKMT machine gun, and Kornet-M ATGM.
Vikhr UGV – Unmanned ground vehicle based on BMD-3 equipped with a smaller turret armed with 2A72 autocannon, 7.62mm PKMT coaxial machine gun and six
anti-tank guided missiles 9M133M Kornet-M, three on each side of the turret. It can carry separate aerial and ground drones.
Prokhod-1 – Unmanned mine-clearing vehicle based on the BMP-3 chassis. It is equipped with the anti-mine TMT-C trawl, and a remote weapon station turret with a 12.7mm
machine gun.
With the Ottoman assault on Sarikamish having stalled, General Yudenich,Chief of Staff of the Russian Caucasus Army, senses an opportunity
to deliver a devastating counterattack. The Ottoman IX and X Corps at Sarikamish are dependent on a single line of communication back to Ottoman territory running through Bardiz,
and Yudenich concludes that if the bulk of I Caucasian and II Turkestan Corps can hold the line against the Ottoman XI Corps, IX and X Corps can be encircled and annihilated. To
this end, he has ordered two regiments from II Turkestan Corps at Yeniköy to move north towards Bardiz, and today they are able to bring the town under artillery
fire.
The Battle of Sarikamish, December 27th, 1914.
For the past several days, the Ottoman X Corps has been moving south towards Sarikamish, but marching across mountain peaks and through waist-deep snow has seen it
lose a third of its strength to the elements. When it arrives at Sarikamish today alongside IX Corps, the two units can muster only 18 000 soldiers to attack a Russian garrison
that now numbers 14 000. Though the Ottomans manage to sever the rail connection between Sarikamish and Kars, and though elements of 17th Division break into the town after dark,
the Russians are able to rally and repulse the enemy assault.
The Battle of Sarikamish, December 26th, 1914.
With the arrival of 17th Division today, Enver Pasha orders IX Corps to attack Sarikamish, even though X Corps has not yet arrived, and despite IX Corps having lost
15 000 of its starting 25 000 men over the past five days to the weather. Moreover, since December 25th the Russian garrison of Sarikamish has grown from two battalions of infantry
to ten, and though the Ottomans press their attacks with great courage and tenacity, they are unable to break through the Russian lines and occupy the town.
The Battle of Sarikamish, December 24th, 1914.
In the Caucasus the occupation of Bardiz today by the Ottoman 29th Division of IX Corps masks growing problems with Enver’s offensive. Moving through heavy
snow and in frigid conditions, thousands are already being lost to the elements; 17th Division of IX Corps reports that as much as 40% of its soldiers have fallen behind, some
undoubtedly disappearing into the drifts of snow. X Corps to the north, meanwhile is exhausted, but two of its divisions are pushed northwards towards Ardahan before Enver orders
it to redirect itself westwards to cover IX Corps left flank. 29th Division, meanwhile, is given no rest – Enver instructs it to march immediately on Sarikamish, not only to
complete the envelopment of the Russian forces facing XI Corps but because the Ottoman units need to seize Russian supplies if they are not to run out of food and
starve.
On the Russian side, I Caucasian and II Turkestan Corps are in the line facing XI Corps when Enver begins his offensive, the former to the south of the latter. The
first response of General Bergmann, commander of I Caucasian Corps, had been to order his force to advance westward in an attempt to threaten the rear of the Ottoman IX and X
Corps. General Nikolai Yudenich, Chief of Staff of the Russian Caucasus Army, is better able to understand the threat the Ottoman advance poses to Sarikamish, and orders I
Caucasian Corps to instead withdraw today while moving reinforcements to concentrate at the threatened town.
The planned advance of the Ottoman 3rd Army
against Sarikamish.December 22nd, 1914
What will become the Battle of Sarikamish begins today when Enver Pasha orders the Ottoman XI and X Corps of his 3rd Army to begin their advance into the Russian
Caucasus. Enver’s objective is the town of Sarikamish, which sits at the head of the main railway supplying Russian forces in the Caucasus, but his plan bears the strong
imprint of German thinking and the influence of 3rd Army’s Chief of Staff Baron Bronsart von Schellendorff. Of 3rd Army’s three corps, XI Corps, reinforced by two
divisions that had been originally bound for Syria and Iraq, was to frontally attack the two Russian corps southwest of Sarikamish in order to fix them in place. This was no small
task for XI Corps, given the two Russian corps number 54 000 men and the Ottoman unit would have been outnumbered by just one of the enemy corps. The key maneouvre, however, is to
be undertaken by IX and X Corps. The former, sitting on XI Corps’ left, is to advance along a mountain path known as the top yol towards Çatak,
from which it can descend on Sarikamish from the northwest, outflanking the two Russian corps pinned by XI Corps. Though the top yol is known to the Russians, they believe it was
impractical to move large bodies of troops along it. Enver, for his part, believes that not only is the path useable but its high altitude and exposed position would ensure that
high winds kept it swept of snow, as compared to the valleys below. Finally, X Corps, on the left of IX Corps, is to advance and occupy the town of Oltu, from which one portion of
the corps can move to support IX Corps’ move on Sarikamish, while another portion can continue northeastwards towards the town of Ardahan. If successful, the plan promises
the envelopment and annihilation of the two Russian corps southwest of Sarikamish and the opening of the way to Kars. With its emphasis on outflanking the enemy position, it has
the obvious imprint of the thinking of Schliffen and the German General Staff. Further, Enver’s plan involves precise timetabling of the advance of IX and X Corps (necessary
given the lack of communications between the three corps of 3rd Army) which removes all possibility of improvisation and does not allow for any unit to fall behind schedule.
Finally, there is the emphasis on speed – the soldiers of IX Corps, for instance, are told to leave their coats and packs behind to quicken their advance. This ignores the
obvious reality of conducting operations in the Caucasus in December and January – temperatures are consistently below -30 degrees centigrade and the snow on the ground is
measured in feet, not inches. This ignorance of the human element, also a conspicuous reflection of pre-war German planning, is to be of decisive import in the days
ahead.
By choosing to enter the war on Germany’s side, the Ottomans were tying the fate of their empire to Germany’s. It was a calculated risk. Germany stood an excellent
chance of winning the war, and it had no immediate designs on Ottoman territory. Its victory would provide the outcome most conducive to affording the breather they needed to
implement the reforms to rejuvenate their empire. From the German perspective, the Ottoman empire could fulfill three functions. It could cut Russia’s communications through
the Black Sea to the rest of the world, tie down Russian forces in the Caucasus, and “awaken the fanaticism of Islam” to spark rebellions against British and Russian rule in India,
Egypt, and the Caucasus.
Around the time of the signing of the secret alliance, Enver and the Germans had discussed a number of speculative war plans, most involving offensives in the Balkans. In the
middle of August Enver ordered his German chief of staff to draw up a formal plan for the opening of the war. The plan identified the main axis of effort to be an attack on the
Suez to cut British communications to India and left open the option of an amphibious landing in the vicinity of Odessa. Another possibility the plan offered was a joint offensive
against Serbia and Russia in the Balkans. Throughout the opening months of the war Ottoman and German planners remained committed to a passive stance in the Caucasus. Indeed, the
August mobilization deployed the bulk of the Ottoman army in the west in Thrace, not in the east. The Ottoman force facing the Caucasus, the Third Army, was to brace for an attack
and mount a defense around Erzurum. Only in the event of a decisive defeat of the Russians was the Ottoman army to go on the offensive.
When Russian forces began to close in on the Austro-Hungarian city of Lemberg (Lviv), Vienna urged the Ottomans to launch an amphibious invasion near Odessa to relieve the
pressure. The initial enthusiasm for the idea of Enver and Austrian and German planners, who entertained ideas of inciting not just Muslims but Georgians, Jews, and even Cossacks
to rebel against the Russians, faded once the enormous logistical difficulties involved became clear. They did not give up the idea of an amphibious operation altogether. Major
Süleyman Askerî Bey, the chief of the Tekilât-ι Mahsusa, envisioned smaller clandestine landings of Ukrainian and other partisans along the Black Sea coast to spark rebellions.
The Tekilât-ι Mahsusa and the Program of Revolution
Enver Pasha had founded the Tekilât-ι Mahsusa in November 1913.59 The experience of fighting against insurgents in the Balkans and as an insurgent against the Italians had
impressed upon Enver and other officers the utility of an organization for irregular warfare. Moreover, an organization that could act in secrecy and lend the Ottoman state
“plausible deniability” had obvious utility in the cutthroat yet diplomatically bounded international environment in which the Ottomans were forced to maneuver. Enver and his
German advisors hoped to use the Tekilât-ι Mahsusa to spark uprisings behind the lines of their foes. In August Tekilât-ι Mahsusa operatives formed units in Trabzon, Van, and
Erzurum to carry out clandestine and guerrilla operations inside Russia and Iran. Bahaeddin akir took command of the unit in Erzurum, the Caucasus Revolutionary Committee. The
committee recruited heavily among Circassians. For purposes of internal security and secrecy, it required two current members to attest to a candidate’s trustworthiness. By
mid September they had formed several bands of Circassians and Iranians armed with pamphlets as well as small arms and grenades. Addressed to “our brothers in faith,” the appeals
of the Caucasus Revolutionary Committee called upon the Muslims of the Caucasus to rise up against the “Moskof” oppressor and to drive the “unbeliever” from the Caucasus entirely.
Several operatives left for the North Caucasus and Azerbaijan, where they made contact with locals, including Mehmed Emin Resulzade of the Musavat Party.
The Kaiser was not the sole German holding high hopes for the revolutionary possibilities of pan-Islam. Extrapolating from the conviction that Islam was a martial religion that
could not countenance the rule of unbelievers over Muslims, German policymakers presumed that Muslims under Entente rule were essentially obliged by both belief and psychological
constitution to revolt. With much encouragement from them, Ali Haydar Efendi, the Ottoman sheikh ul-Islam – the most senior religious authority in the Ottoman state – proclaimed a
jihad on 14 November, three days after the Porte’s declaration of war. The proclamation summoned all Muslims, Shii as well as Sunni, to war against Russia, Britain, and
France. The call to jihad had little to no effect, except perhaps among the Kurds of Iran, among whom more immediate factors were at work. The idea of waging a holy war in alliance
with the infidel powers of Germany and Austria-Hungary was dubious at best. Rumors that Germany had paid for the proclamation circulated inside even the Ottoman empire. Most
Muslims did not find that their own circumstances merited war, regardless of what a religious scholar in Istanbul might declare.
The Germans’ ardor for pan-Islam loomed greater than their competence or common sense, and they often worked at cross-purposes with their Muslim Ottoman allies, who viewed
German efforts in the Middle East with suspicion. The presence in the German effort of unqualified specialists and outright charlatans did not improve matters. The German Foreign
Ministry hired a journalist, Max Froloff, to go to the Red Sea region to recruit Muslim holy warriors. Froloff opted to make a shorter trip to Holland where he wrote an account of
his imagined experiences. The publication of his book nonetheless had an impact. Its descriptions of Froloff’s visits to Mecca and Medina, holy cities strictly barred to
non-Muslims, sullied the Ottomans’ reputation as guardians of the sacred sites and consequently incensed them. Another German project bordering on the surreal was the dispatching,
over the objections of Enver and the Ottoman Interior Ministry, of an Austrian orientalist and Catholic priest, Alois Musil, to inspire Muslim Arabs to embark on jihad. Notably,
after returning from Arabia, Musil testified to the “complete indifference of the tribes toward holy war and Pan-Islamic ideas.” The belief that the Germans were using such
missions to prepare the ground for the postwar expansion of German influence haunted the Ottomans, who obstructed German efforts at holy war at several junctures. Frustrated, the
Germans moved the center of pan-Islamic operations in 1916 from Istanbul to Berlin.
Perhaps precisely because they themselves were Muslims, many Ottoman officials had been skeptical about the possibilities of pan-Islamic revolution from the beginning. Consular
officers in Taganrog, Odessa, Novorossiisk, Batumi, and Tiflis all reported that Russia’s mobilization had only caused people, including Muslims, to rally around the tsar. In
Tiflis Muslims were praying for Russia’s victory. The chargé d’affaires in St. Petersburg Fahreddin Bey predicted that in the event of war the vast majority of
Russia’s Muslims would not only fail to take active measures on the Ottomans’ behalf but would probably fight alongside the Russians as in the War of 1877–78. Most were
living in poverty and uneducated, he explained, and those with some education tended to be even more pro-Russian. Indeed, Enver himself advised his subordinates that most of
Russia’s Muslim Circassians would fight on Russia’s side and that the “Türkmen” (by which he probably meant Azeri Turks) and Muslim and Christian Georgians would merely
refrain from actively supporting Russia.
The war opens
Before their respective governments had declared war, Russian and British armed forces initiated combat operations against the Ottomans along the Iranian border, in the Persian
Gulf, and in the Levant. Russia’s initial war plan for the Caucasus provided for an active defense with limited local offensives. Encountering only light resistance, however,
Russian forces from Iran pushed further into Ottoman territory to occupy Köprüköy and threaten Erzurum. The Ottoman army then struck, however, and within two weeks had driven their
foes back. To the north, where the Tekilât-ι Mahsusa raised a force of some 5,000 Laz and Ajar irregulars, Ottoman forces managed to take the towns of Artvin and Ardanuch. They
announced their entrance into the formerly Ottoman town of Ardahan toward the end of December by firing off a telegram to Istanbul boasting simply, “Greetings from Ardahan!” These
victories had not been easy, and rifts between the Tekilât-ι Mahsusa and regular army led Enver to dismiss Bahaeddin akir from command, but in the initial confrontations the
Ottomans had bested the Russian Caucasus Army.
Sarikamish: gamble and disaster
These early successes emboldened Enver to plan a major offensive to envelop and crush Russian units in the vicinity of Sarikamish (Sarιkamι). In view of the rugged terrain, the
winter weather, and the balance of forces, the plan involved tremendous risks, which Enver’s subordinates brought to his attention. Enver, however, was not one to fear risk.
His meteoric rise had taught him to embrace it. The hero of 1908 had gone from junior officer to minister of war in a mere five years. Moreover, his German chief of staff, Bronsart
von Schellendorf, was encouraging him to undertake a major offensive. With Germany’s armies bogged down on two fronts and Austria-Hungary on the defensive, the short
victorious war the Central Powers had wagered on was growing into a stalemate. If the Ottomans could envelop the Russians on the Caucasian front and inflict a stunning defeat on
them as the Germans had done at Tannenberg, the war effort would regain momentum. Enver had no experience commanding large units but, ever self-confident, he arrived in Erzurum to
take personal command of the operation.
The offensive commenced on 22 December. Unseasonably warm weather boded well. In the initial days the 95,000-strong Third Army made good progress. By coincidence, the tsar had
appeared in Sarikamish on a morale-building mission, and some Russians now feared the advancing Ottomans might capture him. The population in Sarikamish and even some Russian
generals panicked. But in the meantime the weather shifted dramatically. Temperatures plunged to −36°C and blizzard conditions set in, trapping tens of thousands of poorly clothed
Ottoman soldiers in the mountain passes. Most of these were without winter gear and some were without even footwear. Meanwhile, newly arrived reserves enabled the Russians to
counterattack. The result was a calamitous rout from which the Ottoman army would never fully recover. Not until 1918 and the disintegration of the Russian army would the Ottomans
again be able to go on the strategic offensive on the Caucasian front.
As bad as it was, the disaster of Sarikamish later acquired mythical proportions as part of an effort to discredit the Unionists and Enver in particular. Thus Enver’s
decision to launch a wintertime offensive with ill-clothed troops in the mountains is often presented as the epitome of stupidity and fanaticism. Total Ottoman losses were
crippling, but closer to 60,000 than the 130,000–140,000 of popular legend. One explanation advanced for Enver’s otherwise seemingly ineffable heedlessness for entering both
the war and the offensive at Sarikamish is a deep-seated pan-Turanism, a grand desire to unite the Turkic and Muslim peoples of the Caucasus, Russia, and Central Asia with those of
the Ottoman empire. Such an explanation is not convincing. As noted earlier, Ottoman mobilization plans deployed the army in the west, not on the Caucasian front. Despite the fact
that an invasion of the Caucasus was the most obvious and straightforward way to bring the war to Russia, Enver settled on a Caucasian offensive only after discarding for
geographic and logistical reasons other options of attack through the Balkans or across the Black Sea. The military stalemate in Europe led Germany and Austria-Hungary to press the
Ottomans to launch an offensive against Russia sooner. Enver’s concept of encircling Russian units at Sarikamish and cutting them off from their rear was daring but not
hare-brained, and in accord with standard military doctrine. Finally, the Ottomans made no effort even to present the operation as pan-Turanist. Liman von Sanders does recollect
that Enver commented that he “contemplated marching through Afghanistan to India.” A conversational aside is hardly conclusive evidence, and it is notable that Enver stated the
objective was India. India was not an objective of pan-Turanism, but British India had long been an objective of Britain’s rivals, including Germany and Russia.
Given that the advice of Enver’s Ottoman and German staff officers alike was split regarding the proposed operation, Enver’s personality became critical to the
decision to attack. Personal experience had taught the youthful war minister that boldness pays. The Third Army executed the first half of the operation well, but the drastic shift
in the weather and the uncommonly swift Russian counterattack sealed its fate; its fate was not sealed from the beginning. The tactical blunder committed by Enver at Sarikamish –
emphasized so often to underscore the alleged irrational pull of pan-Turanism upon Enver and the Ottomans in general – is less remarkable when compared with the record of British,
French, and German generals fighting on the western front in France, who sacrificed far greater numbers of lives over a longer period of time for no strategic advantage.
Shortly after it had commenced its offensive on Sarikamish, the Ottoman army launched a probe into northern Iran. The idea was that a relatively small force led by the Unionist
and Tekilât-ι Mahsusa commander Ömer Naci Bey, who had fought alongside Iranian constitutionalists in 1907 and knew the region, would rally the Muslims of Iran to rebel against the
Russians, stir problems in the Russian rear, and perhaps even facilitate a drive toward Baku, the center of Russia’s oil industry. The probe initially made rapid headway when
General Aleksandr Myshlaevskii, panicked by the advance at Sarikamish, ordered the abandonment of Urmia and Tabriz. The Russians’ sudden withdrawal inspired the Kurds of Iran,
including the Russians’ erstwhile ally Simko, to swell the ranks of the Ottoman force. The Ottomans and their local allies entered Tabriz on 14 January, looting and wreaking terror
upon Assyrian and Armenian villagers along the way. After Russian defenses at Sarikamish had stabilized, however, the chief of staff of the Caucasus Army General Nikolai Yudenich
ordered General Fedor Chernozubov immediately to retake Tabriz and secure the northern Iranian plateau. The return of the Russians in force caused the Ottoman offensive in Iran
promptly to collapse.
Attack on the Suez
At the same time that Enver was presiding over the disaster at Sarikamish, Cemal Pasha was readying forces for an offensive on the Suez. The offensive aimed at cutting
Britain’s lines of communication to India and inciting the Muslims of Egypt and North Africa to rebel against their British and French overlords. Berlin assigned tremendous
importance to attacking the British in Egypt and from the beginning of the war had been eager for an attack across the Suez Canal. The Ottomans had not foreseen a multifront war in
which Britain was an adversary and so formed a new army, the Fourth, with its headquarters in Damascus. Cemal arrived on 18 November to take command of the offensive. Due to the
long distances involved and the poor state of the roads and communications his army was ready only in the middle of January. The Ottoman and German planners hoped to exploit
religious sentiment against the British and included in the 4th Army a number of imams for this purpose. A German advisor made the fantastic prediction that 70,000 “Arab nomads”
would join their invading Ottoman co-religionists when they reached the canal. The inclusion of a company of Druze, a sect whose beliefs are anathema to mainstream Sunni Islam,
however, belies the notion that Sunni fanaticism inspired the offensive.
After skillfully executing a difficult advance across the Sinai to the Suez, the 4th Army launched their attack across the canal on the night of 2 February. Although they
achieved tactical surprise, they ran into difficulties at the canal due to improper equipment and a lack of training in water crossings. The British on the opposite bank rushed in
reinforcements and repelled those who had made it across. After two days of fighting, Cemal pulled back, having suffered roughly 1,300 casualties.
The offensive had failed in part because Berlin pressured the Ottomans to attack prematurely. Nonetheless, it is doubtful that the offensive would have achieved major results
even if the initial assault force had established a bridgehead on the western bank. Ottoman supply lines were long, Ottoman forces limited, and British military and naval power in
and around Egypt was substantial. The outbreak of a rebellion in the British rear perhaps could have assisted the assault, but precisely to preclude such a possibility the British
had withdrawn their native Egypti
The majority of crime results from the illegal acquisition of property; making up around 2 in 3 of all crime (66%) in the Police Recorded Crime (PRC) series and 80% of all
incidents estimated by the Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW).
The reduction in property crime has been the main driver in falling crime numbers since the mid-1990s.
The CSEW indicates that while there have been long-term declines across most types of property crime, the falls have been most pronounced in vehicle-related thefts (which include
attempted thefts as well as actual thefts from and of vehicles), domestic burglary and criminal damage.
Some commentators have suggested that crime has not actually fallen;
but rather changed its nature and moved into offence categories not well covered by the official statistics, such as fraud and computer misuse. However, new Experimental Statistics from the CSEW on fraud and computer
misuse offences show a substantial volume of crimes (5.8 million) were experienced by the population resident in households in the last 12 months but should be seen in the context
of a fall of 10.2 million incidents of property crime since its peak in 1995.
Initial findings from these Experimental Statistics showed an estimated 6.5% of adults in
England and Wales had been victims of fraud in the previous 12 months (representing a higher prevalence rate than any other crime type) while 3.6% had been victims of computer
misuse. A further update to these Experimental
Statistics, for the year ending June 2016 has also now been published and had similar estimates of incident numbers and prevalence rates.
In the survey year ending March
2016, estimates of CSEW property crime (excluding fraud) continued to fall and there was a reduction of 7% (from 5.4 million to 5.1 million incidents) compared with the previous
year. Police recorded property crime rose by 2% compared with the previous year. This should be seen in the context of a long-term downward trend.
The main drivers in Police
Recorded Crime of the increase were the offence categories of criminal damage and arson (an increase of 7%, or 35,898 offences) and fraud (an increase of 4%, or 26,563 offences).
However, some of the increases in criminal damage are thought to relate to improvements in police recording practices. Other offence categories also increased slightly compared
with the previous year, though being lower volume increases, they contributed less to overall police recorded property crime. These offence categories include: shoplifting, theft
from the person and vehicle offences.
CSEW offences relating to theft of personal items; either unattended (other personal theft) or attended (theft from the person) have not
fallen at the same pronounced rate as other property crime types. Therefore such thefts now make up a higher proportion of CSEW property crime than in previous years (22%,
combined). Most commonly, these thefts are targeted at purses, wallets, bank cards, money and mobile phones. Specifically, wallets or purses continue to be stolen in a high
proportion (41%) of theft from the person offences along with cash or foreign currency and mobile phones (40% and 37% respectively).
Similar to previous years, general
patterns of victimisation were similar across most types of CSEW property crime. Victims of property crimes were more likely to be living in urban areas and areas that had low
employment levels, or high levels of incivility. However, analysis of CSEW Experimental Statistics (relating to fraud and computer misuse) found less variation than other types of
property crime, in the rate of victimisation across different groups in society.
This bulletin provides an overview of statistics on property crime measured by the Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW) and recorded by the police1. The main
trends and the more detailed CSEW data contained within the “Nature of Crime” tables, published
alongside this release, are also discussed within this bulletin. We also present some statistics on property crimes against businesses based on the Commercial Victimisation Survey
(CVS)2. There is further information on each of these sources in the “Quality and Methodology“ section of this release.
Property crime is defined as incidents
where individuals, households or corporate bodies are deprived of their property by illegal means (including attempts) or where their property is damaged. For the purposes of this
report, robbery3 is included as a property crime. Fraud4 is included in total police recorded property crime. CSEW Experimental Statistics on fraud and
computer offences are also referenced, although owing to their experimental nature, they are not included in the total CSEW property crime estimates at this time.
Property
crime covered by the survey includes: criminal damage, vehicle-related theft, domestic burglary, other household theft, theft from the person, other theft of personal property,
bicycle theft and robbery.
Crime recorded by the police includes the following offence categories: fraud, criminal damage, burglary, vehicle offences, shoplifting, bicycle
theft, theft from the person, “other” theft offences and robbery5.
CSEW data are presented for the latest financial year (ending March 2016) although data for the
survey year ending June 2016 have already been published as part of our regular quarterly release.
Time periods
covered
Analysis here is based on financial year data for the year ending March 2016, since this is the latest time period for which we have available all analysis discussed
in this release. Additionally, financial year data are more commonly used to measure long-term trends. Year to June 2016 data are only referenced throughout this bulletin in
instances where these updated figures help interpret recent findings.
The CSEW figures presented in this release are based on interviews conducted between April 2015 and March 2016, measuring people’s experiences of crime in the 12
months before the interview.
The latest recorded crime figures relate to crimes recorded by the police for the year ending March 2016. Police recorded crime data presented in
this release are those notified to the Home Office and were recorded in the Home Office database as at 15 September 2016.
In this release:
“latest year” (or “latest survey year”) refers to the year (or survey year) ending March 2016
“previous year” (or “previous survey year”) refers to the year (or survey year) ending March 2015
any other time period is referred to explicitly
Crime Survey for England and Wales
The CSEW is a face-to-face victimisation survey in which people resident in households in England and Wales are asked about their
experiences of a selected range of offences in the 12 months prior to the interview. For the population and offence types it covers, the CSEW provides the better measure of trends
on a consistent basis over time.
The CSEW is able to capture a broad range of victim-based crimes experienced by those interviewed, not just those that have been reported to,
and recorded by, the police.
New questions on fraud and computer misuse were added to the CSEW in October 2015. While these questions had only been included within the CSEW
for half of the survey year by the end of March 2016, sufficient data were gathered to produce estimates of fraud and computer misuse, and these are referenced in this release as
Experimental Statistics. These do not yet form part of the
headline CSEW estimates. Until such data are available for 2 complete survey years, comparisons with previous years and analysis of trends will be based on CSEW crime excluding
fraud and computer misuse offences.
In addition to these new data covering a wide spectrum of fraud, for the last decade, the survey has included a supplementary module of
questions specifically on plastic card (bank and credit card) fraud. References to CSEW “plastic card fraud” within this bulletin refer to these separate data. Data from these
questions provide an indication of whether an individual has been a victim of plastic card fraud, but do not provide any information on the number of times this occurred or the
scale of any loss that may have been experienced.
Police recorded crime
Police recorded crime figures are restricted to a subset of notifiable offences that have been
reported to and recorded by the police. Therefore, while the police recorded crime series covers a wider population and a broader set of offences than the CSEW, it does not include
crimes that do not come to the attention of the police or are not recorded by them.
Owing to a change in recording practices brought about by the introduction of the
National Crime Recording Standard6 (NCRS) in April 2002, it is not possible to make direct long-term comparisons of police recorded crime prior to the year ending March
2003. Thus, this release restricts discussion of trends in police recorded property crime to the periods between the year ending March 2003 and March 2016.
Notwithstanding
the above, the police recorded crime series is currently not considered a reliable measure of trends in crime. Following an assessment of crime
statistics by the UK Statistics Authority, published in January 2014, the statistics based on police recorded crime data were found not to meet the required standard for
designation as National Statistics. Apparent increases in police recorded crime seen over the last 2 years may reflect a number of factors, including tightening of recording
practice, process improvements, increases in reporting by victims and also genuine increases in the levels of crime. While improvements in recording practices are thought to have
centred more on violent crime, the impact of these improvements is likely to have also affected police recording processes more broadly. Further information is available in Section
13 (Quality and methodology).
Police recorded crime is the principal source of subnational crime statistics and for relatively serious, but low volume, crimes that are not
well-measured by a sample survey. Police recorded crime also covers victims and sectors excluded from the CSEW sample (for example, residents of institutions, tourists and crimes
against commercial bodies), but only, of course, to the extent that such victims report crimes to the police, which varies substantially by crime type (CSEW data inform us that
whilst burglaries are relatively well reported to police, attempted thefts from the person are reported at a much lower rate).
Chapter 3 of the User Guide provides more detailed information about police
recorded crime.
Commercial Victimisation Survey
The Commercial Victimisation Survey (CVS) is a telephone survey in which respondents from a representative sample of
business premises in certain sectors in England and Wales are asked about crimes experienced at their premises in the 12 months prior to interview. Surveys took place in 2012,
2013, 2014 and 2015 having previously run in 1994 and 2002. Further information relating to coverage, quality and methodology can be found in Crime against businesses: findings from
the 2015 CVS: methodology.
Notes for things you need to know about this release:
Police recorded crime data presented in this release are those notified to the Home Office and were recorded in the Home Office database on 15 September 2016.
Data from the CVS are classified as Official Statistics as they have not yet been assessed for National Statistics status.
Robbery is an offence in which violence or the threat of violence is used during a theft (or attempted theft) and, within the quarterly statistical release, is reported as a
separate, standalone category in both the police recorded crime and CSEW data series. As robbery involves an element of theft, it is included within this “Focus on: Property crime”
publication.
The classification of fraud incidents for use in the published statistics consists of 4 major fraud categories: bank and credit account fraud, advanced fee fraud,
non-investment fraud and other fraud, an outline of each can be found in Overview of fraud statistics: year ending March 2016.
More detailed definitions of CSEW offences and police recorded crime offences can be found in Chapter 5 of the User Guide.
The NCRS, introduced in April 2002, was designed to ensure greater consistency between forces in recording crime and to take a more victim-oriented approach to crime recording,
with the police being required to record any allegation of crime unless there was credible evidence to the contrary.
Property crime accounted for 80% (an estimated 5,066,000 incidents) of all crime covered by the Crime Survey for England and Wales
(CSEW) in the latest survey year. Criminal damage (24%), vehicle-related theft (17%), other theft of personal property (15%), domestic burglary (14%) and other household theft
(13%) were the largest components of CSEW property crime in the latest survey year. Theft from the person, bicycle theft and robbery collectively accounted for a small proportion
of CSEW property crime (7%, 6% and 3%, respectively).
Comparing the composition of property crime in 1995 (when peak levels of crime were measured) with the latest survey
year, the most noticeable difference is in vehicle-related theft (Figure 1). Estimated incidences of this offence have dropped from 4.3 million offences in 1995 (when it made up
28% of property crime) to just under 0.9 million offences in the latest survey year (making up 17% of property crime). The sub-categories of theft from a vehicle, theft of a
vehicle and attempted thefts of, and, from vehicles fell 74%, 84% and 88% respectively over this timescale.
Domestic burglary also fell by a slightly higher rate than other
property crimes (by around 1.7 million offences over this time period) and now contributes slightly less (14%) to overall property crime than in 1995 (16%). This has meant other
elements of property crime, now contribute slightly more to overall CSEW property crime. Improvements in car and home security as well as increased desirability and value of items
commonly carried on the person (such as smartphones) have undoubtedly played a role in this changing composition of property crime.
Figure 1: Composition of Crime Survey for England and Wales property crime, year ending December 1995 and year ending March 2016
Source: Crime Survey for England and Wales, Office for National Statistics
Notes:
Experimental statistics on fraud are not included.
Property crime made up 66% (2,970,843 offences) of all police recorded crime in the year ending March 2016. Fraud (21%), criminal damage and
arson (18%) and “other” theft offences, such as theft of unattended items (16%), were the largest components of property offences recorded by the police in the latest year. Theft
from the person (3%), bicycle theft (3%) and robbery (2%) collectively accounted for a small proportion of all police recorded property crime; Figure 2 provides a full
breakdown.
Figure 2: Composition of police recorded property crime in England and Wales, year ending March 2003 and year ending March 20161
Source: Police recorded crime, Home Office
Notes:
Police recorded crime data are not designated as National Statistics.
Fraud offences were recorded by Action Fraud and the National Fraud Intelligence Bureau (through Cifas and Financial Fraud Action UK) from the year ending March 2012 onwards.
Comparisons between earlier years are not directly comparable due to fraud offences coming from new data collections and the implementation of improved recording practices since
the year ending March 2012.
Comparing the composition of police recorded property crime in the year ending March 2016 with the year ending March 2003, noticeable changes include the following:
The volume of shoplifting offences has remained fairly steady relative to other offence categories, which have fallen over time. As a result, this now makes up a larger
share of crimes recorded by the police (11% of property crime in the latest year compared with 6% in the year ending March 2003).
Fraud made up 21% of property crime (619,674 offences) in the latest year compared with 4% (183,683 offences) in the year ending March 2003. However, it should be noted that
increases in fraud offences can at least in part be attributed to the extended coverage of police recorded fraud and improvements in recording following the roll-out of a national
reporting centre (Action Fraud). Such changes from the year ending March 2012, mean it is not possible to make valid comparisons between current fraud data and data available prior
to 20121.
The contribution of vehicle crime to total police recorded property crime reduced by 10 percentage points between the years ending March 2003 and March 2016 (from 22% to
12%). The proportion of property crime accounted for by burglary reduced by 5 percentage points to 13%. Criminal damage also now contributes 5 percentage points less than in the
year ending March 2003 (18%). Some of the above are a by-product of changes to the reporting and recording of fraud data. When fraud is excluded from the police recorded data, the
contributions of criminal damage and burglary to police recorded property crime is almost unchanged compared with the year end 2003. However, the contribution of vehicle crime
still drops by 7 percentage points, demonstrating that these offences have fallen at a faster pace than other property crimes.
Property crime against children aged 10 to
15
Based on the latest survey year, there were an estimated 274,000 incidents of personal theft and 111,000 incidents of criminal damage to personal property experienced by
children aged 10 to 152. Around 65% of the thefts were classified as “Other theft of personal property” (179,000 incidents), which includes thefts of unattended
property. Given the small sample size for the 10-to-15-year old element of the CSEW, estimates can fluctuate over time and as a result trends can be difficult to interpret. The
planned future development and analysis of a rolling 3-year dataset in 2017 for the age 10 to 15 element of the CSEW will hopefully go some way to addressing these issues by
providing estimates based on a much larger sample size. Currently detailed data for the year ending March 2016 are available in the corresponding quarterly release, Tables F21, F22 and F23.
Commercial
Victimisation Survey
Of the crimes against business covered by the Commercial Victimisation Survey (CVS) in 2015, 91% were property-related (an estimated 4.9 million
offences). Section 12
provides further details.
Notes for the composition of property crime:
It is not possible to make direct comparisons with police recorded fraud figures between the years ending March 2003 and March 2016. Further information is available Overview of fraud statistics: year ending March
2016.
Based on the preferred measure of crime, more information about the preferred and broad measures of crime against children aged 10 to 15 can be found in Section 2.5 of the User Guide.
Steady increases in Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW) property crime were seen from 1981 when the survey started, peaking in 1995. Since
then, levels of property crime have declined and estimates from the latest survey year were 67% lower than in 19951 (Figure 3). This trend is consistent with that seen
in many other countries (Tseloni et al., 2010).
Figure 3: Long-term trends in Crime Survey for England and Wales, total crime and property crime, year ending December 1981 to year ending March
2016
Source: Crime Survey for England and Wales, Office for National Statistics
Notes:
Prior to year ending March 2002, CSEW respondents were asked about their experience of crime in the previous calendar year, so year-labels identify the year in which the crime
took place. Following the change to continuous interviewing, respondents' experience of crime relates to the full 12 months prior to interview (that is. a moving reference period),
so year-labels from the year ending 2002 onwards identify the CSEW year of interview.
Figure 4 shows the trend for a number of the high volume property crime types. Most of these show a similar trend to overall CSEW property crime, with levels peaking in the
mid-1990s, followed by a general decline.
The rate of reduction in vehicle offences has been striking. Over the longer-term, the CSEW indicates a consistent downward trend in
levels of vehicle-related theft (the highest volume offence in the theft categories) with the latest estimates being 79% lower than in 1995. There were an estimated 878,000
vehicle-related thefts in the latest survey year, the lowest estimate since the survey began in 1981. Vehicle-owning households were around 5 times less likely to become a victim
of vehicle-related theft in the latest survey year than in 1995.
Improvements to vehicle security are likely to have contributed, in-part, to the reduction seen in vehicle
offences as suggested by Farrell et al 2008. This is discussed further in the Home Office research report,
Reducing criminal opportunity: vehicle security and vehicle crime.
Evidence from the Home Office research report, on the drug epidemic of the
1980s and 1990s published in July 2014 suggests the rise and fall in vehicle-related theft could also be partly attributed to the changing levels of illegal drug
use.
Domestic burglary and other theft of personal property offences peaked in the early to mid-1990s and steadily declined until the survey year ending March 2008. Between
the survey years ending March 2008 and March 2012, the downward trend in these offences appeared to flatten out, but further annual reductions have been seen in both offence
categories since this time.
Criminal damage peaked in the 1993 survey with 3.4 million incidents, followed by a series of modest falls (when compared with other CSEW offence
types) until the survey year ending March 2004 (2.4 million offences). There was then a short upward trend until the survey year ending March 2007 CSEW (2.9 million offences),
after which there were falls to its current level, the lowest since the survey began. So now, in a reversal from the earlier years of the property crime decline, criminal damage
has been the biggest driving factor in the fall, rather than burglary or vehicle crime.
Figure 4: Long-term trends in Crime Survey for England and Wales criminal damage, other theft of personal property, vehicle-related theft and
domestic burglary, year ending December 1981 to year ending March 2016
Source: Crime Survey for England and Wales, Office for National Statistics
Notes:
Prior to the year ending March 2002, CSEW respondents were asked about their experience of crime in the previous calendar year, so year-labels identify the year in which the
crime took place. Following the change to continuous interviewing, respondents' experience of crime relates to the full 12 months prior to interview (i.e. a moving reference
period), so year-labels from the year ending March 2002 onwards identify the CSEW year of interview.
Figure 5 shows the long-term trends in CSEW “other household theft” 2, theft from the person3, bicycle theft and robbery from 1981 to the survey year
ending March 2016. These crime types have shown somewhat different trends compared with those seen for overall CSEW property crime (Figure 3).
“Other household theft” mostly
includes theft from outside a dwelling but also includes theft from inside the home where the offender had the right to be there; for example, workmen or an acquaintance of the
victim. These offences peaked in 1993 and then declined until the survey year ending March 2008 (778,000 offences). This was then followed by a brief upward trend, until the survey
year ending March 2012, when a further general decline in “other household theft” began. The survey year ending March 2016 estimate (672,000 offences) is the lowest recorded since
the introduction of the survey.
Estimates of the volume of theft from the person offences have shown only a slight downward trend over the period from the late 1990s.
However, over the last 2 financial years the rate of change has been more pronounced. In the latest survey year, a non-significant fall of around 19% was seen compared with the
previous survey year. In contrast, in the latest year theft from the person offences recorded by the police have increased by 6% compared with the previous year.
Since these
are relatively low volume offences, CSEW estimates may be more volatile than for other offence types. Additionally, much of this fall (77%) resulted from a statistically
significant reduction in attempted thefts within this offence category. Attempted thefts are less likely to be reported to the police in the first instance and be visible within
trends based on police recorded crime. In the current survey year, it was estimated only 9% of attempted snatch or stealth thefts were reported to the police, compared with an
average of 46% of actual snatch or stealth thefts.
Bicycle theft peaked in 1995 and then declined until around the early 2000s. Since the survey year ending March 2003,
while the overall trend has remained relatively flat, there has been some year-on-year fluctuation.
Robbery has remained a low volume offence across the history of the
survey, typically accounting for around 2% to 3% of CSEW property crime. Levels have fluctuated from year to year and showed a small upward trend during the 1990s, peaking in the
1999 survey, before falling to levels similar to those seen in the 1980s. However, it should be noted that owing to the small number of robbery victims interviewed, CSEW estimates
have large confidence intervals and are prone to fluctuation from year to year (User Guide Tables UG2 to UG9).
There is no clear trend
within the estimates for property crime experienced by children aged 10 to 15 and data are only available from the survey year ending March 2010 onwards. The relatively small
number of children aged 10 to 15 interviewed by the CSEW means that the estimates for crime experienced by children aged 10 to 15 are prone to substantial year-on-year
fluctuation.
Figure 5: Long-term trends in Crime Survey for England and Wales other household theft, theft from the person, bicycle theft and robbery, year
ending December 1981 to year ending March 2016
Source: Crime Survey for England and Wales, Office for National Statistics
Notes:
Prior to the year ending March 2002, CSEW respondents were asked about their experience of crime in the previous calendar year, so year-labels identify the year in which the
crime took place. Following the change to continuous interviewing respondents' experience of crime relates to the full 12 months prior to interview (i.e. a moving reference
period), so year-labels from the year ending March 2002 onwards identify the CSEW year of interview.
For the last 3 years, while property crimes recorded by the police have remained relatively flat, overall police recorded crime has
seen some consecutive rises. Much of the rise in overall police recorded crime is thought to be down to improved recording practices and processes resulting from changes
implemented following the recent HMIC inspections.
These
improvements are likely to have had a broader impact on recording, which has also impacted on some property crimes. For example, the HMIC inspection noted that across all police
forces, only an estimated 67% of offences that should have been recorded as violent offences, were recorded as such, whilst 86% of criminal damage offences were recorded correctly.
While recording improvements are likely to have been more pronounced for violent offences, they may also have had some impact on the more accurate recording of other offences, such
as criminal damage.
Over the longer-term, property crime has shown year-on-year falls and, while in the latest year an increase of 2% was recorded, the volume of police
recorded property crime (2,970,843 offences) is still 38% lower than in the year ending March 2003 (4,821,745 offences). This represents a faster rate of reduction than overall
police recorded crime, which fell by 25% over the same period. Thus, the proportion of total police recorded crime accounted for by property crime has decreased by 15 percentage
points; from 81% in the year ending March 2003 to 66% in the year ending March 2016.
Figure 6: Trends in total police recorded crime and police recorded property crime in England and Wales, year ending December 1981 to year ending
March 2016
Source: Police recorded crime, Home Office
Notes:
Police recorded crime data are not designated as National Statistics.
Following changes to the Home Office Counting Rules (HOCR) in 1998 and the introduction of the National Crime Recording Standard (NCRS) in 2002, data from the year ending March
2003 onwards are not directly comparable with earlier years; nor are data between the year ending March 1999 and the year ending March 2002 directly comparable with data prior to
the year ending March 1999
Data from March 2012 onwards is not directly comparable with previous years. Fraud offences recorded by Action Fraud and the National Fraud Intelligence Bureau (through Cifas
and Financial Fraud Action UK) have been included from the year ending March 2012 onwards.
Similar to the CSEW, police recorded vehicle offences and burglary have shown the largest decreases in volume between the years ending March 2003 and March 2016 (vehicle
offences were down by 66%, to 366,647 offences and burglary was down by 55%, to 401,026 offences) (Figure 7). While the most recent year-on-year comparisons show increases in
vehicle offences (section 6 provides further information), these long-term decreases, alongside decreases in burglary, have been the main drivers of the overall downward trend in
property crime recorded by the police.
The longer-term reduction in vehicle offences should also be seen in the context of increases in the total number of vehicles licensed,
which has risen by 20% in Great Britain compared with 2003 (Vehicle Licensing Statistics Quarter 2 2016).
The long-term declines in vehicle-related offences seen in the CSEW and police recorded crime are substantial given the rise in the number of motor vehicles.
The long-term
trend for “all other theft offences” has been generally downward, other than a short period of increases between the years ending March 2010 and March 2012 (Figure 7). “Other theft
offences” – the largest subcategory of “all other theft offences” – includes theft of both personal property such as wallets or phones and property from outside people’s homes,
such as garden furniture, as well as metal theft from businesses.
The “other theft offences” subcategory, which comprises mostly theft of unattended items, accounted for 71%
(344,950 offences) of the overall “all other theft offences” category (486,217 offences) in the year ending March 2016. The police recorded “other theft offences” subcategory
includes crimes against businesses and other organisations not covered by the CSEW, but it is not possible to separately identify thefts against such victims in centrally held
police recorded crime data (this type of crime is covered by the Commercial Victimisation Survey for some business sectors).
“Other theft offences” have seen a 4% decrease in
the year ending March 2016 compared with the previous year, consistent with declining trends seen over the last 3 years. A short period of increase was seen between the years
ending March 2010 and March 2012. This rise was thought to have been driven by a surge in metal theft over this period, which corresponds with a spike in world commodity prices.
Recent evidence suggests that such offences are now decreasing and should be seen in the context of metal theft legislation which came into force in May 2013 (further
information is given in section
5).
This fall in “other theft offences” has offset smaller volume rises in other subcategories such as; making off without payment (a rise of 5,134 offences) and
blackmail offences (a rise of 2,398 offences) resulting in only a small overall fall (1%) in “all other theft offences”.
Figure 7: Trends in selected police recorded theft offences in England and Wales, year ending March 2003 to year ending March 2016
Source: Police recorded crime, Home Office
Notes:
Police recorded crime data are not designated as National Statistics.
Existing theories on why property crime has fallen
The reduction in property crime has been an important factor in driving falls in overall crime and various
theories have been put forward to explain these falls. Many of them are contested and subject to continuing discussion and debate4. A broad range of factors such as drug
consumption, the removal of lead from petrol, internet usage, forensic investigation techniques, legalised abortion, infrastructure deterrents such as CCTV, prison sentencing and
police activity have all been suggested as being linked to changes in crime levels. A fuller discussion of these theories can be found in Focus on property crime, year ending March
2015.
Increased quality of building and vehicle security is likely to have been a factor in the reduction in property crime. This concept of “target-hardening”, which
makes targets (that is, anything that an offender would want to steal or damage) more resistant to attack, is likely to deter offenders from committing crime (Cornish and Clarke, 2003). The recent Home Office research report ‘Reducing criminal opportunity: vehicle security and vehicle crime’ suggests
that while security is not the only factor of relevance, some vehicle security improvements have positively impacted vehicle crime reduction.
Findings from the CSEW add some
evidence to support this view point. There have been statistically significant reductions in vehicle-related theft resulting from offenders gaining entry by forcing locks (39% of
vehicle-related theft incidents in the 1995 CSEW; compared with 14% in the latest survey year) or breaking windows (40% of vehicle-related theft incidents in the 1995 CSEW;
compared with 23% in the latest survey year).
Additionally, the CSEW indicates that alongside the falls in property crime, there were also improvements in household
security. Since 1995, there have been statistically significant increases in the proportion of households in the latest survey year5 (‘Nature of Crime’ Table 3.12)
with:
window locks (up 21 percentage points from 68% to 89% of households)
light timers and sensors (up 16 percentage points from 39% to 56% of households)
double and dead locks (up 12 percentage points from 70% to 82% of households)
burglar alarms (up 11 percentage points from 20% to 31% of households) Notes for falling long-term trends in property crime:
CSEW trend data does not currently include fraud.
Thefts from inside a dwelling (referring to incidences in which the offender had the right to be there, in contrast to domestic burglary, where the offender did not have the
right to be there) and thefts from outside a dwelling.
Thefts of property being held or carried by someone, but no or minimal force is used (in contrast to robbery, where non-minimal force, or the threat of, is used).
ONS does not endorse any one of the theories over the others.
Sourced from ‘Nature of burglary, 2007/08’ tables (the latest published data on home security measures from the 1996 CSEW).
There were 16,155 metal theft offences recorded by the police (42 forces) in the year ending March 2016, a decrease of over a third (38%) compared with the
same forces for the previous year.
Over the same period (for the same 42 police forces) infrastructure-related metal theft offences, which include those that have a direct
impact on the functioning or structure of buildings or services, decreased by 36% while non-infrastructure-related metal theft decreased by 40%.
There were 3 metal theft
offences per 10,000 population in England in Wales in the latest year.
Rates of metal theft offences have remained highest in the Northern regions, with the North East
recording 7 offences per 10,000 population. However, all regions have shown similar patterns of metal theft trends with year-on-year decreases.
Police recorded
crime
Metal theft refers to the theft of items for the value of their constituent metals, rather than the attainment of the item itself. There is no specific offence
classification for metal theft and so it is not possible to identify such crimes with the main police recorded crime figures. However, a separate data collection from police forces
was established by the Home Office in April 2012 to identify the extent of metal theft offences. Appendix tables 16 to 19 provide more
detailed information.
Police forces can flag offences that involve metal theft as either infrastructure or non-infrastructure-related. Infrastructure-related thefts involve
the removal of metal that has a direct impact on the functioning or structure of buildings or services. This includes the theft of live services such as railway cabling, lead
roofing from churches and historical buildings and copper cabling from power supplies. Non-infrastructure-related thefts involve the removal of metal that has no direct impact on
the functioning or structure of buildings or services. This includes the theft of redundant metals, abandoned vehicles and gates and fencing.
Metal theft offences affect a
range of sectors; notably telecommunications, transport services, power suppliers and heritage sites. Metal theft offences can cause major disruptions to passenger travel when
public transport services are targeted and impact on communities when heritage sites, such as protected buildings and churches are targeted, resulting in the loss of our cultural
heritage. Metal theft offences have costs to the bill payer in terms of repair, labour and security and prevention measures.
Table 1 shows there were 16,155 metal theft
offences recorded by 42 police forces1 in England and Wales, including the British Transport Police, in the year ending March 2016; this represents a decrease of over a
third (38%) compared with the same forces for the previous year. Table 1 also provides a breakdown by infrastructure and non-infrastructure-related offences. In the year ending
March 2016, of all metal theft offences recorded, 44% were infrastructure-related and 56% were non-infrastructure-related.
Table 1: Metal theft offences recorded by the police in England and Wales, year ending March 2013 to year ending March 2016
England and Wales
Apr '12 to
Mar '13
Apr '13 to
Mar '14
Apr '14 to
Mar '15
Apr '15 to
Mar '16
Number of
offences
Metal theft (42 forces)2
62,467
41,087
26,153
16,155
All metal theft (44 forces)
N/A
42,206
27,237
N/A
Proportions3
Infrastructure related
51
47
42
44
Non-infrastructure related
49
53
58
56
Source: Police recorded crime, Home Office
1. Police recorded crime data are not designated as National Statistics.
2. Excludes Norfolk and Suffolk.
3. The proportion of offences which are infrastructure and non infrastructure related are based on a
subset of forces. 38 forces used for the year ending March 2013 excluding Cleveland, Norfolk, Leicestershire, Devon and Cornwall, North Wales and West Midlands. 43 forces used for
the year ending March 2014 and 2015 which only excludes Devon and Cornwall. 41 forces used for the year ending March 2016, excluding Devon & Cornwall, Suffolk and Norfolk.
Forces excluded for providing partial data.
The overall decline in metal theft offences recorded has occurred alongside government initiatives to tackle the prevalence of metal theft. The National Metal Theft
Taskforce was introduced in November 2011 and Operation Tornado was introduced in January 2012 (see Focus on Property Crime 2014 to 2015 for more
information). The Scrap Metal Dealers Act was implemented in 2013, which included the banning of cash payments for scrap metal and for all metal sellers to provide proof of
identity at the point of sale. The act required all individuals and businesses to obtain a scrap metal dealer’s licence and for dealers to keep intensive records of their
suppliers.
Metal theft by region
Across England and Wales2, the police recorded 3 metal theft offences per 10,000 population in the latest year. Rates of
metal theft offences have remained higher in the northern regions than in the southern and Midlands regions and Wales. The North East had the highest rates of metal theft offences
in the latest year, with 7 per 10,000 population. However, all regions have shown similar patterns of metal theft trends with year-on-year decreases; with northern regions showing
smaller decreases (Appendix tables 16
to 19).
Metal theft by offence type
The Home Office Data Hub (HODH) collects record level crime data supplied by police forces and from these data it is possible
to gain further detail, including the specific types of offences flagged as metal theft. The following analysis uses data from 21 forces that provided metal theft data via the HODH
that was of sufficient quality for the year ending March 2016.
Figure 8 shows that in the year ending March 2016, of all metal theft offences recorded by the police 56% were
part of the offence classification “all other theft offences”, which is principally made up of thefts of unattended items. This was followed by burglary and vehicle offences which
accounted for 23% and 19% of all metal theft offences respectively. Of all burglary offences involving metal theft, 72% were recorded as non-domestic burglary, with the remaining
28% of offences recorded as domestic burglary.
Figure 8: Metal theft offences recorded by the police in England and Wales, by offence type, Home Office Data Hub(21 forces), year ending March
2016
Source: Police recorded crime, Home Office Data Hub
Notes:
Police recorded crime data are not designated as National Statistics.
Data based on 21 forces that provided accurate data via the Home Office Data Hub.
Percentages do not add up to 100 as a small proportion of metal theft offences (less than 1%) fall into categories which are not property crime related and are therefore not
included in this analysis.
6. Recent trends within police recorded property crime
The number of offences recorded by police forces in England and Wales, increased in comparison with the previous year for the categories of vehicle offences, and criminal damage
and arson. Administrative data from the National Fraud Intelligence Bureau (NFIB) also show an increase in fraud.
While overall theft has remained fairly steady, some
individual categories (for example, shoplifting and theft from the person) have shown recent increases, while others (for example, bicycle theft and burglary) showed decreases
compared with the previous year.
In comparison, none of the property offence categories from the year ending March 2016 Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW) showed any
significant upward change compared with the previous survey year.
Shoplifting
The longer-term trend in shoplifting recorded by the police is different from that seen
for other theft offences. While most theft offences saw steady declines over much of the last decade, incidents of recorded shoplifting have shown comparatively little change over
this time (Figure 9).
Shoplifting accounted for 7% of all police recorded crime in the year ending March 2016. The police recorded 336,505 shoplifting offences in this
period, a 3% increase compared with the previous year and the highest volume since the introduction of the NCRS in the year ending March 20031. There were reported
increases in 28 of the 44 police force areas in the year ending March 2016.
The 2015 Commercial Victimisation Survey
(CVS)2 provides an alternative measure of shoplifting (referred to in the survey as “theft by customers”); it includes crimes not reported to the police as well as
those that have been reported. The 2015 CVS suggests a non-statistically significant rise in the rate of shoplifting compared with the 2014 CVS. The estimates have large confidence
intervals and it is therefore difficult to detect significant changes over time. Whilst combined these sources suggest there may be some genuine rise in shoplifting offences, it
should also be noted that other data from the CVS also shows that, while thefts by customers have shown a non-significant increase, the rate of thefts from unknown persons has
fallen significantly, from 3,202 to 1,207 incidents per 1,000 premises. This may represent a shift of some thefts from the “unknown” category into “theft by customers”, suggesting
that the perpetrators of more thefts have been identified as customers.
Further information on the nature of shoplifting comes from the British retail consortium (BRC) survey published in 2015, which indicates a new high in terms of
the cost to retailers of shop theft. In the year ending March 2015, the incidence rate of customer theft per 100 premises within the retail sector fell by 2% compared with the year
ending March 2014. However, over the same period, the average value per incident rose by 35% from £241 to £325, continuing the increase reported in the prior year. The BRC
concluded that the upward trend in the value of these offences was due to the continued impact of organised gangs stealing higher value items to sell on.
Figure 9: Trends in police recorded shoplifting offences in England and Wales, year ending March 2003 to year ending March 2016
Source: Police recorded crime, Home Office
Notes:
Police recorded crime data are not designated as National Statistics.
The police recorded crime category of vehicle offences has seen an increase of 15,227 incidents (4%) in the year ending March 2016, compared with
the previous year. This is the first increase in this offence category since the year ending March 2006.
The largest contributor to this volume increase was “vehicle
interference” (making up 48% of the rise), followed by “theft or unauthorised taking of a motor vehicle” (making up 39%). “Theft from a vehicle” also increased (by 1%) for the
first time since the comparable time series began (year ending March 2003). Despite such a small year-on-year percentage increase, this sub-category contributed 11% to the total
volume increase in vehicle offences.
Vehicle interference increased by 19% (from 38,254 to 45,580 offences) in the year ending March 2016 compared with the previous year.
This annual increase represents a slowing of the rate of increase compared with a year earlier (year ending March 2015) when this offence rose by 88% compared with the previous
year. Some of these continued rises are likely to be the result of a change in the guidance issued in April 2014 within the Home Office Counting Rules (HOCR). The impact is likely
to have led to offences that previously might have been recorded as “attempted theft of, or from, a vehicle” or “criminal damage to a vehicle” now being recorded as vehicle
interference where the motive of the offender was not clear. While in the previous year, offence numbers for these categories fell as vehicle interference increased; the current
year shows increases in all vehicle offence categories, making it hard to unpick the effect of recording changes.
The increase in “theft or unauthorised taking of a motor
vehicle” may in part be caused by a continued increase in 2-wheeled vehicle thefts (these vehicles typically do not have immobilisers and may be easier for offenders to target). A
research paper by the Home Office, (Reducing criminal
opportunity: vehicle security and vehicle crime, 2015) noted that within the Metropolitan police force area, comparing the data for the year ending March 2012 and March 2014,
the slight rise in vehicle thefts was due to an increase in the theft of motorbikes. Whereas car thefts in 2014 were down by 15% compared with 2012 (equating to around 2,800 fewer
offences), motorbike thefts had increased by 44% (around 2,900 extra offences). This paper also cited separate but unpublished analysis by the Retail Motor Industry Federation
(RMIF). This analysis used data from the Police National Computer for the whole of England and Wales and also suggested a rise in motorcycle thefts during 2014.
Additionally,
it has been suggested that new technology may be changing vehicle security dynamics, because tools are available (and available to buy via the internet) that allow thieves to
bypass current car security. As a result of this, it has been suggested that “electronic immobilisers in cars are now more prone to getting hacked”. (Choudhuri et al., 2014; Mason, 2012). The latter suggestion was also explored
further in “Reducing criminal opportunity: vehicle security and vehicle crime” and it was noted that, while the technology to overcome electronic immobilisers certainly exists and
is available, current theft rates suggest it is not being used by a large number of offenders (relative to the 1990s). The extent to which this is impacting on vehicle theft rates
is currently unclear.
A small increase of 5% (from 5,414 to 5,686 offences) was also seen in aggravated vehicle taking recorded by the police in the latest year.
Theft
from the person
Theft from the person involves offences where there is theft (or attempted theft) of property, while the property is being carried by, or on the person of,
the victim. These include snatch thefts (where a minimal element of force may be used to snatch the property away) and stealth thefts (where the victim is unaware of the offence
being committed, for example, pick-pocketing). Unlike robbery, these offences do not involve violence or threats to the victim.
Most theft offences saw steady declines in the
number of crimes recorded by the police over much of the last decade. Levels of recorded theft from the person, although generally declining since the year ending March 2003, saw a
period of year-on-year increases between the years ending March 2008 and March 2013. Over this period there was an average annual increase of 5% in theft from the person offences
recorded by the police. In the subsequent 2 years, the downward trend resumed and the number of theft from the person offences recorded by the police fell by 20% between the years
ending March 2014 and 2015. The most recent data shows a 6% increase in these offences compared with the previous year (Figure 10).
It is thought that the increase seen in
these offences between the years ending March 2009 and March 2013 may be due to people carrying more valuable items than previously, such as more advanced smartphones and tablet
computers which attract a high value in the stolen goods market. Since this time, the concept of “target-hardening” (a term referring to the strengthening of the security of an
item or building in order to reduce the risk of attack or theft), has also been applied by providers of mobile phones and this provides a good illustration of how both the value of
and “target hardening” of items can affect crimes. Home Office research
suggests that the introduction of device-based anti-theft solutions (such as Apple iOS7 in September 2013 and Samsung Reactivation Lock in April 2014) is likely to have contributed
to a substantial reduction in mobile phone thefts in London. If this was the case across wider geographies, this could help explain year-on-year falls in theft from the person
offences in March 2014 and March 2015.
Figure 10: Trends in police recorded theft from the person offences in England and Wales, year ending March 2003 to year ending March 2016
Source: Police recorded crime, Home Office
Notes:
Police recorded crime data are not designated as National Statistics.
The most recent 6% rise in thefts from the person recorded by the police, reflects rises in offence numbers in around two-thirds of police forces. While it is not clear what
has driven the latest increase, the CSEW indicates that the majority of offences involve; theft of purses or wallets, or cash or foreign currency, mobile phones or credit cards.
Specifically, wallets or purses continue to be stolen in a high proportion (41%) of theft from the person offences along with cash or foreign currency, mobile phones and credit
cards (40%, 37% and 34% respectively). Owing to the value associated with these items, and because crime reporting is often necessary for insurance purposes, a high proportion of
these offences are likely to be recorded by the police.
Criminal damage and arson
Crimes recorded by the police show a 7% rise (539,767 offences) in criminal damage
and arson offences between the year ending March 2015 and the year ending March 2016. Rises were seen across all offences which sit within the criminal damage and arson offence
category. These rises were also seen consistently across 40 out of the 44 police forces in England and Wales (including the British Transport Police). In the year ending March
2016, criminal damage to a vehicle rose by 6% and other criminal damage rose by 12% compared with the previous year (despite both offence types increasing by a similar volume of
around 12,000 offences); criminal damage to a dwelling also increased (by 7,274 offences; 6%).
In contrast, criminal damage as measured by the CSEW fell by 9% in the latest
survey year. Falls were seen in both CSEW sub-categories; criminal damage to a vehicle (fell non-significantly by an estimated 46,000 offences or 5%) and arson and other criminal
damage (fell significantly by 81,000 offences or 18%). With this in mind, the increases across all criminal damage offences recorded by the police, fairly simultaneously (and
across the majority of police forces) may suggest that the offence of criminal damage has been impacted by the recording improvements made across police forces as a response to the
recent inspections by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary
(HMIC) previously discussed in this bulletin, as well as to ongoing audits by HMIC.
Notes for recent trends within police recorded property crime:
An update to these figures (for the year ending June 2016), show a further rise in shoplifting, where offence numbers reached 340,719.
Results from the 2015 CVS survey relate to interviews carried out between August and December 2015, when interviewers asked about the incidents of crime experienced in the 12
months prior to interview. This is an earlier time period than police recorded crime figures which cover crimes recorded in the year ending March 2016.
The police recorded crime series incorporates offences reported to Action Fraud (the national fraud and cybercrime reporting centre) as well as those reported to the National
Fraud Intelligence Bureau (NFIB) by 2 industry bodies: Cifas and Financial Fraud Action UK (FFA UK). These sources show that fraud offences increased by 4% in the latest year,
compared with the previous year. However, there are several complications in using these sources to measure trends AND the level of fraud reported via administrative sources is
thought to significantly understate the true level of such crime.
FFA UK also collects information from its members on a broader range of bank account and plastic card
frauds than those referred to the NFIB using a system referred to as CAMIS. While these figures are at UK level only, they offer a broader picture of the scale of bank account and
plastic card fraud and can give an indication of longer-term trends for these particular fraud offences.
New Experimental Statistics provided by Crime Survey for England and
Wales (CSEW) fraud questions do include crimes that have not been reported to the authorities. However, they do not capture fraud against organisations and being new, they do not
yet provide any information on trends in fraud offences. Early estimates show that amongst CSEW crimes, fraud has the highest prevalence rate.
Separate data from the
supplementary module in the CSEW asking about respondents’ experiences of plastic card fraud do provide some information about trends, albeit for this sub-category of fraud
alone.
Recorded fraud offences
Fraud offences increased by 4% (to 619,674) in the year ending March 2016 compared with the previous year. Much of the increase was
owing to fraud offences referred by Cifas, which increased by 16% (up to 298,968) compared with the previous year. In contrast, fraud offences recorded by Action Fraud decreased by
4% (down to 221,160) and those referred by FFA UK decreased by 5% (down to 99,546 offences) compared with the previous year. Changes in the volume of offences recorded by Action
Fraud, coincided with a change in service provider for the Action Fraud call centre. It is likely that the level of fraud in the latter part of the year ending March 2016 may have
been subject to under-reporting. As a result the latest trends in Action Fraud data should be interpreted with caution.
The largest increase in the separate categories of
fraud referred to the NFIB in the latest year was “Banking and credit industry” fraud (up 15% to 367,812 offences). Almost all of this increase was in offences reported to the NFIB
via Cifas (up 28% to 242,721 offences). This rise was seen principally in the sub-category of frauds relating to “Cheque, plastic card and online bank accounts” and is thought to
have resulted from an increase in the volume of accounts used to purchase goods that have been set up using stolen identities and personal information (for example, applying to
open a plastic card account using the identity of an innocent party and purchasing goods on it).
A limited time series for fraud reported to the NFIB is available back to the
year ending March 2012. Although fraud offences over recent years appear to have been increasing while many other forms of property crime have fallen, trends in fraud over this
period are difficult to interpret owing to a number of changes in reporting and recording such as the transfer in reporting fraud offences from police forces to Action Fraud. This
is discussed in more detail in Crime in England and
Wales, year ending March 2016.
CSEW
Experimental Statistics from new fraud and computer misuse questions that were added to the CSEW from October 2015 are unable
to tell us more about trends in fraud but give some initial estimates of the extent of fraud victimisation amongst the resident household population. Adults aged 16 and over
experienced an estimated 5.8 million fraud and computer misuse incidents in the 12 months prior to interview; 3.8 million of these were fraud incidents and 2.0 million were
computer misuse incidents1.
The most common types of fraud experienced were “Bank and credit account” fraud (2.5 million incidents; 66% of the total), followed by
“Non-investment” fraud – such as fraud related to online shopping or fraudulent computer service calls (1.0 million incidents; 28% of the total).
Data from the separate
supplementary module on plastic card fraud is currently the most reliable measure of trends for this form of banking fraud (these questions have been included in the survey since
the survey year ending March 2006). Estimates from this separate question showed that 4.7% of plastic card owners were victims of card fraud in the latest survey year, a similar
level to the previous survey year (4.6%). The trend in levels of plastic card fraud measured by this supplementary module has remained fairly stable over the last few years,
following a rise between the survey years ending March 2006 and March 2010 and a subsequent fall between the survey years ending March 2010 and March 2012.
Other sources of
fraud data
Data referred to the NFIB by Cifas and FFA UK are known to exclude a significant volume of card and bank account fraud. Cifas do not collect information on some
types of plastic card fraud, including “Remote purchase” frauds2, fraud resulting from cards being lost or stolen, or ATM fraud. While FFA UK does collect this
information, it only refers crimes to the NFIB in cases where there is intelligence value for the police to aid in investigating and detecting fraud.
FFA UK does collect
information from its members on a broader range of bank account and plastic card frauds than those referred to the NFIB using a system referred to as CAMIS. In the latest year, FFA
UK reported 1.7 million cases of frauds on UK-issued cards, cheque fraud and remote banking fraud (internet, telephone and mobile banking)3, an increase of 32% from the
previous year. This compares with a 5% decrease in the level of these frauds that were reported by FFA UK to the NFIB4. FFA UK have attributed recent rises to “the
growth of impersonation and deception scams and complex online attacks where the methods target customers’ personal and financial details, including card data, to facilitate fraud”
including remote purchase fraud. They also comment on the increase in fraud relating to lost and stolen cards suggesting that “intelligence from FFA UK members suggests there have
been more incidents at ATMs, through distraction thefts and entrapment. Courier scams, in which a scammer visits the victim’s house to collect either cash or a bank card, also
continue to play a role” (January to June 2016 fraud
update).
In general, the FFA UK figures have been consistent with those shown by the CSEW trend in plastic card fraud, with levels peaking around 2008 to 2010 followed by
falls in subsequent years that were likely to be related to the introduction of chip card technology. In the latest year, there was a small (non-statistically significant) increase
in the prevalence of plastic card fraud measured by the CSEW. In the year to March 2016, FFA UK data from CAMIS showed a 32% rise in banking offences. More recent data released in
Crime in England and Wales, year ending June
2016 show further non-statistically significant rises in CSEW plastic card fraud.
Alongside “Crime in England and Wales, year ending March 2016”, we published an “Overview of fraud statistics” article; this
outlines the definitions used in fraud statistics for England and Wales, describes the main sources of data and provides an overview of what these sources tell us about long-term
trends, the characteristics of victims and the nature and circumstances of fraud offences.
Notes for what is happening to trends in fraud:
These data are only based on interviews with half of the sample of respondents conducted during the second half of the survey year, but have been grossed up to provide an
estimate covering the entire survey year.
Those frauds where the cardholder and card are not present at the point of sale, such as use of the card online, over the phone or by mail order.
It is important to note that the number of cases relates to the number of accounts defrauded, rather than the number of victims.
The cases reported to the NFIB are those with intelligence value to the police and are less likely to include incidences of “Remote purchase” fraud, which are an important
driver in the overall increase in FFA UK data from CAMIS.
Data on the prevalence of property crime from the Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW), year ending March 2016, suggest households were most likely to
be a victim of vehicle-related theft or criminal damage (both 4% or 4 in 100 households) than other household property crimes. Personal crimes such as theft from the person and
robbery were lower in volume and currently affect an estimated 0.7% of the population (or 7 in 1,000 adults) and 0.3% (or 3 in 1,000 adults) respectively.
The most noticeable
difference in the proportion of households affected by crime between the latest survey year and the peak survey year in 1995 was in vehicle-related theft. These offences decreased
from around 1 in 5 vehicle-owning households experiencing a vehicle-related theft in 1995 to 1 in 25 in the last 12 months, according to the survey in the year ending March 2016.
Levels of victimisation vary by property crime type (Figure 11). In the latest survey year, 1 in 25 vehicle-owning households had experienced vehicle-related theft and just
under 1 in 25 households had experienced criminal damage. In contrast a much lower number of adults had been a victim of theft from the person (only 7 in 1,000 adults) or robbery
(3 in 1,000 adults).
Around 3 in 50 children aged 10 to 15 had been a victim of personal theft1 and around 1 in 50 had been a victim of criminal damage to personal
property.
Comparing victimisation rates in 1995 (when crime was at its peak) with the latest survey year:
the most noticeable difference is in vehicle-related theft, which decreased from around 1 in 5 vehicle-owning households experiencing a vehicle-related theft in 1995 to 1 in 25
in the latest survey year
criminal damage has shown a decrease from around 1 in 10 households experiencing criminal damage in 1995 to fewer than 1 in 25 in the latest survey year
domestic burglary has also shown a decrease from just under 9 in 100 households experiencing domestic burglary in 1995 to only 2 in 100 in the latest survey year
personal crimes, such as theft from the person, are lower in volume but have shown smaller decreases; 16 in 1,000 adults (1.6%) experienced theft from the person in 1995
compared with around 7 in 1,000 (0.7%) in the latest survey year
Figure 11: Property crime victimisation, year ending December 1995 and year ending March 2016 Crime Survey for England and Wales
Source: Crime Survey for England and Wales, Office for National Statistics
Notes:
Vehicle-related theft victimisation rates relate to vehicle-owning households only.
Bicycle theft victimisation rates relate to bicycle-owning households only.
Data for 1995 are unavailable for children aged 10 to 15.
Experimental Statistics, based on 6-months of data only.
Experimental Statistics based on new fraud questions in the year ending March 2016 CSEW suggest fraud against adults (from the resident household population) is currently a
relatively high prevalence crime, affecting 6.5% of adults. This is still far lower than the prevalence rate for both criminal damage and vehicle-related theft at the crime peak in
1995 and it therefore does not appear that substitution into fraud can explain why overall CSEW property crime has fallen.
The levels of victimisation experienced by
children aged 10 to 15 years show a higher level than adult victimisation rates for all crime types in the latest year (Figure 11). This is because data from the CSEW show that
crimes against 10-to-15-year olds are different in nature compared with those against adults. For example, the majority of personal theft offences against children were carried out
by a pupil at their school (61%) or a friend (23%) and took place in or around school (70%). The “Nature of Crime” tables accompanying
this release have further details on the data contained within this section.
Notes for levels of victimisation:
Personal theft includes: theft from the person (stealth theft, snatch theft and attempted snatch or stealth theft) and “other” theft of personal property, but also theft from
inside and outside a dwelling and theft of bicycles where the property stolen belonged solely to the child respondent.
9. Characteristics associated with being a victim of property crime
Some demographic and household characteristics may be closely associated with each other, so caution is needed in the interpretation of the effect of these different
characteristics when viewed in isolation (for example, employment and household income are closely related). However, some of these characteristics show a similar relationship to
victimisation across the majority of traditional property crime types. Experimental Statistics on fraud and computer misuse from the Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW) show
less variation across demographic and household characteristics. Appendix tables 1 to 11 contain
victimisation data broken down according to a broad range of household and personal characteristics.
Similar to findings from previous years, in the latest survey year some
general patterns in victimisation were similar across most types of CSEW property crime:
respondents living in areas with the highest unemployment levels1 are more likely to be victims than those who lived elsewhere
those living in urban areas were more likely to be victims than those living in rural areas for all property crime types
respondents living in households in areas of high incivility2 were more likely to be victims than those living in households in areas of low incivility
there was a pattern across almost all offence types (though not all the differences were statistically significant) where those who were unemployed were more likely to be
victims compared with those in other occupational groups3
while not statistically significant for all crime types, there was a general pattern in which private and social renters were more likely to be victims than owner occupiers
Additionally, other demographics factors also showed relationships with victimisation but these relationships varied by crime type.
Age groups had different relationships with victimisation depending on the type of offence in question. In general those aged 16 to 24 were more likely to be victims of
crime than those in older age groups (for example, than those aged 65 and over for domestic burglary, vehicle-related theft and other household theft; and than those aged 35 and
over for bicycle theft, robbery and theft from the person). Those in the older age group (75 and over) were significantly less likely than any other age group to experience
criminal damage (1.6%). Those most likely to experience criminal damage were aged between 25 to 54 (4.6%).
In the main, lower income households (£10,000 or less) were more likely to have been victims of crime than higher income households. However, this did not hold true for
victims of criminal damage, where those with a household income of less than £10,000 were significantly less likely (2.8%) than those with a household income of £40,000 or more
(4.4%) to have been victims. Similarly for vehicle-related theft, those with a household income of £50,000 were more likely (4.9%) to have been victims than those in households
with incomes between £10,000 and £40,000 (where risks were between 3.5% and 3.8%).
Levels of victimisation were similar for men and women for most crime types; with the exception of robbery where men had higher rates of victimisation than women (0.4% and
0.2%, respectively).
Fraud
Initial analysis of the year ending March 2016 CSEW Experimental Statistics looked at personal and household characteristics associated with being a victim of
fraud (Experimental tables E7 and E8) and found
fraud victims to exhibit different patterns of victimisation compared with victims of other CSEW crime types. There was typically less variation than other types of crime in the
rate of victimisation across different groups in society, although some personal and household characteristics were associated with being a victim of fraud and those with the
higher risk of victimisation often differed from other crime types.
Fraud victimisation was identified as being higher in:
the middle of the age distribution
higher income households (of £50,000 or more) than in lower income households (of less than £10,000)
those in managerial professions as compared to those in a manual or routine profession, unemployed or students
The characteristics of plastic card fraud victims from the separate CSEW sub-module were very similar to those described above (Appendix tables).
Notes for
characteristics associated with being a victim of property crime:
Data are available for England only. There is more information on the employment deprivation indicator, in Section 7.1 of the User Guide. Areas with the highest unemployment
are output areas with the 20% highest employment deprivation as measured by the The English Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) 2015.
This term is used in the CSEW to describe a measure based on the interviewer’s assessment of the level of (a) vandalism, graffiti and deliberate damage to property; (b) rubbish
and litter; and (c) homes in poor condition in the area.
Other occupational groups include; Managerial and professional occupations, intermediate occupations, routine and manual occupations, full-time students and those not
classified, further information is available in Section 7.1 of the User Guide.
The year ending March 2016 Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW) suggested 81% of adults (over 46 million people) owned a mobile phone, the same proportion as the previous
year.
Data from the latest survey year suggest 1.0% (equivalent to 446,000 people) of mobile phone owners experienced a theft in the previous year. This reflects a decrease
from 1.2% in the survey year ending March 2015 and is the second consecutive fall.
Between the survey year ending March 2005 and the survey year ending March 2009, levels of
mobile phone theft showed a fairly flat trend, but this was followed by a fall between the years ending March 2009 and March 2010 (from 2.1% to 1.7% respectively). The rate then
remained stable until the year ending March 2014 when further drops have occurred. Changes in trends in mobile phone theft from 2010 can be linked to legislation requiring improved
security to be incorporated into new phones. More recent falls may be attributable to improved security features on mobile phone operating systems.
Trends
Since April
2005, the CSEW has asked respondents about every household member’s ownership of mobile phones and their experience of mobile phone theft. Data on CSEW mobile phone ownership and
theft are shown in Appendix tables 12
to 15.
In the latest survey year, it is estimated that 1.0% (equivalent to 446,000 people) of mobile phone owners experienced a theft in the previous year; a decrease
from 1.2% in the survey year ending March 2015. Between the survey year ending March 2005 (when measurement began on the CSEW) and the survey year ending March 2009, levels of
mobile phone theft showed a fairly flat trend, but this was followed by a fall between the survey years ending March 2009 and March 2010 (from 2.1% to 1.7%). Since then, the rate
has remained consistently below 2%. The largest fall in the proportion of people experiencing mobile phone theft occurred between the survey years ending March 2014 and March 2015,
when the rate fell from 1.7% to 1.2%. This has been followed by a further 0.2 percentage point fall in the latest survey year (Figure 12).
Figure 12: Proportion of individual mobile phone owners experiencing theft in the last year, year ending March 2006 to year ending March 2016
Crime Survey for England and Wales
Source: Crime Survey for England and Wales, Office for National Statistics
Notes:
Information on mobile phone theft was collected about the respondent and all other members of the household.
The trend in prevalence of mobile phone theft has been similar for males and females. In the latest survey year, 1.0% of both male and female mobile phone owners had their
mobile phone stolen, equivalent to around 218,000 males and 227,000 females.
Consistent with previous years, teenagers and young adult mobile phone owners (those aged 18 to
24) were more likely than other age groups to have had their mobile phone stolen (18 to 21: 2.4%; 22 to 24: 2.0%). Children under 10, adults aged 65 to 74 and adults aged 75 or
older who own a mobile phone were least likely to have had their phone stolen (0.1%, 0.4% and 0.1% respectively).
It is not clear what caused the fall in mobile phone theft
prevalence between the survey years ending March 2009 and March 2010, although they cover a period relatively soon after a charter was launched by the Mobile Industry Crime Action Forum (at the end of 2006) where the majority of mobile phones would be blocked (and hence unusable) within
48 hours of being reported stolen, making them less desirable to criminals.
The latest 0.2 percentage point decrease (representing a reduction of 89,000 victims) in the
prevalence of mobile phone theft compared with the previous survey year may be partly explained by improvements to mobile phone security and theft prevention. It has been suggested
that there has been a fall in levels of mobile phone theft since the introduction of device-based anti-theft solutions such as Apple iOS7 (September 2013) and Samsung Reactivation
Lock (April 2014). The Home Office research paper “Reducing mobile phone
theft and improving security, paper 2” published in March 2016 also provides further information on mobile phone ownership and theft, using results from the CSEW and
London-specific data from the Metropolitan Police. The London-specific analysis showed that some brands and types of mobile phone, such as Apple, Samsung and Microsoft devices,
were more likely to be stolen than others. There are several factors that are likely to affect this, from how desirable a phone is and its potential resale in second-hand markets,
to how easy it is to steal the personal data contained within it.
The tables discussed in this section are based on findings from the Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW), year ending March 2016 and give a picture of the nature of
domestic burglary, theft, criminal damage and crimes against children aged 10 to 15. Nature of crime tables include data on the timing and location of incidents, what was stolen or
damaged and the associated costs, the emotional impact on the victim and information about contact with offenders. There is further detail on the data contained in the ”Nature of Crime” tables accompanying
this release.
Timing
The year ending March 2016 CSEW showed, as in previous years, that property crimes happened mostly in the evening or night1 (59% of
total CSEW property crime). Exceptions to this general pattern were “other” theft of personal property and theft from the person, which were more likely to happen in the daytime
(67% and 61% of incidents respectively, Figure 13). As might be expected, the majority of thefts experienced by children aged 10 to 15 took place during daylight2 hours
(89%).
Figure 13: Time during day when incidents of property crime occurred, year ending March 2016 Crime Survey for England and Wales
Source: Crime Survey for England and Wales, Office for National Statistics
Notes:
Morning/afternoon is from 6:00am to 6:00pm; afternoon is from noon to 6:00pm.
Evening/night is from 6:00pm to 6:00am; night is midnight to 6:00am.
The timing of victimisation was similar across most crime types (Figure 14). Robbery had the lowest proportion of incidents occurring during the week, at 60% and the highest
proportions of incidents occurring during the weekend, at 40%. Looking at property crimes against adults, between 60% and 73% of incidents occurred during the week (this is
equivalent to between 13% and 16% per week day3). Although the percentage of incidents occurring at a weekend was generally lower (between 27% and 40%) this was
equivalent to a similar proportion of incidents per day (between 11% and 16% per weekend day4).
Figure 14: Time during week when incidents of property crime occurred, year ending March 2016 Crime Survey for England and Wales
Source: Crime Survey for England and Wales, Office for National Statistics
In the latest survey year, 90% of incidents of theft from children aged 10 to 15 occurred during the week (equivalent to 20% per week day) and 10% of incidents occurred
during the weekend (equivalent to 4% per weekend day). This means that the likelihood of a child aged 10 to 15 being a victim of theft is much higher during the week and reflects
the fact that a large proportion of incidents occurred in or around school (70%) (“Nature of crime” Table
10.1).
Location
Similar to previous findings, in the latest survey year, incidents of vehicle-related theft, criminal damage to a vehicle and bicycle theft most
often occurred at or nearby the victim’s home (74%, 72% and 66% respectively) (Figure 15). Looking in more detail at the location of these incidents (“Nature of Crime Tables 4.2, 5.2, and
8.2), bicycle theft was most likely to occur in a semi-private location nearby the victim’s home (49% of incidents), while criminal damage to a vehicle was most likely to occur
in the street outside the victim’s home (47% of incidents). Vehicle-related theft was almost equally likely to occur in the street outside the victim’s home (37% of incidents) or
in a semi-private location nearby the victim’s home (35% of incidents), such as in or near a row of shared garages, or shared residential car park.
Figure 15: Location of where incidents of property crime occurred, year ending March 2016 Crime Survey for England and Wales
Source: Crime Survey for England and Wales, Office for National Statistics
Table 2 shows the items most commonly stolen in different types of property crime where a theft was involved.
The year ending March 2016 CSEW
found that “purse, wallet or money” were the items most commonly stolen in incidents of domestic burglary in a dwelling (44%).
Cash and foreign currency6, were the
most commonly stolen items in incidents of robbery (44%) and purse or wallet were the most commonly stolen items in incidents of theft from the person (41%) (“Nature of Crime” Tables
3.6 and 7.3).
The changing value of goods and the emergence of new consumer electronics, mobile telephones and computing (such as satellite navigation systems), impact
how attractive items are to criminals. According to the latest survey, electrical equipment was stolen in 16% of vehicle-related theft incidents compared with only 3% of incidents
in the year ending March 2006.
Ease of removal is also a factor in many property crimes. Results from the latest survey year showed that in incidents of theft from vehicles,
the items most commonly stolen were exterior fittings (for example, hub caps, wheel trims, number plates); stolen in 26% of incidents. This was also the case in 1995 where a third
of thefts from vehicles, were of external fittings. Conversely other goods such as car radios will have become less attractive to steal. For example, whereas car radios were stolen
in around a third of incidences in the 1995 survey, this is now rarely reported; reflecting a change in both value and accessibility.
Table 2: Item most commonly stolen in incidents of property crime, year ending March 2016 Crime Survey for England and Wales
Households/adults aged 16 and over/
children aged 10 to 15
England and Wales
Property crime type
Item most commonly stolen
Proportion of incidents where item was stolen
Percentage
Theft from the person1
Purse/wallet
41
Theft from outside a dwelling
Garden furniture
44
Robbery1
Cash / foreign currency
44
Domestic burglary in a dwelling1
Purse / wallet / money /
cards
44
Domestic burglary in a non-connected building to a dwelling1
Tools / work materials
37
Theft from a dwelling
Purse / wallet / money / cards
49
Theft from vehicles1
Exterior fittings
26
Other theft of personal property
Cash / foreign currency
29
Personal theft (children aged 10 to 15)
Clothing
21
Source: Crime Survey for England and Wales, Office for National Statistics
Items of clothing were the most commonly stolen items in incidents of theft experienced by children aged 10 to 15 (stolen in 21% of incidents) in the latest survey
year. Cash and foreign currency were stolen in 16% of incidents and stationery or books were stolen in 9% of incidents (“Nature of Crime” Table
10.6).
Emotional impact on victims and perceived seriousness
Property crime does not generally result in physical injury to the victim; one possible exception to this
is robbery, which by definition involves the use or threat of force or violence. However, the emotional impact can still be considerable for victims. The “Nature of Crime” Tables 3.10, 4.7, 5.4,
6.4, 7.5, 8.5, and 9.4 provide estimates on the proportion of victims emotionally affected by the result of property crimes. Respondents who were victims of property crime were
also asked to rate the seriousness of the crime, with a score of 1 being the least serious and 20 being the most. The “Nature of Crime“ Tables 3.11, 4.8, 5.5,
6.5, 7.6, 8.6, and 9.5 provide estimates on the perceived seriousness of the property crimes.
Offender profile
For certain crime types, it is possible to provide
further information on the characteristics of offenders. According to the year ending March 2016 CSEW, the victim was able to say something about the offender(s) in 95% of
incidents of robbery, 45% of incidents of domestic burglary, 25% of criminal damage incidents and in 50% of thefts of personal property experienced by children aged 10 to 15. There
is more detailed information on the characteristics of offenders for the above crime types in “Nature of Crime“ Tables 3.9, 8.7, 9.1 and
10.3.
Notes for nature of CSEW property crime:
Evening is from 6:00pm to midnight; night is midnight to 6:00am.
Daylight (morning) is from 6am to noon; and (afternoon) from noon to 6:00pm.
Daily data are calculated from the weekly total with the week classified at 6:00am Monday until 6:00pm Friday.
Daily data are calculated from the weekend total with the weekend classified as 6:00pm Friday until 6:00am Monday.
“Semi-private” includes outside areas on or near the premises and garages or car parks around, but not connected to the home.
For personal theft offences (robbery, theft from the person and “other” theft of personal property) “Purse or wallet”, “Cash or foreign currency” and “Credit cards” are
separate stolen item categories; for household theft offences (domestic burglary and “other” household theft) they have been combined into one stolen item category: “Purse, wallet,
money or cards”.
It should be noted that the following totals from the Commercial Victimisation Survey (CVS) represent a small proportion
of all crimes experienced by businesses. Direct comparisons in all sectors are not possible due to different sectors and differing numbers of sectors being sampled each year.
Further information is available in section 13 (Quality and
Methodology).
CVS data for 2015 estimated that there were 4.9 million crimes against business in the 4 sectors covered by the survey in the year prior to the interview, of
these, 91% were property related. Each year since 2012 the wholesale and retail sector has been surveyed consistently. The 2015 CVS showed that, while wholesale and retail premises
have consistently experienced the highest levels of crime compared with other sectors, crime against the wholesale and retail sector fell significantly between the 2012 and 2015
CVS, showing a steady downward trend over time.
While it is difficult to make comparisons over time for all sectors, there is some evidence that the proportion of
agricultural premises experiencing crime has fallen compared with the 2013 CVS.
Property-related crimes have consistently contributed between 86% and 91% of estimated CVS
crime across all sectors. CVS data for 2015 estimated that there were 9.2 million crimes against business in the 4 sectors covered by the survey in the year prior to interview; of
these 91% were property related. CVS data for 2013 estimated a total of 6.8 million crimes against business (again 4 sectors were covered by the survey); of these, 91% were
property related. The 2014 CVS only sampled 3 industry sectors, but estimated a total of 4.8 million crimes against businesses in these sectors, 86% were property related. Full
details of the sampled business sectors for each of these years and the estimated number of offences by crime type, are available in Crime against business: headline findings
from the CVS 2015.
Data sources – coverage and coherence: Crime Survey for England and Wales
The Crime Survey for England and Wales (CSEW; previously known as the British Crime Survey) is
a face-to-face survey in which people resident in households in England and Wales are asked about their experiences of crime in the 12 months prior to the interview. It covers both
children aged 10 to 15 and adults aged 16 and over, but does not cover those living in communal establishments (such as care homes, student halls of residence and prisons), or
crimes against commercial or public sector bodies.
The CSEW is able to capture a broad range of victim-based crimes1 experienced by those interviewed, not just
those that have been reported to, and recorded by, the police. It covers a broad range of victim-based crimes experienced by the resident household population. However, there are
some serious, but relatively low volume offences, such as homicide and sexual offences, which are not included in its main estimates. Although, at the end of the main interview
there is a self-completion element (via a tablet computer), where adults aged 16 to 59 are asked about their experience of domestic abuse and sexual violence, and these results are
reported separately2.
A major strength of the CSEW has been its ability to compare crime types over time and for this reason the CSEW has changed little over the
last 30 years. However, the way in which criminals are operating is changing and they can now take advantage of new technologies, such as the internet, to both expand the scope of
existing crime types and develop new ones. Nowhere has this been more apparent than in fraud and cybercrime. As questions aimed at identifying fraud and other cyber offences were
not part of the original survey design, it had not previously been possible to include these new offences in the main estimate of CSEW crime.
To address this issue, new
questions relating to fraud and computer misuse were introduced onto half the survey sample from October 2015. Sufficient data have now been gathered to produce estimates of fraud
and computer misuse and these are published within the “Crime in England and Wales” release for the first time. Details regarding the process in obtaining these new fraud and
computer misuse estimates are available in the “Overview of fraud statistics”
article.
Since it began, the CSEW has been conducted by an independent (from government or the police) survey research organisation using trained interviewers to collect data
from sampled respondents; the interviewers have no vested interest in the results of the survey. For the crime types and population groups it covers, the CSEW has a consistent
methodology and is unaffected by changes in levels of public reporting to the police, recording practice or police activity. As such, the survey is widely seen to operate as an
independent reality-check of the police figures. The independence of the survey has been further strengthened by the transfer of responsibility from the Home Office to the Office
for National Statistics (ONS) in April 2012.
The CSEW has a higher number of reported offences than police recorded crime as the survey is able to capture all offences by
those interviewed, not just those that have been reported to the police and then recorded. However, it does cover a narrower range of offences than the police recorded crime
collection.
In 2009, the CSEW was extended to cover children aged 10 to 15, and this release also incorporates results from this element of the survey. However, the main
analysis and commentary is restricted to adults and households due to the long time series for which comparable data are available.
The CSEW has a nationally representative
sample of around 35,000 adults and 3,000 children (aged 10 to 15 years) per year. The response rates for the latest financial survey year were 72% for adults and 66% for children.
The survey is weighted to adjust for possible non-response bias and to ensure the sample reflects the profile of the general population.
Data sources – coverage and
coherence: Police recorded crime and other sources
Police recorded crime figures are restricted to a subset of notifiable offences that have been reported to and recorded by
the police. Therefore, while the police recorded crime series covers a wider population and a broader3 set of offences than the CSEW, it does not include crimes that do
not come to the attention of the police or are not recorded by them.
Police recorded crime figures are supplied by the 43 territorial police forces of England and Wales, plus
the British Transport Police, via the Home Office, to us. Data on fraud are sourced from Action Fraud, the UK’s national fraud reporting centre; Cifas, the UK-wide fraud and
financial crime prevention service; and Financial Fraud Action UK, who co-ordinate fraud prevention activity for the financial services industry.
Police recorded crime is
the principal source of subnational crime statistics and for relatively serious, but low volume, crimes that are not well-measured by a sample survey. It covers victims (including,
for example, residents of institutions and tourists as well as the resident population) and sectors (for example, commercial bodies) excluded from the CSEW sample. Recorded crime
has a wider coverage of offences, for example, covering homicide, sexual offences and crimes without a specific, identifiable victim (referred to as “Other crimes against society”)
not included in the main CSEW crime count. Police recorded crime also provides good measures of well-reported crimes, but does not cover any crimes that are not reported to, or
discovered by, the police. It is also affected by changes in reporting and recording practices. Like any administrative data, police recorded crime will be affected by the rules
governing the recording of data, by the systems in place and by operational decisions in respect of the allocation of resources.
As well as the main police recorded crime
series, there are additional collections providing detail on offences involving the use of knives and firearms, which are too low in volume to be measured reliably by the
CSEW.
Strengths and limitations of the Crime Survey for England and Wales and police recorded crime
Crime Survey for England and Wales
Police recorded crime
Strengths
Strengths
Large nationally representative sample survey that provides a good measure of long-term crime trends for the
offences and the population it covers (that is, those resident in households)
Has wider offence coverage and
population coverage than the CSEW
Consistent methodology over time
Good
measure of offences that are well-reported to the police
Covers crimes not reported to the police and is not affected by changes in police recording practice; therefore is
a reliable measure of long-term trends
Primary source of local crime statistics and for lower-volume crimes
(for example, homicide)
Coverage of survey extended in 2009 to include children aged 10 to 15 resident in households
Provides whole counts (rather than estimates that are subject to sampling variation)
Independent collection of crime figures
Time
lag between occurrence of crime and reporting results tends to be short, providing an indication of emerging trends
Limitations
Limitations
Survey is subject to error associated with sampling and respondents recalling past events
Excludes offences that are not reported to, or not recorded by, the police and does not include less serious offences
dealt with by magistrates’ courts (for example, motoring offences)
Excludes crimes against businesses and those not resident in households (for example, residents of institutions
and visitors)
Trends can be influenced by changes in recording practices or police activity
Headline estimates exclude offences that are difficult to estimate robustly (such as sexual offences) or that have
no victim who can be interviewed (for example, homicides and drug offences)
Not possible to make long-term
comparisons due to fundamental changes in recording practice introduced in 1998 and the year ending March 2003(5)
Previously, excluded fraud and cybercrime(4)
There are concerns about the quality of recording – crimes may not be recorded
consistently across police forces and so the true level of recorded crime may be understated
Accuracy of the statistics: Crime Survey for England and Wales
Since the CSEW is based on a sample of the population, estimates have a margin of quantifiable
and non-quantifiable error associated with them. Non-quantifiable error includes:
when respondents have recalled crimes in the reference period that actually occurred outside that period (“telescoping”)
crimes that did occur in the reference period that were not mentioned at all (either because respondents failed to recall a fairly trivial incident or, conversely, because they
did not want to disclose an incident, such as a domestic assault)
respondents saying they reported crimes to police when they did not (a “socially desirable” response)
some incidents reported during the interview being miscoded (“interviewer or coder error”)
Unless stated otherwise, all changes in CSEW estimates described in the main text are statistically significant at the 5% level. Since the CSEW estimates are based on a
sample survey, it is good practice to publish confidence intervals alongside them; these provide a measure of the reliability of the estimates and can be found in the User Guide tables. Further information on statistical
significance can be found in Chapter 8 of the User
Guide.
Accuracy of the statistics: Police recorded crime
Police recorded crime figures are a by-product of a live administrative system that is continually being
updated as incidents are logged as crimes and subsequently investigated. The police return provisional figures to the Home Office on a monthly basis and each month they may supply
revised totals for previously supplied months. The Home Office Crime and Policing Statistics team undertake a series of validation checks on receipt of the data and query outliers
with forces who may then re-submit data. Details of these validation checks are given in Section 3.3 of the User Guide, and the differences in data published between the
current and preceding publications can be found in Table QT1a.
Police recording practice is
governed by the Home Office Counting Rules (HOCR) and the National Crime Recording Standard (NCRS). The HOCR have existed in some form since the 1920s, with substantial changes in
1998. The NCRS was introduced in April 2002 following a critical report from Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) in 2000 (Povey, 2000), which showed that there was a
problem with differing interpretation of the HOCR that resulted in inconsistent recording practices across forces.
Following an assessment of crime
statistics by the UK Statistics Authority, published in January 2014, the statistics based on police recorded crime data have been found not to meet the required standard for
designation as National Statistics.
In their report, the UK Statistics Authority set out 16 requirements that needed addressing for the statistics to meet National Statistics
standards. We are working in collaboration with the Home Office Crime and Policing Statistics team and HMIC to address these requirements. A summary of actions taken in response to these requirements is available.
Full details on the history of the assessment and auditing of the quality and
accuracy of police recorded crime statistics carried out in recent years is given in Section 3.3 of the User Guide. Since the UK Statistics Authority assessment
decision, HMIC have undertaken an inspection of the integrity of police recorded crime (carried out between December 2013 and August 2014), which reviewed a total of 10,267 reports
of crime recorded between November 2012 and October 2013 across all 43 police forces in England and Wales.
HMIC concluded that, across England and Wales as a whole, an estimated 1 in 5 offences (19%) that
should have been recorded as crimes were not. The greatest levels of under-recording were seen for violence against the person offences (33%) and sexual offences (26%). However,
there was considerable variation in the level of under-recording across the different offence types investigated. For other crime types: an estimated 14% of criminal damage and
arson offences that should have been recorded as crimes were not; 14% of robbery offences; 11% of burglary offences; and 17% of other offences (excluding fraud).
HMIC is now
undertaking a further set of crime data integrity inspections across all 43 police forces in England and Wales. These are unannounced visits, and will include a statistically
robust audit in each force. Forces will be awarded a graded judgment. This programme of inspections commenced in April 2016 and is expected to continue until the end of
2019.
Reports have been published (25 August 2016) for the first 3 of these forces, and moderated graded judgments applied as follows:
Sussex – Good
Greater Manchester – Inadequate
Staffordshire – Requires Improvement
In these 3 forces, officers and staff were found to have made progress in placing the victim at the forefront of their crime-recording decisions. In addition, good progress
had been made against recommendations made to forces following the 2014 inspection.
The renewed focus on the quality of crime recording means that caution is needed when
interpreting statistics on police recorded crime. While we know that it is likely that improvements in compliance with the NCRS have led to increases in the number of crimes
recorded by the police, it is not possible to quantify the scale of this, or assess how this effect varied between different police forces. In volume terms, police recorded crime
for England and Wales as a whole has increased by 8% in the latest year compared with the previous year and 40 police forces (including the British Transport Police) have recorded
overall increases in levels of crime.
Apparent increases in police force area data may reflect a number of factors, including tightening of recording practice, increases in
reporting by victims and also genuine increases in the levels of crime. It is thought that incidents of violence are more open to subjective judgements about recording and thus
more prone to changes in police practice. A number of forces have also shown large increases in sexual offences, which are thought to reflect both a greater willingness among
victims to report such crimes and improved compliance with recording standards for sexual offences.
the strengths and limitations of the data and how it compares with related data
users and uses of the data
how the output was created
the quality of the output including the accuracy of the data
Notes for quality and methodology:
Victim-based crimes are those offences with a specific identifiable victim. These include the CSEW categories of “Violence”, “Robbery”, “Theft offences”, “Criminal damage” (and
recently “Fraud” and “Computer misuse”) and the police recorded crime categories of “Violence against the person”’, “Sexual offences”, “Robbery”, “Theft offences” and “‘Criminal
damage and arson”.
The coverage of police recorded crime is defined by the Notifiable Offence List, which includes all indictable and triable-either-way-offences (offences which could be tried at
a Crown Court) and a few additional closely related summary offences (which would be dealt with by magistrates’ courts). Appendix 1 of the User Guide has more information on the classifications used
for notifiable crimes recorded by the police.
From 1 October 2015, the offence coverage of the CSEW was extended to include fraud experienced by the adult population. Estimates from these new questions were published for
the first time in ‘Crime in England and Wales, year ending March 2016’ release.
Section 3.3 of the User Guide has more information.
an troops to Sudan and deployed British and Indian troops to the canal. Because the Suez offensive resembled the Sarikamish operation in its
timing, ambition, and mismatch between objectives and available resources, historians have tended to locate its origins, too, in an emerging ideology of pan-Islam. They overlook
the Central Powers’ common interest in cutting British lines of communication and the Ottomans’ particular interest in expelling the British from Egypt, a land to which they had
strong historical and cultural ties, and which had formally remained part of their empire until the outbreak of the war. The scale of defeat at the Suez was nothing like that at
Sarikamish. The Germans, in fact, were satisfied with the operation despite its collapse because it had compelled the British to retain in Egypt troops they could have deployed to
Europe.
The crushing defeat of Sarikamish and the failure at Suez deprived the Ottoman army of any offensive capability at the strategic level. The spring 1915 Anglo-French amphibious
assault at Gallipoli, British thrusts into Mesopotamia and Palestine, and the steady advance of the Russian army across Anatolia would keep the Ottomans hard-pressed throughout the
next two years. They would manage only limited counteroffensives in Anatolia and Mesopotamia, while also contributing substantial forces to joint operations in the Balkans.
Deprived of an army and resources, pan-Islam, too, lost whatever strategic significance it may have possessed. In Iran, the Ottomans, backed by the Germans, made appeals to Muslims
to join them in the struggle against the infidel Russians and British, but the larger legions and greater resources of the Entente proved to be more persuasive stimuli for the
Muslims of Iran. Following their defeats there was little the Ottomans could do beyond backing the activities of a few individuals, such as Enver’s younger brother Nuri
Pasha, who assisted the Sanussi tribesmen’s resistance to the Italians in Tripoli.91 The fact that pan-Islam exerted little pull on Muslims outside the reach of Ottoman or
German material support is not insignificant, as it highlights yet again the ideology’s slight power.
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