The Rise and Fall of Organized Crime in the United States

А. Коза Ностра Семьи

Каждую семью возглавляет начальник, которого иногда называют «крестным отцом». Как боссов выбирают или выбирают сами, не ясно. Скорее всего, нет единого метода. Возможно, в некоторых случаях, как в фильмах Крестный отец , действующий босс выбрал своего преемника. Это потребовало бы согласия по крайней мере значительной части членство в семье. Возможно, в других случаях младшие боссы, консильери и капо после переговоров и заключения сделки приходили к консенсусу. Смена руководства иногда определяется внутрисемейной войной, как это произошло в войнах Бонанно 1960-х годов в Нью-Йорке (DeStefano 2006 ). Теоретически босс обладает почти абсолютной властью над семьей; получает долю доходов подчиненных; контролирует выплаты политикам, полиция и другие официальные лица; и заботится о семьях заключенных (а иногда и умерших) членов. Реальность часто отличалась. Семьи заключенных часто не если они предусмотрены адекватно. Честолюбивые подчиненные не соглашались с политикой или назначениями босса и в других случаях чувствовали, что с ними плохо обращаются или не уважают.

Боссов из двух десятков Семьи Коза Ностры, проработавшие более трех четвертей века, обязательно сильно различались по интеллекту, энергии, компетентности и амбициям. С середины 1970-х начальство столкнулось с серьезные угрозы ареста и судебного преследования. Боссам, вовлеченным в уголовные тяжбы, было бы непросто эффективно управлять своими семьями. Этот вызов стали еще больше после осуждения и во время длительного тюремного заключения. Похоже, что не существует стандартной практики или правила о том, когда следует отказаться от лидерства.

Каждый В семье есть босс, консильери и несколько капо. Босс назначает эту команду лидеров без необходимости совета и согласия, но с одобрения подчиненных или, по крайней мере, уважение к нижнему боссу, консильери и капо, вероятно, будет важным. Каждый капо имеет власть над «командой», состоящей из солдат, иногда называют «молодцы» или «мудрые ребята." Все члены должны быть мужчинами итальянского происхождения (по мнению некоторых авторов сицилийского происхождения). Близкородственное определение «итальянского происхождения» неясно. Два «чистокровных» Требуются итальянские родители? У жены Джона Готти, Виктории, была мать русская, а отец - итальянец, поэтому ее сын Джон Готти-младший, несколько лет возглавлявший Гамбино, не был чистокровным. Итальянский. Что считается квалифицирующим итальянским происхождением - «полностью» итальянские мать, отец или и то, и другое - неясно и, вероятно, варьируется в зависимости от семьи и со временем.

Человек должен быть приглашенным стать постоянным членом, почти всегда после многих лет общения с семьей. Выдающийся перебежчик Джозеф Валачи, член предшественника нью-йоркской Семья Луккезе, давая показания перед Постоянным подкомитетом по расследованиям сенатора Макклеллана, описала секретную церемонию введения в должность Коза Ностра. Он включал присягу на верность семье и ее кодексу omerta , который требует молчания об организации, членстве и деятельности семьи (McClellan 1962 ). Кровь берется из руки посвященного (обычно из пальца на спусковом крючке). Затем в руке сжигается изображение святого. (Фресолоне и Вагман 1994 ; Маас 1997 ). Последующие перебежчики подтвердили описание церемонии Валачи. Агенты ФБР, используя устройство подслушивания, в 1989 году зафиксировали инициирование четырех мужчины из семьи Патриарка Новой Англии ( США против Бьянко ¹ ). В следующем году Джордж Фрезолоне, сотрудничая с ФБР, записал свое посвящение в семью Бруно-Скарфо (Фрезолон и Вагман 1994 ). Фрезолон утверждал в своей автобиографии, что отказ семьи Филадельфии оказать финансовую помощь его семье, когда он был заключен в тюрьму, привел к к его разочарованию в Коза Ностре и, в конечном итоге, к его нарушению omerta (Фрезолон и Вагман 1994 ). Его информация способствовала предъявлению обвинений в рэкете в 1991 году против 38 известных мафиози, в том числе Никодемо Скарфо из Филадельфии-Атлантик-Сити. босс (Cox 1989 ).

Cosa В состав бригад Nostra входят «партнеры», которые работают на своих членов и вместе с ними. Оценка численности и состава нью-йоркской семьи Дженовезе за 1998 год показала, что на каждого назначенного члена приходилось по четыре или пять партнеров, из которых примерно 250 (Raab 1998c ). Сотрудникам не обязательно быть итальянцами.

Сотрудник с высоким доходом может быть очень высокооплачиваемым. влиятельный в семейном руководстве. Мейер Лански, руководитель развития Лас-Вегаса как игорного центра, стал одной из самых влиятельных фигур в Коза Ностра, хотя сам он никогда не мог стать сделанным человеком. Не могли и Мюррей Хамфрис, Ред Дорфман и Стэнли Коршак, главные фигуры в семье Чикаго в 1950-х, 1960-х и 1970-х годах. И Мо Далица в Кливленде не было. Бенджамин Сигел сыграл ключевую роль в создании игорной империи Cosa Nostra в Лас-Вегасе.

Члены и партнеры Cosa Nostra действуют как криминальные предприниматели, ищущие выгодные легальные и нелегальные возможности; легальный бизнес, как правило, велся незаконным путем (Джейкобс и Панарелла 1998 ). Члены и партнеры должны делиться доходами с руководителями семьи, но нет жесткие правила учета или фиксированные проценты. Предположительно, размеры выплат capos, consiglieri, underbosses и босса оговариваются индивидуально. Финансовые споры не участвуют в судебных процессах; подчиненный, подозреваемый в обмане босса, может быть атакован или убит.

Б. Отношения между семьями

Несмотря на то, что Дональд Кресси ( 1969 ) утверждение, что итальянско-американская организованная преступность представляет собой общенациональный заговор, Коза Ностра никогда не была организация. С 1930-х годов по крайней мере 24 итальянско-американских преступных клана действовали независимо, каждая из которых обладала исключительной юрисдикцией в своем географическом районе (кроме Новой Зеландии). Йорк, где работают пять семей). Каждая семья выбирает своих лидеров, членов и единомышленников; запускает и ведет собственные криминальные предприятия; инвестирует в законные предприятия; и делит доходы. Босс семьи Бонанно на пенсии Джозеф Бонанно утверждал в своей автобиографии, что семьями управляет общенациональная Коза Ностра. «Комиссия», учрежденная в 1930-х годах Чарльзом Лучиано (Бонанно и Лалли 1983 ). Однако другие чем неудачный конклав 1957 года в Апалачине, штат Нью-Йорк, на котором присутствовали десятки деятелей Коза Ностры со всей страны, мало доказательств, подтверждающих существование национальный руководящий орган ( США против Буфалино ). Номинальная комиссия с представителями некоторых семей могла иногда встречаться для обсуждения взаимных интересов и межсемейные и внутрисемейные споры, но если и так, то они в каком-либо значимом смысле не «управляли» организованными преступными семьями.

Обвинения в« комиссионном деле »1986 года, по которому были выдвинуты обвинения против руководителей четырех из пяти семей Коза Ностра в Нью-Йорке, обвиняли в существовании комиссия состояла из глав пяти семейств (Бонанно, Коломбо, Гамбино, Дженовезе и Луккезе). По словам прокуратуры, эта комиссия «регулировала и способствовал установлению взаимоотношений между семьями, продвигал и осуществлял совместные предприятия, разрешал фактические и потенциальные споры, расширял формальное признание новых боссов и, начиная с время от времени разрешал споры о лидерстве в семье, одобряя инициирование или «создание» новых членов или солдат, удерживая людей внутри и за пределами Ла Коза Ностра в страх совершения с угрозами, насилием и убийством »( США против Салерно , обвинительный акт; см. Джейкобс, Панарелла и Уортингтон 1994 ). В той мере, в какой комиссия существовала, неясно, как она исполняла свои решения. Скорее всего, Нью-Йорк боссы время от времени встречались на специальной основе, чтобы обсудить вопросы, представляющие общий интерес, например, войну 1960-х годов в семье Бонанно. Не было комиссии, нет персонал, бюджета нет. Нам ничего не известно о процедурах принятия решений предполагаемой комиссией. Требовалось единогласие? Если нет, то уступили ли боссы в меньшинстве воле большинство?

Существует предание, что для того, чтобы члены семьи могли свергнуть (убить) своего босса, требовалось одобрение комиссии. Однако никакой информации о том, что Джон Готти, глава семьи Гамбино, искал, а тем более получил одобрение комиссии на убийство босса Гамбино Пола Кастеллано. Конечно, Готти не рискнул бы раскрыть свой заговор перед боссы других семей, чтобы информация не просочилась в Кастеллано. Трудно представить, чтобы Готти удалось устроить конфиденциальную встречу с начальством без Кастеллано. И если бы Готти предстал перед комиссией, были бы приняты его обвинения против Кастеллано за чистую монету или боссы захотели бы услышать, что Кастеллано или какие защитники его лидерства должны были сказать? Без установления фактов комиссии было бы трудно предвидеть последствия неудачной или даже неудачной попытки. успешное покушение. Наконец, возможно, другие боссы не захотели одобрить убийство босса капо в свете их собственной уязвимости перед лицом подчиненных?

Семьи лучше рассматривать как франшизы, чем как формальные бюрократические организации. Сделанный член или ассоциированный член получает власть и экономическую выгоду от быть признанным семьей. Бизнесмены, профсоюзные деятели и политики, скорее всего, будут выполнять «просьбы» члена семьи из-за репутации семьи, владеющей власть через насилие и другие средства.

А. Труд Рэкет

С начала двадцатого века трудовой рэкет обеспечил Коза Ностре власть, статус, легитимность и финансовое вознаграждение (Сейдман 1938 ; Taft 1958 ; Хатчинсон 1969 ; Джейкобс 2006 ). Проникновение в профсоюзы началось в 1910-х и 1920-х годах, когда компании нанимали гангстеров для прекращения забастовок, а профсоюзы вербовали их для участия в забастовках. бороться со штрейкбрехерами. Попав в дверь, организованные преступные семьи захватили профсоюзы, заменив их офицеров силой или путем фальсификации выборов (Джейкобс и Панарелла 1998 ; Джейкобс 2006 ). В некоторых случаях они превращали контроль над местным населением в влияние, а иногда и на контроль над национальным союзом (международным, если в Канаде были местные жители). На протяжении десятилетий Коза Ностра пользовалась значительным влиянием в Международной ассоциации портовых грузчиков, Союзе рабочих, Профсоюзе работников отелей и ресторанов, а также Международное братство водителей.

Коза Ностра превратила профсоюзную власть в прибыль путем вымогательства (продажи трудового мира работодателям), присвоения пенсий и вымогательства. и фонды социального обеспечения, принимая выплаты работодателя в обмен на контракты с любовью или игнорируя нарушения коллективных договоров, выплачивая членам профсоюзов завышенные зарплаты, и принуждение работодателей нанимать на работу неявку (Reuter 1985 , стр. 56). Преступные кланы Коза Ностры также использовали свои профсоюзы для приобретения долей собственности в предприятиях; бизнес не мог бы работать, если бы профсоюз не позволял своим членам работать на него. Показатели организованной преступности может легко вывести работодателя из бизнеса или получить долю владения. Более того, контролируя, какие предприятия могут работать в определенном секторе, они могли создавать ассоциации работодателей (картели) в сфере вывоза мусора, строительства, морских и воздушных грузовых перевозок, а также в других секторах бизнеса (Целевая группа по борьбе с организованной преступностью штата Нью-Йорк 1990 ; Jacobs 2006 ). Картели устанавливали цены и решали, какие компании могут участвовать в торгах по контрактам и за какие суммы. Короче, они определили, кто победит. контракты.

Начиная с 1950-х годов, влияние Коза Ностры в Международном союзе грузчиков позволило странам Гамбино (Бруклин и Нью-Джерси) и Дженовезе (Манхэттен) семьи, чтобы эксплуатировать многие операции порта. Коза Ностра определил, кто работал в доках, и решил, когда будут выгружены грузовые суда. Они вымогали взятки у или вымогал у грузоотправителей, определяя, какой груз был загружен и разгружен и когда (Bell 1960 ; Абадинский ( 1994 ). В 1970-х годах масштабная операция ФБР UNIRAC ( Uni на Rac keteering) расследование показало, что влияние семей Гамбино и Дженовезе в Союзе грузчиков простиралось от Нью-Йорка до Майами ( United States v. 1804-1, Международная ассоциация грузчиков ). Грузоотправители платили семьям, чтобы избежать вреда, чтобы получить выгоду или и то, и другое.

Коза Ностра пользовалась огромным влиянием в Международное братство возчиков (IBT). Это был крупнейший в стране профсоюз частного сектора, на пике популярности насчитывавший 2,3 миллиона членов. Джимми Хоффа стал президентом с помощью Коза Ностры и, в свою очередь, уступили их желаниям. Однако Хоффа был осужден за фальсификацию присяжных, попытку взяточничества и мошенничества и отправлен в тюрьму в 1967 году. Фрэнк Фитцсиммонс исполнял обязанности президента. Президент Ричард Никсон помиловал Хоффа в декабре 1971 года при условии, что он не будет участвовать в профсоюзной деятельности. Хоффа немедленно отказался от этого условия и попытался восстановить свое прежнее положение. Боссы Коза Ностры, однако, предпочли Фитцсиммонса и, предупредив Хоффу о воздержании, убили его (Брандт 2004 ). Фитцсиммонс занимал пост президента IBT с 1971 по 1981 год.

К концу 1980-х гг. преступность укоренилась по крайней мере в 38 крупнейших местных жителей Teamster (PCOC 1986a ; Джейкобс и Куперман 2011 ). Боссы Коза Ностры выдвинули своих любимых кандидатов на пост президента IBT и другие высшие должности. Например, семья Канзас-Сити успешно лоббировала кандидатуру Роя Уильямса на смену Фитцсиммонсу. Уильямс ушел в отставку после осуждения за заговор подкупить сенатора США. Затем семья Кливленда выдвинула успешную кандидатуру Джеки Прессера (Brill 1978 ; Moldea 1978 ; Кроу 1993 ; Джейкобс 2006 ; Джейкобс и Куперман 2011 ).

Влияние Козы Ностры на чернорабочих Гарантия Международного Союза Северной Америки сильное присутствие в строительной отрасли во многих городах. Подробно записанные разговоры Сэма ДеКавальканте (семья из Нью-Джерси) подробно описали, как его семья контролирует местный профсоюз рабочих (Zeiger 1970 ). В течение многих лет «Экипировка» (семья Чикаго) стратегически разместил членов Cosa Nostra среди местных жителей Союза рабочих в этом городе (Abadinsky 1994 ). В Президентская комиссия по организованной преступности (PCOC 1986a ) и несколько федеральных гражданских исков документально подтвердил влияние семей Луккезе и Дженовезе в Нью-Йоркском лейбористском районе 6A и в Восточном окружном совете (Целевая группа по борьбе с организованной преступностью штата Нью-Йорк 1990 ).

Коза Ностра, особенно Луккезе преступный клан, прочно укоренился во многих Профсоюзы местных строителей города Нью-Йорка, включая маляров, плотников, каменщиков и сантехников (Целевая группа по борьбе с организованной преступностью штата Нью-Йорк 1990 ). Профсоюзы «скопом» подавили оппозицию с помощью занесения в черный список и личного насилия. Должностные лица профсоюзов, которые были членами или сотрудники Коза Ностра использовали системы патронажа у своих местных жителей.

Коза Ностра имеет сильные позиции в Международном союзе работников отелей и ресторанов. (ЗДЕСЬ). Контроль над HEREIU Local 54 позволил семье Бруно-Скарфо из Филадельфии принимать решения о покупке отелей Атлантик-Сити (Абадинский1994 ). В Чикаго контроль Outfit над местным жителем HEREIU дал ему власть над ресторанной индустрией. (McClellan 1962 ). В Нью-Йорке в течение многих лет доминировали семьи Коломбо и Гамбино. HEREIU Locals 6 и 100 (PCOC 1986a ).

Cosa Nostra получила огромную выгоду от своего союза влияние (Целевая группа по борьбе с организованной преступностью штата Нью-Йорк, 1990 ). Джон Коди (возчики), Ральф Скопо (Рабочие), Альберт Анастасио и Энтони Скотто (грузчики) и Гарри Давидофф (возчики) были одними из самых влиятельных рабочих Нью-Йорка во второй половине двадцатое столетие. Ред Дорфман был президентом Чикагского союза переработчиков мусора и ключевой фигурой в Chicago’s Outfit. Мюррей Хамфрис, еще одна фигура в наряде, но не профсоюз сам чиновник, обладал огромным влиянием на несколько профсоюзов Чикаго.

По мере роста совместных пенсионных и социальных фондов работодателей и профсоюзов члены и партнеры Cosa Nostra, обслуживающие в качестве попечителей фонда относились к фондам как к копилкам. Самый известный пример - это использование боссами Чикаго, Канзас-Сити, Милуоки и Кливленда огромных возчиков. Пенсионный фонд и фонд социального обеспечения Центральных штатов ( США против Дорфмана ). Щедрые займы из этого фонда (контролируемого семьей Чикаго Коза Ностра через Аллена Дорфмана, который утвержденные займы) для финансирования деятельности Cosa Nostra в Лас-Вегасе (Сколник 1978 ) .

Контроль над профсоюзами позволили членам Cosa Nostra вымогать у предприятий выплаты за мирный труд и вымогать взятки в обмен на коллективные трудовые договоры (Джейкобс и Panarella 1998 ; Джейкобс 2006 ). Профсоюзы, в которых доминирует Коза Ностра, закрывали глаза на неспособность работодателей производить необходимые выплаты в пенсионные фонды и фонды социального обеспечения, игнорируя «Двубортные» магазины (в которых работают как профсоюзы, так и не профсоюзы) и содействие другим действиям работодателя, нарушающим договорные обязательства. В некоторых юрисдикциях Объединенный профсоюз содержал двух местных жителей: у одного был сильный коллективный договор, а у другого - слабый. Работодатели, дававшие взятки профсоюзным боссам и их Коза Союзникам Ностры было разрешено заключить договор с недорогим профсоюзом. Работодателей также побуждали указывать неявку членов, друзей или партнеров Cosa Nostra на своих платежные ведомости.

Влияние на профсоюзы и пенсионные фонды позволило Cosa Nostra заключить профсоюзы с поставщиками стоматологических и медицинских услуг, юридических услуг и других товаров и услуг. (Целевая группа по борьбе с организованной преступностью штата Нью-Йорк, 1990 ). Иногда фирмы, принадлежащие членам Cosa Nostra или партнеры были выбранными подрядчиками; в других случаях контракты переходили к законным подрядчикам, которые платили откаты. Например, контракты на обслуживание тяжелого оборудования для разгрузка морских грузов в Нью-Джерси на протяжении десятилетий контролировалась рабочими-вымогателями Коза Ностра (Стюарт 2019 ).

Рэкетиры Cosa Nostra также вымогали откаты у рядовых членов профсоюзов. Рабочий должен был платить часть своей зарплаты организованной профсоюзный руководитель, контролируемый преступностью, чтобы получить желаемое назначение и даже работать вообще, особенно на стороне Нью-Джерси в порту Нью-Йорка. Эти откаты были среди другие уловки, иногда называемые «рождественскими подарками» от члена профсоюза к боссу (Стюарт 2019 ).

Б. Бизнес Рэкет и картели

С начала двадцатого века бандиты Нью-Йорка оказали сильное влияние на строительную промышленность, центр одежды, Fulton Fish. Рыночные и морские грузовые операции в портах Нью-Йорка и Нью-Джерси (Hortis 2014). From the 1950s to the 1990s, based on their influence in unions, the New York City Cosa Nostra families were deeply entrenched at the Javits Exhibition Center, in John F. Kennedy Airport’s air cargo operations, and in commercial waste hauling and disposal. They were also involved in moving and storage, securities, linen supplies, food processing, importation, and retail distribution (Kwitny 1979; Jacobs and Hortis 1998; Jacobs 1999). The Genovese, Gambino, Colombo, and Lucchese families made millions from a monopoly over window replacement in all public housing and much private housing in New York City.

Gambino family boss Paul Castellano owned Dial Meat Purveyors, which distributed poultry to 300 butchers, grocers, and supermarkets in the New York City metropolitan area and, ultimately, to two national supermarket chains (Maas 1997). Chicken magnate Frank Perdue found that getting supermarkets to purchase his chickens required paying off Castellano (PCOC 1986a; O’Brien and Kurins 1991; Maas 1997). Small butchers could not obtain poultry from anyone other than Dial (Maas 1997). If a business complained, Castellano orchestrated union problems.

Control over a union allowed Cosa Nostra to determine which companies could do business in a sector whose workers that union represented. The cartels allocated contracts and fixed prices. The cartels’ members inflated prices, in effect imposing a “cartel tax” or “mob tax” on consumers (Jacobs and Hortis 1998). Businesses that were not members could neither get union labor nor operate with nonunion labor. A business that tried to operate with nonunion labor would be picketed, disrupted, and ultimately shut down.

In the “commission case,” United States v. Salerno, federal prosecutors proved that four of New York City’s five Cosa Nostra crime families controlled a concrete contractors cartel. S&A Concrete, owned in part by Anthony Salerno (“front” boss² of the Genovese family) and Paul Castellano (boss of the Gambino family), was the only company permitted to bid on poured concrete contracts in excess of $5 million (Jacobs, Panarella, and Worthington 1994). The cartel assigned middle-sized contracts (i.e., $2–$5 million) to one of a half-dozen contractors in which Cosa Nostra families held interests. Other companies could bid on and carry out smaller contracts, as long as they kicked back 2 percent of the contract price to the Colombo family (United States v. Salerno). The Cosa Nostra families also had a monopoly over concrete manufacturing in New York City, owning the only two plants in that business. These companies were forfeited to the government in the prosecution of Cosa Nostra front man Edward Halloran, who was subsequently assassinated by his former sponsors.

Cosa Nostra exerted similar influence in the New York City drywall industry through Vincent DiNapoli, a Genovese capo. Through its control of the Carpenters Union, the Genovese family held ownership interests in several drywall contractors and ran the Metropolitan New York Drywall Contractors Association (Jacobs 1999). Much like its concrete counterpart, the drywall cartel allocated bids and took 2 percent of contracts as a kickback. Firms that were not members of DiNapoli’s cartel paid an additional $1,000 per week to ensure labor peace. The association’s district council was placed under a federal trusteeship in 1990, but Cosa Nostra’s control of the union was not broken (Jacobs 1999). The government brought a new round of charges against the union’s leadership in 2010.

For at least two decades, two powerful Cosa Nostra–sponsored cartels allocated contracts and fixed prices in the New York City and Long Island waste hauling industry (Jacobs and Hortis 1998; Cowan and Century 2002). Peter Reuter (1993) explains that these cartels operated smoothly because a Cosa Nostra member sat on the grievance committee of the employers’ association, the New York Trade Waste Association. Consequently, no carting company ever refused to accept the committee’s resolution of a dispute over “ownership” of routes and customers (Jacobs 1999). Similar waste hauling cartels operated in Chicago, Los Angeles, Philadelphia, Long Island, and many other northeastern and Midwest cities and counties (Russo 2001).

The Chicago family’s Murray Humphries parlayed his control of unions into a dry cleaning and laundry empire. He also achieved a monopoly on supplying ice to Las Vegas casinos (Russo 2006).

Brothers Thomas and Joseph Gambino gained control of New York City’s garment district through their domination of International Ladies Garment Workers Union Local 102 (Jacobs 1999) and ownership of several trucking companies. Thomas Gambino (a capo in the Gambino family) amassed a $100 million fortune, mostly through ownership of trucking companies operating in the garment center. In 1981, the garment industry honored Gambino as its Man of the Year. The Lucchese family operated similar schemes in painting and window replacement.

Cosa Nostra members and associates owned and invested in myriad other businesses, particularly nightclubs and restaurants. In the mid-twentieth century, Stefano Magaddino, boss of the Buffalo family, owned the Magaddino Funeral Parlor, the Camellia Linen Supply Co., and Pandoro Exterminators, Inc. Wall Street Journal investigative journalist Jonathan Kwitny (1979) documented Cosa Nostra’s ownership or control of meat and cheese processing firms in New York City.

A. Gambling

Gambling has always been an important source of revenue for Cosa Nostra families. The 1967 President’s Commission’s Task Force on Organized Crime identified gambling as Cosa Nostra’s main moneymaker. The 1985 President’s Commission on Organized Crime (PCOC) focused much of its attention on Cosa Nostra’s gambling operations. FBI agent Frank Storey Jr. told the later commission that by a conservative estimate (for which he did not provide a source) more than half of Cosa Nostra revenues came from gambling (PCOC 1985, p. 57).

The Cosa Nostra families thrived on bookmaking for numbers, horse races, and sporting events (Liddick 1998). Some of the midcentury titans of organized crime, such as Frank Costello, became rich via slot machines and other gambling rackets. The PCOC (1985) concluded that sports betting provided the largest proportion of gambling revenue, but they presented no reliable data, nor are any likely to become available.

Las Vegas’s development as a gambling mecca is a critical chapter in Cosa Nostra’s history. With financial backing from Meyer Lansky, Frank Costello, Bugsy Siegel, and other Cosa Nostra figures projected its influence in Las Vegas just as they had previously done in Havana (Colhoun 2013). With organized crime financing, Siegel built the Flamingo, the first huge Las Vegas casino hotel. Over time, Cosa Nostra bosses obtained ownership interests in many Las Vegas hotels and casinos (Skolnick 1978). At one point, the Teamsters Central States Pension lent approximately a quarter of a billion dollars secured by mortgages on those properties (PCOC 1985). Even more important than mob ownership of the casinos was control over their operation. This enabled the Cosa Nostra bosses to skim money, thereby avoiding taxes (Skolnick 1978; PCOC 1983). In 1986, with the aid of testimony from Angelo Lonardo, Cleveland underboss turned government witness, federal prosecutors convicted a number of those involved in skimming (e.g., United States v. Spinale).

The PCOC explained that the Outfit, which controlled gambling in Chicago, imposed a 50 percent tax on bookmakers. The Outfit supplied wire rooms, clerks, and telephones. The bookmaker had to attract his own clients. Government telephone intercepts exposed a Milwaukee-based sports bookmaking operation headed by Frank Balistrieri (boss), Steve DiSalvo (underboss), and Balistrieri’s sons (PCOC 1985). “Writers” answered phones and dealt with customers.

Cosa Nostra members also profited by fixing sports contests that made their bets a sure thing. Cosa Nostra families fixed boxing and jai alai matches and dog and horse racing. It is easier to fix contests in individual sports where just one contestant has to be corrupted, but team sport contests could also be fixed. The notorious Boston College basketball fix began with a small-time bookie, Tony Perla, who was friendly with Rick Kuhn, a member of the Boston College basketball team. Perla bribed Kuhn to keep Boston College’s margins of victory within the point spread. In order to increase profits, Perla needed a multicity bookmaking network. This led him to the Lucchese family. Ultimately, the Luccheses paid Kuhn and one other player $2,500 (and drugs) per game (PCOC 1985).

The PCOC reported that Cosa Nostra placed illegal gambling devices in restaurants, clubs, and stores and shared revenue with those businesses. If a player won, the business paid out. Cosa Nostra members picked up its share of the profits on a weekly basis.

B. Loan-Sharking

Loan-sharking, which involves usurious loans backed up by intimidation and threats of force to obtain repayment, has been a Cosa Nostra mainstay (Goldstock and Coenen 1978). Organized crime members loaned money to their own associates, gamblers, and individuals who could not or would not obtain bank loans (Kenney and Finckenauer 1995). Estimates of interest rates range as high as 250 to 1,000 percent per annum (Kenney and Finckenauer 1995).

One of the predicate racketeering offenses charged in the 1986 commission case (United States v. Salerno) was conspiracy to allocate loan-sharking territories on Long Island. The indictment charged the defendants facilitated loan-sharking by resolving a territorial dispute between the Lucchese and Gambino crime families (Jacobs, Panarella, and Worthington 1994). Gambino family boss John Gotti was convicted of loan-sharking, among other offenses (United States v. Gotti, aff’d, United States v. Locascio).

In United States v. DiSalvo, federal prosecutors in Philadelphia convicted two Scarfo family associates of loan-sharking offenses. Former underboss Philip Leonetti, testifying as a cooperating witness, described how intrafamily lending worked. When Scarfo became boss, he agreed temporarily to exempt DiSalvo’s loan-sharking operations from having to kick back to him. However, when Scarfo assisted DiSalvo in collecting on a $200,000 loan, DiSalvo was required to share the money with Scarfo.

Loan-sharking continued into the twenty-first century. In 2009, the New York Police Department arrested 22 Lucchese and Gambino members and associates for loan-sharking and sports gambling. However, it seems likely that the vast expansion of consumer credit options in the last several decades diminished Cosa Nostra’s loan-sharking business. Bank of America launched the first bank credit card, which eventually became Visa, in the mid-1950s, American Express followed in 1959, and Mastercard in the mid-1960s. More than 80 percent of American households have at least one credit card.

C. Prostitution and Pornography

In 1936, Lucky Luciano and several codefendants, targeted by investigators for their efforts to centralize control of New York City brothels, were successfully prosecuted for 62 counts of compulsory prostitution (Block 1983). Governor Thomas Dewey granted Luciano clemency in exchange for his assistance in keeping East Coast ports free of labor unrest during World War II (Kenney and Finckenauer 1995). Beginning in the 1960s, the sexual revolution likely reduced the demand for paid sex. In any case, by the 1970s and 1980s the Cosa Nostra families had largely ceased to operate brothels, although some organized crime figures continued to extort protection payoffs from independent brothel owners (Abadinsky 1994).

Historically, Cosa Nostra members actively trafficked in pornography. According to the FBI, Cosa Nostra families controlled the pornography industry through threats and use of force. In the 1960s, the Colombo family ran coin-operated machines showing 8-millimeter pornography films in New York’s then seedy Times Square. In the 1970s, Matthew Ianniello, boss of the Genovese family, amassed an empire of topless bars, porn shops, and sex shows centered in Times Square (Raab 2005). A mobster affiliated with the Colombo family financed the breakout 1972 porn movie Deep Throat. The Bonanno family’s Mickey Zaffarano owned Pussycat Cinemas, a chain of movie theaters that specialized in porn. In 1980, a two-and-a-half-year FBI investigation resulted in 45 pornography indictments that included Cosa Nostra figures. A 2002 indictment charged the Chicago Outfit with extorting payments from adult entertainment businesses (United States v. Calabrese).

In recent years, the availability of so much explicit sexual material in print, films, and over the internet has likely diminished Cosa Nostra’s role in the pornography market. However, that does not mean that entrepreneurial mobsters haven’t found ways to continue to profit. In 2005, prosecutors charged Gambino family members with fraud for offering free tours of adult websites and then extravagantly billing customers’ credit cards. The Gambinos, as individuals, invested profits in a phone company, bank, and more than 64 shell companies and foreign bank accounts.

D. Drug Trafficking

Italian American organized crime figures have been heavily involved in drug trafficking since the early twentieth century (Hortis 2014). For example, Lucky Luciano was arrested for transporting heroin (Kenney and Finckenauer 1995). Vito Genovese, “boss of bosses” in the late 1950s, was ultimately convicted of drug trafficking (Hanna 1974). The infamous “French Connection” case revealed Lucchese family dominance and Bonanno family involvement in importing heroin from France to New York City in the 1950s. In the 1980s, prosecutors proved extensive Bonanno family drug trafficking in United States v. Badalamenti (known as the “pizza connection” case because several defendants used pizzerias as fronts). The federal government exposed an international drug-trafficking network, with over 200 participants, coordinated primarily by the Bonanno family and a Sicilian Mafia group (Jacobs, Panarella, and Worthington 1994).

Some Cosa Nostra members (and the fictional Don Corleone in the 1972 Godfather movie) claimed to oppose drug trafficking for moral reasons and because of the risk of provoking law enforcement crackdowns (Bonanno and Lalli 1983; Maas 1997). If such a no-drugs edict existed, it was routinely violated (Jacobs, Panarella, and Worthington 1994; Hortis 2014). Gambino family boss Paul Castellano allegedly prohibited members of his family from participating in drug trafficking, but demanded a cut of Sonny Black Napolitano’s (Bonanno family) heroin business in exchange for supporting Napolitano in the Bonanno intrafamily conflict (Bonavolonta and Duffy 1996). In addition, the Gambino family’s capos and soldiers were heavily involved. Castellano’s inconsistent drug policy is one reason John Gotti arranged his assassination in 1985 (Bonavolonta and Duffy 1996).

Many members of the Genovese family have been convicted of drug trafficking offenses (Peterson 1983). Alphonse D’Arco, cooperating with the government, testified that he did not directly sell drugs while serving as acting Lucchese family boss but that subordinates did (United States v. Avellino). Angelo Bruno, head of the Philadelphia crime family, adopted a similarly hypocritical approach (Fresolone and Wagman 1994). While many Cosa Nostra individuals and crews participated in drug trafficking, they could not dominate the market. There are just too many traffickers, some as violent and ruthless as Cosa Nostra.

E. Thefts and Frauds

Cosa Nostra families did not and do not limit themselves to activities stereotypically associated with organized crime. They also sponsor and engage in garden-variety crimes.

F. Violence

Cosa Nostra’s power derives from its reputation for ruthless violence. Peter Reuter (1987) explains that Cosa Nostra members rely on and exploit Cosa Nostra’s violent reputation. However, “because organized crime figures have a reputation for being able to execute threats of violence … and to suppress the course of justice when complaints are brought against them means that actual violence is rarely necessary” (Reuter 1985, p. 56). This explains why Cosa Nostra members signal their family ties through dress and comportment (Gambetta 2009).

By far, most Cosa Nostra murder victims have themselves been Cosa Nostra members and associates. In his testimony against Gambino family boss John Gotti, Sammy Gravano explained that murder is employed as a tool for maintaining family discipline (Jacobs, Panarella, and Worthington 1994). Gravano admitted to participating in 19 murders. Gotti was convicted of murdering Paul Castellano and several of Castellano’s henchmen. Defendants in the commission case, United States v. Salerno, were convicted of ordering the murder of Carmine Galante (Bonanno family boss) and two of his associates. The discovery of the remains of two murdered mob members below the Arista windows factory in Brooklyn (owned by Pete Savino, the leader of the Cosa Nostra window replacement scam) enabled the government to recruit Savino as a cooperating witness (Bonavolonta and Duffy 1996).

In Cosa Nostra’s long history there are practically no examples of violence against police, prosecutors, judges, or jurors, which is not uncommon in Italy. It is puzzling why the extraordinary post-1970s government campaign against Cosa Nostra did not degenerate into the kind of violent conflict between gangsters and law enforcement agents that occurs in Mexico, Central and South America, and elsewhere. Investigators and prosecutors say that Cosa Nostra feared all-out repression would result from assassinating government personnel or jurors. Perhaps, but since the mid-1970s, the FBI and the DOJ have engaged in all-out suppression of Cosa Nostra, albeit using legal strategies, not assassinations (Jacobs, Panarella, and Worthington 1994). It does not seem likely that federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies would have engaged in a campaign of assassinations against Cosa Nostra even if Cosa Nostra had targeted law enforcement, prosecutors, court personnel, and jurors.

A. Early Days of Organized Crime Control

J. Edgar Hoover became director of the Bureau of Investigation, the FBI’s predecessor, in 1924 and became first director of the FBI in 1935. He remained director until his death in 1972. During that long period, communists and other “subversives” were his top priority. Hoover denied the existence of nationwide organized crime, arguing that city police and county prosecutors were responsible for investigating local criminal groups. The FBI decimated communist and left-wing involvement in the fledgling labor movement but left organized crime’s labor racketeering untouched. Cosa Nostra bribery and intimidation neutralized local law enforcement.

Congressional attention to organized crime dates to 1950, when a Special Senate Committee, chaired by Tennessee Senator Estes Kefauver, exposed ties between organized crime and local government in several US cities (Kefauver 1951). Unfortunately, there was no follow-up. In 1956, Arkansas Senator John McClellan initiated hearings for the Senate Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field that extended for 15 years (McClellan 1962). During Robert F. Kennedy’s tenure as that committee’s chief counsel, he engaged in acrimonious exchanges with IBT President Jimmy Hoffa (Kennedy 1960).

In 1957, a New York State police officer in rural Apalachin, New York, stumbled on what appeared to be a nationwide conclave of mob bosses. After Apalachin, an embarrassed Hoover launched the “Top Hoodlum Program,” consisting of extensive intelligence gathering (electronic eavesdropping) on Cosa Nostra families around the country. However, the fruits of wiretaps and bugs were not admissible in federal court until 1968, when Congress authorized judicial supervision of electronic surveillance. When, in 1961, Robert Kennedy became attorney general, he revitalized the DOJ’s Organized Crime and Racketeering Section. In 1964, federal prosecutors convicted IBT President Jimmy Hoffa of jury tampering, attempted bribery, and fraud. However, the DOJ’s organized crime control effort withered after Kennedy’s resignation in summer 1964. His successor, Ramsay Clark, was a critic of electronic surveillance.

B. Organized Crime Control Laws

In 1968, Congress authorized federal law enforcement agencies to conduct electronic surveillance subject to judicial supervision. The 1970, the RICO Act enabled law enforcement agents and prosecutors to target entire crime families and the New York families’ commission, such as it was. Under RICO, defendants faced the prospect of lifetime imprisonment. The 1970 Witness Security Program enabled crime members to survive if they chose to cooperate with the government.

A. FBI Top Priority

Italian American organized crime became the FBI’s number one priority after the death of J. Edgar Hoover and the presidential election of Richard Nixon (Nash 1972; Schlesinger 1978; Powers 1986). Initially, the strategy focused on disrupting Cosa Nostra’s gambling operations. But the gambling investigations and prosecutions were not notably successful. Prosecutions faltered, but even when they were successful, sentences were light. Juries and judges did not see mostly low-level gambling figures as a serious threat to American society (US General Accounting Office 1976). Former IBT President Jimmy Hoffa’s 1975 disappearance and death touched off a major investigation of the relationship between the Teamsters and organized crime.

The FBI promoted its attack on labor racketeering to the top of its organized crime control agenda. The Miami Organized Crime Strike Force’s Operation UNIRAC (for union racketeering) targeted organized crime’s influence in the International Longshoremen’s Association. Eventually, the investigation expanded across the whole East Coast; more than a hundred individuals, including labor and Cosa Nostra leaders, were convicted of embezzlement, taking kickbacks, and other offenses. Operation BRILAB (for bribery/labor) resulted in bribery, corruption, and racketeering convictions of New Orleans Cosa Nostra boss Carlos Marcello, other organized crime members and associates, and Louisiana politicians. The Operation PENDORF (for penetration of Allen Dorfman) investigation, focusing on Cosa Nostra’s corruption of Teamsters Central States Pension and Welfare Fund, resulted in convictions of Teamsters President Roy Williams and Cosa Nostra figures in Chicago, Milwaukee, Cleveland, Las Vegas, and Kansas City (Jacobs, Panarella, and Worthington 1994).

B. Donnie Brasco

The undercover infiltration of the Bonanno, and to a lesser extent the Colombo, families in 1976–82 by FBI agent Joe Pistone (aka “Donnie Brasco”) provided invaluable information that led to the conviction of more than 100 Cosa Nostra members and associates (Pistone and Woodley 1987; Bonavolonta and Duffy 1996). Posing as a jewel thief and burglar, Pistone made contact with organized crime members and associates at bars and restaurants. That the FBI would attempt to place an undercover agent inside a Cosa Nostra family reveals how committed, confident, and creative the agency had become since the days when undercover operations were prohibited (Nash 1972; Schlesinger 1978). Pistone was eventually befriended by a Bonanno soldier whom he cut in on a number of apparent jewel thefts. He eventually became a full-fledged Bonanno family associate. After his undercover operation ended, he testified in dozens of Cosa Nostra trials, including the commission case, United States v. Salerno. His infiltration of the Bonanno family resulted in that family’s expulsion from the New York City commission (DeStefano 2006). His undercover work generated a mountain of intelligence material that supported other indictments in Milwaukee and Tampa (Bonavolonta and Duffy 1996).

C. Department of Justice’s Initiatives

In 1967, the US DOJ established Organized Crime Strike Forces in 14 cities (Ryan 1994). Comprised of prosecutors and investigators, the strike forces reported to the Organized Crime and Racketeering Section at the DOJ headquarters in Washington, DC, not to the US Attorneys in the strike forces’ jurisdictions. They played an important role in bringing federal, state, and local agencies together in well-designed and well-executed investigations. According to supporters, the strike force prosecutors developed specialized expertise, achieved close working relationships with state and local law enforcement agencies, and stayed in their jobs longer than other federal prosecutors (Jacobs, Panarella, and Worthington 1994). However, many US attorneys resented the strike forces’ independence. When Richard Thornburgh, a former US Attorney and a strike force opponent, became US Attorney General in 1988, he disbanded the strike forces, transferring their mission and personnel back to the US Attorneys (Jacobs, Panarella, and Worthington 1994). In 2010, the DOJ’s Organized Crime and Racketeering Section merged with the Gang Unit and the National Gang Targeting, Enforcement and Coordination Center to become the Organized Crime and Gang Section within the Criminal Division. In the last decade, the Organized Crime and Gang Section has targeted diverse organize crime groups, not only or primarily Cosa Nostra.

D. Federal, State, and Local Law Enforcement Cooperation

In 1970, President Richard Nixon established the National Council on Organized Crime and tasked it with formulating a strategy to eliminate organized crime. The council, composed of representatives of all federal agencies whose work or responsibilities touch on organized crime, mainly addressed the rivalries that undermine interagency cooperation; it did not formulate an organized crime control strategy. The Executive Working Group for Federal-State-Local Prosecutorial Relations, established in 1980, was another attempt to coordinate efforts.

Informal multiagency agreements supplemented and reinforced formal coordinating efforts (Jacobs, Panarella, and Worthington 1994). For example, the FBI and the New York City Police Department effectively cooperated in numerous organized crime investigations. Former FBI organized crime supervisor Jules Bonavolonta estimates that the New York City FBI office’s organized crime division by the mid-1980s had 350 agents, supplemented by more than 100 police officers (Bonavolonta and Duffy 1996). This formidable task force supported round-the-clock investigations, particularly labor-intensive electronic surveillance, of the five Cosa Nostra crime families (Jacobs, Panarella, and Worthington 1994).

E. Political Support from Washington

The federal focus on Cosa Nostra waned after Robert Kennedy resigned his position as attorney general in 1964. His successor, Ramsey Clark, President Lyndon Johnson’s attorney general, viewed electronic eavesdropping as a threat to civil liberties. The Nixon administration revitalized the attack on Cosa Nostra; it reached its pinnacle during Ronald Reagan’s presidency. Due to his involvement with the Cosa Nostra–influenced International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, President Ronald Reagan was aware of Cosa Nostra’s labor racketeering. He appointed the PCOC, which, from 1983 to 1987, issued 12 reports documenting Cosa Nostra’s organization, drug trafficking, gambling, and labor racketeering (PCOC 1983, 1985, 1986a, 1986b). It recommended that the DOJ bring a civil RICO suit against the International Brotherhood of Teamsters with the goal of court appointment of a trustee charged to purge the union.

The US Senate’s Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, under the leadership of Georgia Senator Sam Nunn, kept the spotlight on organized crime. The subcommittee held hearings on Cosa Nostra’s role in illicit rackets and in the legitimate economy (US Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations 1981, 1983; Jacobs and Mullin 2003). Cosa Nostra defectors and other witnesses testified about Cosa Nostra’s structure and operations.

F. State and Local Law Enforcement and Regulatory Initiatives

State and local law enforcement also contributed to the decimation of Cosa Nostra. The New York State Organized Crime Task Force, led by Ronald Goldstock, was particularly creative in the 1980s (Goldstock 1989). In 1983, the task force placed a listening device in Lucchese family boss Anthony Corallo’s car. Over the course of 6 months, it intercepted incriminating conversations that led to the successful prosecution of Corallo, underboss Salvatore Santoro, and several others (Bonavolonta and Duffy 1996). It also provided evidence for the civil RICO suit that put an end to Cosa Nostra’s Long Island waste hauling cartel (Abadinsky 1994). Goldstock encouraged use of civil remedies to purge Cosa Nostra from mob-influenced industries (Goldstock, n.d.; Jacobs 1999). He and his chief assistant, Martin Marcus, drafted and successfully promoted a “little-RICO law” in New York State (Jacobs 1999). Many other states followed suit. Besides purging the Gambino family from garment center trucking, its power base, Manhattan District Attorney Robert Morgenthau brought important cases against Cosa Nostra–controlled cartels of painting and window replacement (Jacobs 1999).

As New York City mayor (1994–2001), Rudy Giuliani continued the campaign against organized crime that he had aggressively waged as US Attorney. He launched an administrative strategy to continue purging organized crime from the city’s economy. He required wholesalers at the Fulton Fish Market, which had been dominated by organized crime since the 1930s, to apply for city licenses; companies with organized crime ties were denied licenses (Jacobs and Hortis 1998). The Cosa Nostra–dominated organization that ran and profited from the annual Feast of San Gennaro street fair in Little Italy was replaced by an untainted organization and the Roman Catholic Archdiocese (Jacobs 1999). New York City’s School Construction Authority used much the same strategy to deny contracts to construction contractors with organized crime ties.

In June 1996, the New York City Council, at Giuliani’s urging, created the Trade Waste Commission (TWC) to use a licensing strategy to eliminate Cosa Nostra’s domination of waste hauling (Jacobs and Hortis 1998). The TWC hired executive officers, attorneys, monitors, and police detectives with experience in organized crime investigations and prosecutions (Jacobs and Hortis 1998). It denied waste hauling licenses to companies operated by individuals in any way connected with the organized-crime-dominated waste hauling cartel (Jacobs and Hortis 1998). The TWC also set maximum rates and regulated the duration of waste hauling contracts. National waste-hauling companies began operating in New York City for the first time (Raab 1998a).

In 2001, the city merged the TWC and the Gambling Commission into an Organized Crime Control Commission and, a year later, into a general-jurisdiction Business Integrity Commission, with a mandate “to eliminate organized crime and other forms of corruption from the public wholesale markets, the trade waste and shipboard gambling industries.” The Business Integrity Commission’s goals are “to ensure that the regulated businesses are able to compete fairly; that the marketplaces remain free from violence, fraud, rackets and threats; that customers receive fair treatment; and that regulated businesses … conduct their affairs with honesty and integrity.”⁴

A. Legalization of Gambling

For decades, the Cosa Nostra crime families benefited from legal prohibition of most forms of gambling, much as they had in the early twentieth century from national alcohol prohibition. They ran urban numbers games, sports betting, and local casinos and controlled the wire services that carried the results of horse racing and dominated local bookies. Cosa Nostra’s legitimate and illegitimate gambling interests in Havana and Las Vegas generated vast revenue.

This gambling near-monopoly imploded. Lotteries are run by 47 jurisdictions: 44 states plus the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the US Virgin Islands. The Supreme Court’s decision in California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987), overturned prohibition of gambling on Native American territories. Congress responded by passing the 1988 Indian Gaming Regulatory Act; it expanded the kinds of games that tribal casinos can offer and provided a framework for regulating the industry. The act established the National Indian Gaming Commission and divided Indian gaming into three classes. Class I encompasses charitable and social gaming with nominal prizes; Class II includes bingo and other punch-board/pull-tab style games; and Class III includes high-stakes bingo, casinos, slot machines, and other commercial gaming.

In 1996, there were 184 tribes operating 281 gaming facilities in 24 states. After expenses, this amounted to $1.9 billion in net income, $1.6 billion of which went straight to the tribes. By 2007, the tribal gaming industry had become a $25 billion industry; there were 350 tribal casinos in 28 states.

In May 2018, the Supreme Court struck down a federal law that prevented states other than Nevada from authorizing sports betting (Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Association). That ruling means that individuals will be able to legally bet online on amateur and professional sports. Cosa Nostra members will probably not be wiped out since their bettors can more easily avoid taxes on winnings, but the legalization will take a large bite out of their sports gambling operations. Video poker machines are legal in Native American casinos. Online video poker betting is legal when played at licensed foreign casinos. Many foreign casinos welcome US players and offer secure, high-quality online video poker. Cosa Nostra members have an ownership interest in some legal gambling operations, but competition is fierce.

Despite the radically changed gambling business, Cosa Nostra families still profit from gambling operations (Trends in Organized Crime1997). State v. Taccetta exposed Cosa Nostra’s placement of Joker Poker video slot machines in New Jersey bars, restaurants, and other businesses. The Lucchese and Bruno-Scarfo crime families shared the revenue with the business owners and extorted the manufacturer. The 2002 indictment in United States v Calabrese alleged that several Chicago Outfit crews dominated video device gambling and sports gambling in Chicago suburbs and threatened and used violence to collect gambling debts.

B. Competitive Drug Markets

Cosa Nostra never had a monopoly or near-monopoly on drug importation and distribution, but in some places and times individual mobsters and their crews were major importers and wholesalers. Today, competitors can block opportunities that Cosa Nostra members covet and cooperate with government in investigation and prosecution of Cosa Nostra members (Reuter 1995). In states where marijuana is legal, Cosa Nostra’s opportunity to profit from trafficking in the drug is much diminished.

C. Decline of Private Sector Unions

Much of Cosa Nostra’s power derived from its influence in labor unions, but private sector labor unions have been on the decline for decades. In the mid-1950s, about 35 percent of US workers belonged to a union. In recent years, only 6.5 percent of private sector workers have been union members. The DOJ has used criminal and civil remedies to eliminate Cosa Nostra’s presence and curb its influence in the big four unions in which it was ensconced for decades. Thus, labor racketeering opportunities are diminished. Jointly managed union pension and welfare funds are much better insulated from organized crime influence.

D. Italian Assimilation

Fifty years ago most big US cities had well-recognized working class Italian neighborhoods, often called Little Italy, where Cosa Nostra members maintained physical presence and exerted influence. They hired teenage boys, some of them Italian immigrants, for odd jobs and recruited the most promising into their operations. These neighborhoods have dramatically shrunken as Italian Americans have steadily assimilated into mainstream society, thereby radically diminishing the pool of tough teenagers with Cosa Nostra potential.

E. Criminal Prosecutions

There is no exact figure on the number of federal, state, and local criminal organized crime prosecutions over the past 40 years, but the number certainly exceeds 1,000. According to David Williams, director of the US Government Accounting Office’s Office of Special Investigations, between 1983 and 1986 there were 2,500 indictments of Cosa Nostra members and associates (this does not mean 2,500 separate individuals). In 1988, FBI director William Sessions reported to the Senate Subcommittee on Investigations that federal prosecutors had since 1981 convicted 19 bosses, 13 underbosses, and 43 capos (Jacobs, Panarella, and Worthington 1994; US Senate Permanent Subcommittee 1988). Federal prosecutions, plus some state and local prosecutions, systematically decimated whole organized crime families. The incomplete list in Table 1 of Cosa Nostra bosses and acting bosses convicted since 1980 illuminates the results.

The FBI’s and the DOJ’s priorities radically changed after the September 11, 2001, al-Qaeda attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon. The FBI shifted 2,000 agents from criminal investigations to counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and cybersecurity.

The successful law enforcement attack on Cosa Nostra in the 1980s and 1990s meant that there was less need, going forward, to devote so many resources to organized crime (Raab 1998b). The DOJ’s organized crime control priority changed from Cosa Nostra to international organized crime groups. In April 2008, Attorney General Michael Mukasey announced a Law Enforcement Strategy to Combat International Organized Crime (IOC) “in order to address the growing threat to US security and stability posed by international organized crime groups.” The strategy aims “to identify priority IOC groups and individuals for concerted, high-impact law enforcement action by domestic and international agencies to significantly disrupt and dismantle those targets” (US Department of Justice 2008). In November 2008, the DOJ’s Organized Crime and Racketeering Section distributed the first Top International Criminal Organization Targets List to federal investigators and prosecutors. It also organized a special task force to break up MS-13, a Central American gang with a presence on both the West and East Coasts. United States v. Dany Freedy Ramos Mejia et al. (2007) involved charges against 50 MS-13 members, and United States v. Manuel de Jesus Ayala et al. (2008) charges against 26 MS-13 members.

Despite the reduction in resources aimed at Cosa Nostra, investigations and prosecutions continued into the twenty-first century. In 2004, the FBI arrested 27 Bonanno family members who were charged with racketeering, murders, attempted murders, and conspiracy to murder. That same year, 22 Genovese members and associates were charged with racketeering, extortion, fraud, and tax evasion related to bid rigging and price fixing in the New York City drywall industry.

In January 2011, a joint task force involving 800 federal, state, and local law enforcement officers arrested more than 120 defendants, including dozens of Cosa Nostra members. The defendants were charged by grand juries in New York, New Jersey, and Rhode Island with numerous violent and illegal acts—from murder and narcotics trafficking to extortion, illegal gambling, arson, loan-sharking, and labor racketeering. US Attorney General Eric Holder said:

F. Cosa Nostra Dysfunction

The decades-long federal campaign against Cosa Nostra coincided with and no doubt reinforced Cosa Nostra’s internal deterioration, most strongly evidenced by the number of its members who served as cooperating witnesses in exchange for leniency and protection. The breakdown of omerta in the 1980s and 1990s is attributable to more powerful and effective law enforcement and the possibility that defecting members will survive in the Witness Security Program. The current generation of members and associates may have less loyalty to the Cosa Nostra (Demaris 1980; Goldstock 1989).

Several families experienced violent conflict over leadership succession. The Persico and Orena factions’ battle for control of the Colombo family (described in United States v. Orena) and bloody internecine conflicts in the Bonanno family following Carmine Galante’s assassination are examples. Following Nicodemo Scarfo’s incarceration, Philadelphia’s Bruno-Scarfo family was wracked by intrafamily warfare (United States v. Stanfa).

G. Purging Cosa Nostra from the Legitimate Economy

The federal government, using criminal and civil forfeiture laws, has taken possession of forfeited Cosa Nostra businesses, including restaurants and a concrete manufacturing plant. The New York City poured concrete contractors and waste hauling company cartels no longer exist. The Fulton Fish Market has been moved to the Bronx and purged of mob influence. Cosa Nostra’s presence at the Javits Exhibition Center has been eliminated. Organized crime has been purged from some union locals. Even those locals that have stubbornly resisted reform are far less easily dominated than they were decades ago.

H. A Caution

Cosa Nostra’s involvement in the legitimate economy, black markets, and crimes like theft, extortion, and fraud significantly diminished in the first two decades of the twenty-first century, and economic and legal changes have reduced traditional targets and illicit opportunities. Cosa Nostra’s resilience for more than a century nonetheless cautions against declaring its extinction inevitable.